docs(wiki): appliance provisioning runbook — booth unit 1 hardened (LUKS+TPM+SecureBoot+GRUB)

New wiki/decisions/appliance-provisioning.md: the hardware-verified step-by-step for
provisioning a booth PC (Dell OptiPlex 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM 2.0) from
factory Windows to a hardened Ubuntu 26.04 LTS appliance. Every command was run on the
first real unit (2026-06-23). Captures the firmware-specific gotchas: Ventoy → 0x1A under
Secure Boot (flash ISO directly); the 7070 BIOS can't view db (verify via live USB); the
installer's hardware-backed encryption fails with PCR_UNUSABLE/dbt (use passphrase LUKS +
manual systemd-cryptenroll PCR-7 seal); GRUB password must be edit-only (--unrestricted)
to keep unattended boot.

OS hardening on unit 1 is COMPLETE + verified: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7,
unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock (closes the init=/bin/bash root-shell
hole that PCR-7 sealing does not cover). Resolves the implementation half of
open-questions #12 for unit 1.

Cross-linked from disk-os-hardening; index + log updated. Still TODO on the box: Docker +
run the stack.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V

wiki/concepts/disk-os-hardening.md

@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@ With LUKS in place, **SQLCipher becomes optional** defence-in-depth rather than
 layer. (The custom controller adds its own: ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot — see
 [[esp32-custom-controller]].)
 
+> **Step-by-step OS install + TPM-seal procedure** (BIOS → encrypted install → manual PCR-7 TPM
+> seal, with the Dell-7070-specific `dbt` workaround) lives in [[appliance-provisioning]] — written
+> from the first real provisioning (2026-06-23) and verified on hardware. **OS hardening on the first
+> unit is COMPLETE: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7, unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB
+> edit-lock** (the GRUB password is the specific countermeasure to the `init=/bin/bash` root-shell
+> hole that PCR-7 sealing does NOT cover). Resolves the implementation half of [[open-questions]] #12
+> for unit 1.
+
 ## Deploy-time server configuration (runbook)
 
 Env in `apps/server/.env` on the appliance (see `apps/server/.env.example`). The security-load-bearing ones:

wiki/decisions/appliance-provisioning.md

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+---
+type: reference
+tags: [parking, deployment, appliance, hardening, runbook, offline-first]
+sources: []
+updated: 2026-06-23
+status: settled
+---
+
+# Appliance provisioning runbook (booth PC)
+
+Step-by-step to take a booth PC from factory Windows to a hardened, encrypted, container-running
+parking appliance. Written from the **first real provisioning, 2026-06-23**, on the actual hardware
+below — every command here was run and verified on that machine, including the firmware-specific
+workaround. Companion to [[disk-os-hardening]] (the *why*), [[tpm]] (TPM analysis), and
+[[container-deployment]] (the images this runs).
+
+> ⚠ This box is the [[threat-model|outsider-with-the-box]] defence. The load-bearing anti-fraud
+> control is still [[reconciliation]] over the [[append-only-event-chain|signed chain]] — disk
+> encryption + Secure Boot raise the cost of offline tamper, they don't replace reconciliation.
+
+## Reference hardware (first unit, 2026-06-23)
+
+- **Dell OptiPlex 7070**, **Intel Core i5-8500** (Coffee Lake), 238 GB SATA SSD (`/dev/sda`).
+- **TPM 2.0 — discrete Nuvoton** (`Get-Tpm` → `ManufacturerIdTxt NTC`, fw 7.2.1.0). NOT Intel
+  PTT/fTPM. Discrete ⇒ an external LPC/SPI bus exists (bus-sniff is a theoretical physical attack on
+  PCR-only sealing — accepted; see [[tpm]]). Used PC — previous owner irrelevant.
+- Shipped Windows 11; formatted to **Ubuntu 26.04 LTS** (the decided platform — [[desktop-shell-tauri]]).
+
+## 1. BIOS (F2 at the Dell logo)
+
+- **TPM**: leave **On**. Used PC → **Clear the TPM once** (Security → TPM → Clear) so the prior
+  owner's keys are wiped before LUKS enrollment. (PPI "Bypass for Clear" was unchecked → it asks for
+  physical confirmation at next boot; that's normal.)
+- **Secure Boot**: **Enabled**, **Deployed Mode** (not Audit). **"Enable Custom Mode" UNCHECKED** =
+  Standard Mode with stock Microsoft keys — this is what Ubuntu's signed shim needs. Do NOT touch
+  PK/KEK/db/dbx. NB: the 7070's Expert Key Management is **edit-only** (Save/Replace/Append/Delete —
+  no read-only "View Key"), so you **cannot inspect db from BIOS**; verify via the live USB instead
+  (step 2).
+- **Boot**: UEFI only (no CSM/Legacy — a Legacy install has no Secure Boot / TPM-seal path).
+- Set a **BIOS admin password**.
+
+## 2. Boot the Ubuntu 26.04 USB (Secure Boot ON)
+
+- **Flash the ISO DIRECTLY** (Rufus GPT/UEFI, Etcher, or `dd`). **NOT Ventoy** — Ventoy's own
+  bootloader isn't in `db`, so Secure Boot rejects it with **`Verification failed: (0x1A) Security
+  Violation`** (this is Secure Boot working correctly, not a fault). A directly-flashed Ubuntu USB
+  boots the Microsoft-signed shim, which stock `db` trusts.
+- **F12** at the Dell logo → pick the USB under **UEFI BOOT**.
+- Reaching the installer with Secure Boot ON = positive proof the MS third-party UEFI CA is in `db`
+  (the verification the BIOS couldn't show us).
+
+## 3. Encrypted install — the firmware workaround (IMPORTANT)
+
+The 26.04 installer disk page offers: No Encryption / **Encrypt with a passphrase** / **Use
+hardware-backed encryption** (+ advanced LVM/ZFS, both ZFS experimental).
+
+- **"Use hardware-backed encryption" FAILS on this 7070** with:
+  `PCR_UNUSABLE … error with secure boot policy (PCR7) measurements: generating secure boot profiles
+  for systems with timestamp revocation (dbt) support is currently not supported.`
+  → Ubuntu's *automated* FDE profiler can't model PCR7 on Dell firmware carrying a `dbt` (UEFI
+  timestamp revocation list). It is NOT a TPM or Secure-Boot fault — both are fine.
+- **So: choose "Encrypt with a passphrase".** Set a strong passphrase and **SAVE IT OFF-MACHINE**
+  (phone / password manager). It is both the boot unlock (until TPM sealing) AND the permanent
+  recovery slot. Finish the install.
+- Result (verify with `lsblk`): `sda1` vfat `/boot/efi`, `sda2` ext4 `/boot`, `sda3` `crypto_LUKS`
+  → `dm_crypt-0` (LVM2) → `ubuntu--vg-ubuntu--lv` ext4 `/`.
+
+## 4. Seal LUKS to the TPM (manual — PCR 7 only)
+
+Do this AFTER first boot. Manual enrollment sidesteps the installer's dbt profiler and lets us pick
+PCRs. **Bind to PCR 7 only** (Secure Boot state): it catches the attack that matters (disabling
+Secure Boot to boot a tampered kernel) WITHOUT breaking on routine kernel/GRUB updates (which churn
+PCRs 4/8/9 → would otherwise drop every boot to the passphrase). Firmware-only PCR 0 is the fallback
+if PCR 7 ever errors.
+
+```bash
+sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y tpm2-tools
+sudo tpm2_pcrread sha256                 # sanity: PCRs 0-10 populated, PCR 7 has a real value
+
+# Enroll the TPM (prompts for the EXISTING install passphrase to authorize the new slot):
