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docs(wiki): appliance provisioning runbook — booth unit 1 hardened (LUKS+TPM+SecureBoot+GRUB)
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New wiki/decisions/appliance-provisioning.md: the hardware-verified step-by-step for
provisioning a booth PC (Dell OptiPlex 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM 2.0) from
factory Windows to a hardened Ubuntu 26.04 LTS appliance. Every command was run on the
first real unit (2026-06-23). Captures the firmware-specific gotchas: Ventoy → 0x1A under
Secure Boot (flash ISO directly); the 7070 BIOS can't view db (verify via live USB); the
installer's hardware-backed encryption fails with PCR_UNUSABLE/dbt (use passphrase LUKS +
manual systemd-cryptenroll PCR-7 seal); GRUB password must be edit-only (--unrestricted)
to keep unattended boot.

OS hardening on unit 1 is COMPLETE + verified: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7,
unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock (closes the init=/bin/bash root-shell
hole that PCR-7 sealing does not cover). Resolves the implementation half of
open-questions #12 for unit 1.

Cross-linked from disk-os-hardening; index + log updated. Still TODO on the box: Docker +
run the stack.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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Julian Çuni
2026-06-23 15:53:56 +02:00
parent 8155ff456b
commit 9d65099d9b
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wiki/concepts/disk-os-hardening.md
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@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@ With LUKS in place, **SQLCipher becomes optional** defence-in-depth rather than
layer. (The custom controller adds its own: ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot — see
[[esp32-custom-controller]].)
> **Step-by-step OS install + TPM-seal procedure** (BIOS → encrypted install → manual PCR-7 TPM
> seal, with the Dell-7070-specific `dbt` workaround) lives in [[appliance-provisioning]] — written
> from the first real provisioning (2026-06-23) and verified on hardware. **OS hardening on the first
> unit is COMPLETE: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7, unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB
> edit-lock** (the GRUB password is the specific countermeasure to the `init=/bin/bash` root-shell
> hole that PCR-7 sealing does NOT cover). Resolves the implementation half of [[open-questions]] #12
> for unit 1.
## Deploy-time server configuration (runbook)
Env in `apps/server/.env` on the appliance (see `apps/server/.env.example`). The security-load-bearing ones: