feat(roles): roles remember the jobs they follow (re-appliable), every role edit is signed

Closes the permissions-matrix loose ends (venue-modules.md §Permissions matrix):

- `role_jobs` (migration 0029): a role stores the manifest jobs it was composed from
  (chips on at save + any bundle fully present). `jobById` / `jobsBehind` in
  @parking/shared surface a followed job whose bundle grew past the role in a later
  release; the roles list shows a "behind <job>" badge with a one-click "Update to job"
  (the union, nothing removed) and the editor lints it. Never a runtime union: the grid
  stays the explicit enforcement layer and an update never widens a role without a click.
- Every role create/update/delete appends a `config_change` (`role.<id>`, prev/value =
  name + sorted permissions + jobs, operator); a no-op resave signs nothing. roleRoutes
  now takes the ledger.
- booth-supervisor already carries subscription:*; the stale open note is closed.

Tests: routes/roles.test.ts. Wiki: venue-modules status, local-jwt-auth, log.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU

apps/server/src/routes/roles.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { createTestDb } from "@parking/db/testing";
+import { type Db } from "@parking/db";
+import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
+import { jobsBehind } from "@parking/shared";
+import { buildServer } from "../server.js";
+import { login, seedUser } from "../test-helpers.js";
+
+// Roles are data composed from the permission grid (venue-modules.md §Permissions
+// matrix): every edit is SIGNED as a config_change, and a role remembers the manifest
+// JOBS it was built from so a grown job can be surfaced and re-applied.
+
+let db: Db;
+let close: () => void;
+let app: FastifyInstance;
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  delete process.env.MODULES_ENTITLED;
+  const t = createTestDb();
+  db = t.db;
+  close = t.close;
+  app = await buildServer({ db });
+  await app.ready();
+});
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await app.close();
+  close();
+});
+type Auth = { cookie: string; csrf: string };
+const hdrs = (a: Auth) => ({ cookie: a.cookie, "x-csrf-token": a.csrf });
+async function admin(): Promise<Auth> {
+  const { username, password } = await seedUser(db, { username: "boss", roleId: "admin" });
+  return login(app, username, password);
+}
+async function roleChanges(a: Auth) {
+  const r = await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/api/events?limit=100", headers: { cookie: a.cookie } });
+  return (r.json().events as { type: string; payload: Record<string, unknown> }[]).filter(
+    (e) => e.type === "config_change" && String(e.payload.setting).startsWith("role."),
+  );
+}
+
+describe("role edits are signed and jobs are remembered", () => {
+  it("create / update / delete each sign one config_change with prev + value + operator; a no-op resave signs nothing", async () => {
+    const a = await admin();
+    const created = await app.inject({
+      method: "POST", url: "/api/roles", headers: hdrs(a),
+      payload: { name: "Lavazh", permissions: ["carwash:read", "carwash:create", "carwash:update", "carwash:cash"], jobs: ["wash-operator"] },
+    });
+    expect(created.statusCode).toBe(201);
+    const role = created.json();
+    expect(role.jobs).toEqual(["wash-operator"]);
+    let evs = await roleChanges(a);
+    expect(evs).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(evs[0]!.payload).toMatchObject({
+      setting: `role.${role.id}`, prev: null, operator: "boss",
+      value: { name: "Lavazh", jobs: ["wash-operator"] },
+    });
+    expect((evs[0]!.payload.value as { permissions: string[] }).permissions).toEqual(["carwash:cash", "carwash:create", "carwash:read", "carwash:update"]);
+
+    // Same content again → nothing new on the chain.
+    const same = await app.inject({
+      method: "PUT", url: `/api/roles/${role.id}`, headers: hdrs(a),
+      payload: { permissions: ["carwash:read", "carwash:create", "carwash:update", "carwash:cash"], jobs: ["wash-operator"] },
+    });
+    expect(same.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    expect(await roleChanges(a)).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    // A real change: prev is the old shape, value the new.
+    const renamed = await app.inject({ method: "PUT", url: `/api/roles/${role.id}`, headers: hdrs(a), payload: { name: "Lavazh NEW" } });
+    expect(renamed.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    evs = await roleChanges(a);
+    expect(evs).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(evs[0]!.payload).toMatchObject({ prev: { name: "Lavazh" }, value: { name: "Lavazh NEW" } });
+
+    const gone = await app.inject({ method: "DELETE", url: `/api/roles/${role.id}`, headers: hdrs(a) });
+    expect(gone.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    evs = await roleChanges(a);
+    expect(evs).toHaveLength(3);
+    expect(evs[0]!.payload).toMatchObject({ prev: { name: "Lavazh NEW" }, value: null });
+  });
+
+  it("unknown jobs are refused; a role built from a job that later grew reports what it is missing", async () => {
+    const a = await admin();
+    const bad = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/roles", headers: hdrs(a), payload: { name: "X", permissions: [], jobs: ["bar-tender"] } });
+    expect(bad.statusCode).toBe(400);
+    // Compose "behind": the role follows wash-operator but holds only part of today's bundle
+    // — exactly what an older release's chip would have left once the job grew.
+    const r = (await app.inject({
+      method: "POST", url: "/api/roles", headers: hdrs(a),
+      payload: { name: "Old wash", permissions: ["carwash:read", "carwash:create"], jobs: ["wash-operator"] },
+    })).json();
+    const view = (await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/api/roles", headers: { cookie: a.cookie } })).json().roles.find((x: { id: string }) => x.id === r.id);
+    const has = new Set<string>(view.permissions);
+    expect(jobsBehind(view.jobs, (p) => has.has(p))).toEqual([{ job: "wash-operator", missing: ["carwash:update", "carwash:cash"] }]);
+    // Re-apply = the union; then nothing is behind.
+    const fixed = (await app.inject({
+      method: "PUT", url: `/api/roles/${r.id}`, headers: hdrs(a),
+      payload: { permissions: [...has, "carwash:update", "carwash:cash"] },
+    })).json();
+    const has2 = new Set<string>(fixed.permissions);
+    expect(jobsBehind(fixed.jobs, (p) => has2.has(p))).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});

