feat(roles): roles remember the jobs they follow (re-appliable), every role edit is signed

Closes the permissions-matrix loose ends (venue-modules.md §Permissions matrix):

- `role_jobs` (migration 0029): a role stores the manifest jobs it was composed from
  (chips on at save + any bundle fully present). `jobById` / `jobsBehind` in
  @parking/shared surface a followed job whose bundle grew past the role in a later
  release; the roles list shows a "behind <job>" badge with a one-click "Update to job"
  (the union, nothing removed) and the editor lints it. Never a runtime union: the grid
  stays the explicit enforcement layer and an update never widens a role without a click.
- Every role create/update/delete appends a `config_change` (`role.<id>`, prev/value =
  name + sorted permissions + jobs, operator); a no-op resave signs nothing. roleRoutes
  now takes the ledger.
- booth-supervisor already carries subscription:*; the stale open note is closed.

Tests: routes/roles.test.ts. Wiki: venue-modules status, local-jwt-auth, log.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU

wiki/entities/local-jwt-auth.md

@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ Authentication and authorization, kept **fully local** — a direct consequence
   `bumpPermsCache()`, which user update/delete now call), so REASSIGNING a user's role — or deleting
   the user (→ 401 on their next request) — applies immediately too. Found when a user moved to a new
   wash role kept the old role's rights until logout.
+  **Role edits are signed (2026-09-06):** every create/update/delete of a role appends a
+  `config_change` (`role.<id>`, before/after shape, operator) to the ledger, and a role remembers
+  the manifest JOBS it was composed from (`role_jobs`) so a job that grows in a later release can
+  be re-applied with one click rather than expanding silently — [[venue-modules]] §Permissions
+  matrix.
 - **Protected built-in `admin` role** (`id='admin'`, `builtin=1`): non-editable, non-deletable, and
   always resolves to the FULL permission set in code. The app refuses to delete or downgrade the
   **last user holding admin** — administration can never be locked out of the appliance.