feat(desktop): runtime-configurable backend server address
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The desktop shell is one generic .deb/.AppImage distributed via
mca/public_releases, not built per-booth, but the backend origin was baked
in at build time (VITE_API_BASE, hardcoded to http://127.0.0.1:3000) — the
same installer could never point at a different appliance without a
rebuild.

Adds ConnectScreen (shown before Login in Tauri when no backend is saved),
backed by tauri-plugin-store persisting the operator-entered URL across
restarts. CSP's connect-src tightens to 'self' only — all backend traffic
already routes through tauri-plugin-http/websocket, which run Rust-side
and are outside connect-src's reach anyway — and the real access boundary
moves to capabilities/default.json's http:default scope, wildcarded so an
operator-chosen host is actually reachable. Adds a "Change server" control
in Setup (desktop-only) to repoint an already-configured install.

While tracing the desktop auth path for this: tauri-plugin-http's fetch()
runs through Rust's reqwest, which keeps its own cookie jar separate from
the webview, so document.cookie on tauri://localhost never sees the
parking_csrf cookie the server sets (open upstream bug,
tauri-apps/tauri#13045/#11518). This means the desktop app has likely been
silently sending no CSRF header on every mutation since the shell was
first built — pre-existing, independent of this change. Fixed by having
sessionView() (routes/auth.ts) also echo the CSRF value in the login/me
JSON body; the desktop client stashes it in memory and echoes that instead
of reading document.cookie. assertCsrf() itself is untouched.

Verified end-to-end against a real LAN-bound dev server: login returns a
csrfToken matching the cookie, a mutation using the body-sourced token in
X-CSRF-Token succeeds (200), and the same mutation without it still
correctly 403s.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-04 10:32:03 +02:00
parent 969bf2b191
commit 5c6a21e2c3
21 changed files with 575 additions and 47 deletions
+24
View File
@@ -2817,3 +2817,27 @@ version ("it's offering v0.1.4, so I must be on v0.1.3"). Added DesktopVersionBa
existing server-side VersionBadge in router.tsx, using @tauri-apps/api's getVersion() (the real
running app version, synced to the git tag at build time by release.yml). No-ops in a browser.
Full detail on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].
## [2026-09-04] feat | Desktop backend origin is now runtime-configurable (was build-time)
The desktop shell is one generic .deb/.AppImage distributed via mca/public_releases — not built
per-booth — but VITE_API_BASE was a build-time env var hardcoded to http://127.0.0.1:3000, so the
same installer could only ever talk to a server on its own machine. Added ConnectScreen (shown
before Login in Tauri when no backend is saved), backed by tauri-plugin-store persisting the
operator-entered URL across restarts; origin.ts's API_BASE became a runtime-settable `let`. CSP's
connect-src tightened to 'self' only (all backend traffic already went through
tauri-plugin-http/websocket, which run Rust-side and are outside connect-src's reach anyway); the
real boundary moved to capabilities/default.json's http:default scope, wildcarded to any host so
the operator-chosen address is actually reachable. Added a "Change server" control (Setup nav,
desktop-only) that clears the saved URL and reloads back to ConnectScreen.
While tracing the desktop auth path for this, found a pre-existing (not newly introduced) bug:
tauri-plugin-http's fetch() runs through Rust's reqwest, which keeps its own cookie jar separate
from the webview — document.cookie on tauri://localhost never sees the parking_csrf cookie the
server sets (open upstream bug, tauri-apps/tauri#13045/#11518), so the desktop app has likely been
silently sending no CSRF header on every mutation since the shell was first built, regardless of
which host it targeted. Fixed by having sessionView() (routes/auth.ts) also echo the same csrf
value in the login/me JSON body; the desktop client stashes it in memory and echoes that instead of
reading document.cookie. assertCsrf() itself is untouched — the cookie is still what's verified,
and reqwest was already sending it correctly; this only fixes how the desktop client *learns* the
value. Full detail (including the exact CSP/capability tradeoffs) on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].