apps/server/src/routes/roles.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
-import { and, eq, isNull, rolePermissions, roles, users, type Db } from "@parking/db";
-import { ADMIN_ROLE_ID, PERMISSIONS, type Permission } from "@parking/shared";
+import { and, eq, isNull, roleJobs, rolePermissions, roles, users, type Db } from "@parking/db";
+import { ADMIN_ROLE_ID, PERMISSIONS, jobById, type Permission } from "@parking/shared";
 import { bumpPermsCache, permissionsFor, requirePermission } from "../auth.js";
+import type { EventLog } from "../event-log.js";
 import { softDelete } from "../recycle-bin.js";
 
 // Role management (admin). Roles are DATA: an admin composes a role from the
@@ -18,14 +19,30 @@ import { softDelete } from "../recycle-bin.js";
 // that grants admin-equivalent powers, and escalate. So a non-admin caller may
 // only put permissions they ALREADY hold onto a role. An admin (full set) is
 // unrestricted, which is the intended behaviour.
+//
+// EVERY role edit is SIGNED on the ledger as a `config_change` (setting `role.<id>`,
+// value/prev = the role's name + permissions + jobs, operator = who) — a role edit is a
+// privilege change, and under this threat model the only setting an admin could alter
+// without a trace. A role also REMEMBERS the manifest JOBS it was composed from
+// (role_jobs) so a later release that grows a job's bundle can be surfaced and
+// re-applied — the grid is never expanded silently (venue-modules.md §Permissions matrix).
 
 interface RoleBody {
   name: string;
   permissions: string[];
+  jobs?: string[];
 }
 interface UpdateBody {
   name?: string;
   permissions?: string[];
+  jobs?: string[];
+}
+
+/** What a signed role change records (before/after). */
+interface RoleShape {
+  name: string;
+  permissions: Permission[];
+  jobs: string[];
 }
 
 const VALID = new Set<string>(PERMISSIONS);
@@ -41,7 +58,19 @@ function cleanPermissions(input: unknown): { ok: true; perms: Permission[] } | {
   return { ok: true, perms: [...out] };
 }
 
-export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
+/** Validate + dedupe a requested job list against the registry's job presets. */
+function cleanJobs(input: unknown): { ok: true; jobs: string[] } | { ok: false; bad: string } {
+  if (input == null) return { ok: true, jobs: [] };
+  if (!Array.isArray(input)) return { ok: false, bad: "jobs must be an array" };
+  const out = new Set<string>();
+  for (const j of input) {
+    if (typeof j !== "string" || !jobById(j)) return { ok: false, bad: `unknown job: ${String(j)}` };
+    out.add(j);
+  }
+  return { ok: true, jobs: [...out] };
+}
+
+export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db, eventLog?: EventLog): Promise<void> {
   const readGuard = requirePermission("role:read");
   const createGuard = requirePermission("role:create");
   const updateGuard = requirePermission("role:update");
@@ -64,10 +93,39 @@ export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
       name: role.name,
       builtin: role.builtin === 1,
       permissions: role.id === ADMIN_ROLE_ID ? [...PERMISSIONS] : perms,
+      jobs: jobsOf(roleId),
       userCount,
     };
   }
 