+sudo systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=7 /dev/sda3
+
+# Verify TWO slots — keep BOTH (slot 0 password = recovery, slot 1 tpm2 = auto-unlock):
+sudo systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda3
+#   SLOT TYPE
+#      0 password
+#      1 tpm2
+```
+
+Wire it into boot (back up first; the mapping is `dm_crypt-0`, the LUKS UUID is in `/etc/crypttab`):
+
+```bash
+sudo cp /etc/crypttab /etc/crypttab.bak
+sudo sed -i 's/none luks$/none luks,tpm2-device=auto/' /etc/crypttab
+cat /etc/crypttab     # → dm_crypt-0 UUID=… none luks,tpm2-device=auto
+sudo update-initramfs -u
+sudo reboot
+```
+
+- **Boots straight to login, no passphrase prompt** = ✅ TPM auto-unlock works (unattended reboot
+  achieved — VERIFIED on this unit 2026-06-23).
+- Still prompts = PCR mismatch; type the passphrase (NOT locked out), then retry with
+  `--tpm2-pcrs=0`. The `password` slot + `crypttab.bak` make this fully reversible.
+
+> **Re-seal runbook:** a BIOS update / Secure Boot change alters PCR 7 → the TPM refuses → boot
+> falls back to the passphrase prompt (not a brick). After such a change, re-run step 4's
+> `systemd-cryptenroll --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=7 /dev/sda3` to re-bind.
+
+## 5. GRUB password — EDIT-ONLY (VERIFIED 2026-06-23)
+
+Closes the `init=/bin/bash` / `systemd.unit=rescue.target` local-root hole: without it, anyone at
+the keyboard presses `e` at the GRUB menu, edits the kernel cmdline, and boots to a **root shell with
+no login**. **The PCR-7 TPM seal does NOT cover this** — editing the GRUB cmdline doesn't change
+PCR 7 (Secure Boot policy), so the TPM still releases the key and the attacker lands on the decrypted
+disk. This is the specific countermeasure for the [[threat-model|operator-at-the-booth]]. Use
+**edit-only** mode (`--unrestricted`) so the box still boots UNATTENDED — the password is required
+only to EDIT entries, never to boot.
+
+```bash
+grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2          # enter a password (twice) → copy the grub.pbkdf2.sha512.* hash
+```
+
+Add the superuser (paste YOUR hash) to the end of `/etc/grub.d/40_custom`:
+```
+set superusers="admin"
+password_pbkdf2 admin grub.pbkdf2.sha512.10000.<YOUR_HASH>
+```
+
+Make menu entries bootable WITHOUT the password (edit-only) — in `/etc/grub.d/10_linux`, set the
+active `CLASS=` line to include `--unrestricted`:
+```
+CLASS="--class gnu-linux --class gnu --class os --unrestricted"
+```
+
+Regenerate + VERIFY BOTH HALVES landed in the real config BEFORE rebooting (a GRUB misconfig means a
+rescue-USB recovery):
+```bash
+sudo update-grub
+sudo grep -c "password_pbkdf2" /boot/grub/grub.cfg   # want ≥1 (password present)
+sudo grep -c "unrestricted"    /boot/grub/grub.cfg   # want ≥1 (entries bootable w/o password)
+sudo reboot
+```
+
+✅ VERIFIED on this unit: boots straight to login (no GRUB prompt, TPM still auto-unlocks) AND
+pressing `e` at the menu prompts for `admin` + password. Store the GRUB password off-machine
+(alongside the LUKS passphrase).
+
+> OS hardening on the first unit is now COMPLETE: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7) + Secure Boot
+> (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock.
+
+## 5b. Further hardening (TODO — not yet done)
+
+- **Key-based SSH only** (disable password auth) if SSH is enabled at all.
+- **No/locked-down desktop** — single-purpose; autostart the kiosk ([[desktop-shell-tauri]]).
+- Consider moving the host **event-signing key into the TPM** (non-extractable) — [[tpm]], [[open-questions]] #12.
+- `sudo apt autoremove` the leftover old kernel (`linux-*-7.0.0-14`) once the new one is proven.
+
+## 6. Runtime — Docker stack
+
+Per [[container-deployment]]: install Docker Engine + compose, then run the `parking-server` +
+`parking-vision` images via `docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml`. Provide a real
+`JWT_SECRET` (`openssl rand -hex 32`) and `COOKIE_SECURE=0` (plain-http booth LAN — see
+[[disk-os-hardening]] deploy-time runbook). Images are published to the Gitea registry by
+`build-images.yml` on push to dev/main.
+
+## Quick-reference: the gotchas, in order they bit us
+
+1. Ventoy USB → `0x1A` Security Violation under Secure Boot → flash the ISO directly instead.
+2. 7070 BIOS has no "View Key" → can't inspect db; the live-USB boot IS the verification.
+3. Installer "hardware-backed encryption" → `PCR_UNUSABLE`/dbt → use passphrase LUKS + manual seal.
+4. Bind TPM to **PCR 7 only**, not a multi-PCR set (kernel updates churn 4/8/9 → passphrase every boot).
+5. Always keep the **password slot** + an off-machine copy of the passphrase (TPM is never the only key).
+6. GRUB password MUST be **edit-only** (`--unrestricted` on entries) or it prompts on EVERY boot →
+   breaks unattended reboot. Verify `grep -c unrestricted /boot/grub/grub.cfg` ≥1 before rebooting.

