feat(entry): operator-issued entry + exit plate-swap reconciliation
Two halves of one anti-fraud design.
(A) Operator-issued entry — when the physical entry button is broken, an
operator can issue an entry ticket so a real car isn't blocked out of the lot.
This hands the operator-adversary a mint, so it is:
- PRESENCE-GATED like the physical button: a real car must be present (radar/
loop AND camera busy). Enforced BOTH sides — the server re-checks current
presence so a direct POST can't bypass a disabled button; no presence loop
=> feature unavailable; a no-presence attempt signs an anomaly.
- FLAGGED: vehicle_entry source=manual + operatorInitiated + operator, PLUS a
companion entry.operatorIssued anomaly (the adversary path always leaves a
red-flag row).
- capacity-OVERRIDE allowed but stamped lotFull (a broken button mustn't trap
a legit car).
New session:create permission (migration 0019 -> operator role, admin-
revocable), POST /api/entry/issue (open-shift gated), EntryFlow.
issueForOperator; the fraud-critical print->sign->open->snapshot sequence is
factored into one shared #issueTicket (button + operator). UI: the entry
BarrierLight becomes a clickable issue-control when presence+permission+shift
meet (confirm -> issue).
(B) Exit plate-swap reconciliation — defends the ticket-swap fraud the mint
enables (paid car let out on a fresh $0 ticket, original ticket lingers
"inside", occupancy drifts up by phantom cars). The plate is the invariant:
ExitFlow.#reconcilePlateAtExit compares the exiting plate against all OPEN
sessions' entry plates, EXACT + HIGH-CONFIDENCE only (>=0.85; a fuzzy read never
gates — ANPR is advisory). On a match under a DIFFERENT ticket:
- BOOTH path: returns swap_suspected + signs exit.plateSwapSuspected; the
pay/exit modal shows a red warning + "Override & release" (override signs an
attributed exit.plateSwapOverride). Flag+override, never a silent hard block
(exit fails-open; a plate is never the sole gate).
- READER path (no operator): log-only anomaly + fail-open.
Extended BoothExitResult + /api/exit (override); boothExit client returns a
structured swap result.
Verified: full monorepo build/lint/test green (229 server tests incl. 4 new:
hold-on-swap, override-releases-with-attribution, low-confidence-no-warning,
own-plate-no-warning). New wiki: operator-issued-entry.md +
plate-reconciliation.md; cross-linked from entry-exit-points, capacity-
occupancy, index. Preserves "a plate never OPENS a barrier alone — and now never
TRAPS a car alone either."
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, booth, entry, threat-model, anpr, presence]
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sources: []
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updated: 2026-07-01
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status: settled
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---
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# Operator-issued entry (broken entry button)
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When the physical entry button is broken, an operator can **issue an entry ticket** from the booth so
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a real car isn't blocked out of the lot. This hands the [[threat-model|operator (the adversary)]] a way
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to mint entries — so it is **flagged, presence-gated, and paired with an exit defense**
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([[plate-reconciliation]]). Built 2026-07-01. Companion to [[entry-exit-points]] (the entry flow it
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reuses) and [[capacity-occupancy]].
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## Why give the operator this at all
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An operator *could* mint tickets to defraud — but a broken entry button otherwise **blocks the whole
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lot**, which is worse and more common. So the feature exists, and the fraud it enables is defended
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downstream (see the "ticket-swap" scenario in [[plate-reconciliation]]) rather than by withholding the
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capability.
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## The three controls that make it safe
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### 1. PRESENCE-GATED — a real car must be there (radar AND camera)
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The operator button obeys the **same rule as the physical button**: it is only active when **BOTH**
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presence conditions meet —
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- **radar/loop present** (a presence input is shorted at the entry barrier), AND
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- **camera confirms** a vehicle in the zone (the entry lane is "busy").
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This ties every mint to a **real vehicle physically at the entry** — the operator can't pad occupancy
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with phantom tickets, and (crucially) it guarantees the entry snapshot captures a **plate**, which is
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what [[plate-reconciliation]] reads at exit. **No presence loop configured → the feature is
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unavailable** at that site (we require both; no weaker camera-only fallback).
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**Enforced on BOTH sides.** The UI only enables the entry [[booth-console|BarrierLight]] as a clickable
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issue-control when `radar.entry && lanes.entry` (both true) and the operator holds `session:create`.
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The **server re-checks** current presence (`LaneStatus.snapshot().entry === true` AND the entry relay's
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guard `present === true`) and **refuses** otherwise — so a direct `POST /api/entry/issue` by the
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operator-adversary can't bypass a disabled button. A refused (no-presence) attempt signs an
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`anomaly` (`entry.issue.noPresence`) so probing the endpoint is itself in the tamper-evident record.
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### 2. FLAGGED — every operator mint leaves a red-flag row
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The issued entry is a **real** `vehicle_entry` (so occupancy/tariff/exit all work), but:
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- `source: "manual"` + `operatorInitiated: true` + `operator` on the signed payload, AND
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- a **companion `anomaly`** (`entry.operatorIssued`) — mirroring the [[booth-exit-flow|barrier
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re-open]]: the operator-adversary path always leaves an explicit anomaly for [[reconciliation]].
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### 3. Capacity OVERRIDE is allowed but recorded
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Unlike the physical button (which refuses transient entry when the lot is [[capacity-occupancy|full]]),
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the operator **can** issue over capacity — a broken button mustn't trap a legit car when the count is
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near/at the cap (and the count may itself be inflated by the very fraud this defends). But an over-cap
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mint stamps `lotFull: true` + the occupancy on the events, so the override is visible.
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## Wiring
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- **Permission:** `session:create` (new; migration 0019 grants it to the default `operator` role;
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admin-revocable per role, so an admin can turn off an operator's ability to mint). Admin has it in code.
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- **Route:** `POST /api/entry/issue` — `session:create` + an **open shift** (a minted entry belongs to
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an accountable operator, like the money path).
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- **Server:** `EntryFlow.issueForOperator(operator, cameraBusy)`. The fraud-critical
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print → sign(vehicle_entry) → pulseOpen → snapshot → cache sequence is a **single shared
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`#issueTicket`** used by both the physical button and this path (no divergent copy).
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- **UI:** the entry `BarrierLight` becomes clickable (confirm → issue) only when presence + permission +
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shift are satisfied; the exit light stays a pure indicator.
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## Relates
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- [[plate-reconciliation]] — the exit-side defense against the ticket-swap this capability enables.
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- [[entry-exit-points]] — the entry flow + snapshot/ANPR path reused here.
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- [[capacity-occupancy]] — why occupancy integrity matters (the swap fraud drifts it upward).
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- [[threat-model]] — the operator-adversary framing all three controls serve.
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