+  function jobsOf(roleId: string): string[] {
+    return db.select({ jobId: roleJobs.jobId }).from(roleJobs).where(eq(roleJobs.roleId, roleId)).all().map((r) => r.jobId).sort();
+  }
+
+  /** The role as the ledger records it (sorted so two identical shapes compare equal). */
+  function shapeOf(roleId: string): RoleShape | null {
+    const v = roleView(roleId);
+    if (!v) return null;
+    return { name: v.name, permissions: [...v.permissions].sort() as Permission[], jobs: v.jobs };
+  }
+
+  /** Replace a role's remembered jobs. */
+  function setJobs(roleId: string, jobs: string[]): void {
+    db.delete(roleJobs).where(eq(roleJobs.roleId, roleId)).run();
+    for (const jobId of jobs) db.insert(roleJobs).values({ roleId, jobId }).run();
+  }
+
+  /** Sign a role change. `prev` null = created; `value` null = deleted. Skipped when
+   *  nothing changed (a no-op resave leaves no trace, like the site-config flips). */
+  async function signRoleChange(req: { user?: { username?: string } }, roleId: string, prev: RoleShape | null, value: RoleShape | null): Promise<void> {
+    if (JSON.stringify(prev) === JSON.stringify(value)) return;
+    await eventLog?.append({
+      type: "config_change",
+      source: "manual",
+      payload: { setting: `role.${roleId}`, value, prev, operator: req.user?.username ?? "unknown" },
+    });
+  }
+
   /** Replace a role's permission rows with `perms` (in a single pass). */
   function setPermissions(roleId: string, perms: Permission[]): void {
     db.delete(rolePermissions).where(eq(rolePermissions.roleId, roleId)).run();
@@ -104,13 +162,17 @@ export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
     }
     const cleaned = cleanPermissions(req.body?.permissions ?? []);
     if (!cleaned.ok) return reply.code(400).send({ error: cleaned.bad });
+    const jobs = cleanJobs(req.body?.jobs);
+    if (!jobs.ok) return reply.code(400).send({ error: jobs.bad });
     const over = escalates(req.user.roleId, cleaned.perms);
     if (over) return reply.code(403).send({ error: `cannot grant a permission you do not hold: ${over}` });
 
     const id = randomUUID();
     db.insert(roles).values({ id, name, builtin: 0 }).run();
     setPermissions(id, cleaned.perms);
+    setJobs(id, jobs.jobs);
     bumpPermsCache();
+    await signRoleChange(req, id, null, shapeOf(id));
     return reply.code(201).send(roleView(id));
   });
 
@@ -125,6 +187,7 @@ export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
       if (role.builtin === 1) {
         return reply.code(409).send({ error: "the built-in admin role cannot be edited" });
       }
+      const prev = shapeOf(id);
 
       if (req.body?.name != null) {
         const name = req.body.name.trim();
@@ -140,7 +203,13 @@ export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
         if (over) return reply.code(403).send({ error: `cannot grant a permission you do not hold: ${over}` });
         setPermissions(id, cleaned.perms);
       }
+      if (req.body?.jobs != null) {
+        const jobs = cleanJobs(req.body.jobs);
+        if (!jobs.ok) return reply.code(400).send({ error: jobs.bad });
+        setJobs(id, jobs.jobs);
+      }
       bumpPermsCache();
+      await signRoleChange(req, id, prev, shapeOf(id));
       return roleView(id);
     },
   );
@@ -163,8 +232,10 @@ export async function roleRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, db: Db): Promise<void> {
       if (holders > 0) {
         return reply.code(409).send({ error: `cannot delete a role still assigned to ${holders} user(s)` });
       }
+      const prev = shapeOf(id);
       softDelete(db, "role", id, req.user.sub);
       bumpPermsCache();
+      await signRoleChange(req, id, prev, null);
       return { ok: true };
     },
   );

apps/server/src/server.ts

@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
   // RBAC administration: compose roles (role:*) + manage users (user:*). The
   // built-in admin role is protected; the last admin can't be removed. See auth.ts.
   await userRoutes(app, db);
-  await roleRoutes(app, db);
 
   // Vision (ANPR) client — built early so the device monitor can include the vision
   // service's health in the footer, AND so the setup wizard's "Test ANPR" can run a
@@ -144,6 +143,7 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
   // no lane — a parking lot is one pool with a flexible set of entry/exit points.
   // See wiki/concepts/first-run-setup.md, entry-exit-points.md.
   await setupRoutes(app, db, visionClient, eventLog);
+  await roleRoutes(app, db, eventLog);
 
   // Inbound device pushes (e.g. Dingtian Input Link URL → button events),
   // guarded by source-IP allowlist + a shared-secret path token, both read from