wiki/index.md

@@ -122,3 +122,4 @@ Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 45 concepts · 7 decision records.
 - [[event-streams-split]] — split the signed business ledger (ledger_events) from unsigned device telemetry (device_events).
 - [[desktop-shell-tauri]] — ✅ Tauri v2 chosen over Electron for the desktop kiosk shell; thin wrapper, server keeps all logic. Best case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS (resolves WebKitGTK); worst case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser, no native shell.
 - [[container-deployment]] — Docker images for the non-desktop apps: parking-server (Fastify API + bundled SPA via @fastify/static) + parking-vision (Python/uv ANPR); branch+SHA tags, per-env compose, Gitea registry, build-images.yml CI; pnpm deploy (not prune) for native better-sqlite3; migrate-at-boot.
+- [[appliance-provisioning]] — booth-PC provisioning runbook (Dell 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM): BIOS/Secure-Boot → direct-flash Ubuntu 26.04 USB (not Ventoy) → passphrase-LUKS install → manual PCR-7 TPM seal (workaround for the installer's dbt PCR_UNUSABLE error) → Docker. Verified on hardware 2026-06-23; TPM auto-unlock works.

wiki/log.md

@@ -1484,3 +1484,35 @@ insecure/change-me). VERIFIED: server image builds + runs — migrates, SPA serv
 / + /booth serve HTML, /api/nope JSON 404, no sqlite outside /data. Vision image build + smoke in
 progress. New page [[container-deployment]]; updated [[vision-service-packaging]] (resolved its two
 open Qs), index. Server tests stay 141 green (SPA serving guarded on dist existence).
+
+## [2026-06-23] provision | First booth appliance — Dell OptiPlex 7070, Win11 → Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, encrypted + TPM-sealed
+Provisioned the first real booth PC. Hardware: Dell OptiPlex 7070, i5-8500, 238GB SSD, discrete
+Nuvoton TPM 2.0 (NOT Intel PTT — Get-Tpm ManufacturerIdTxt NTC). Formatted Win11 → Ubuntu 26.04 LTS
+(the decided platform). Gotchas hit + resolved, in order: (1) Ventoy USB → 0x1A Security Violation
+under Secure Boot (Ventoy's loader not in db) → flash the ISO directly; (2) the 7070 BIOS Expert Key
+Management is edit-only, no "View Key" → can't inspect db, so the live-USB boot IS the verification
+(it reached the installer with Secure Boot ON → MS 3rd-party UEFI CA confirmed present); (3) the
+installer's "Use hardware-backed encryption" FAILED with PCR_UNUSABLE / "secure boot policy (PCR7) …
+timestamp revocation (dbt) … not supported" — Ubuntu's automated FDE profiler can't model PCR7 on
+Dell firmware with a dbt; NOT a TPM/SB fault. Workaround: "Encrypt with a passphrase" (plain LUKS) +
+MANUAL TPM seal after boot via systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=7 /dev/sda3 (PCR 7 only — avoids
+kernel-churned 4/8/9 that would drop every boot to the passphrase). Two LUKS slots kept (0 password =
+recovery, 1 tpm2 = auto-unlock); crypttab gets tpm2-device=auto; update-initramfs; reboot → BOOTS
+STRAIGHT TO LOGIN, no passphrase → TPM auto-unlock VERIFIED (unattended reboot achieved). New runbook
+page [[appliance-provisioning]] (every command verified on hardware); cross-linked from
+[[disk-os-hardening]] (resolves impl half of open-questions #12 for unit 1) + index. REMAINING on the
+box: GRUB password, Docker install, run the parking-server/parking-vision stack.
+
+## [2026-06-23] provision | First booth appliance — GRUB edit-lock added; OS hardening COMPLETE
+Added the GRUB password (edit-only mode via --unrestricted) to the first booth unit. WHY it matters
+specifically: the PCR-7 TPM seal does NOT cover the GRUB-cmdline attack (editing the kernel line to
+init=/bin/bash doesn't change PCR 7, so the TPM still releases the LUKS key → root shell on the
+decrypted disk). Edit-only mode keeps unattended boot (the box still boots password-free; the
+password is required only to EDIT entries / open the GRUB shell) — the right config for an unattended
+booth. Verified BOTH halves in /boot/grub/grub.cfg before rebooting (password_pbkdf2 ≥1, unrestricted
+≥1) and on reboot: boots straight to login (no GRUB prompt, TPM auto-unlock intact) AND pressing `e`
+prompts for admin+password. OS hardening on unit 1 is now COMPLETE: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7)
++ Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock. Updated [[appliance-provisioning]] (§5 GRUB now a verified
+step, §5b further-hardening TODO: SSH key-only, kiosk lockdown, signing key→TPM, autoremove old
+kernel) + [[disk-os-hardening]]. STILL TODO on the box: Docker install + run the parking stack (needs
+the images pushed — dev push + registry secrets pending).