Initial scaffold: Turborepo monorepo + design wiki

Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest
mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5,
React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45.

Layout:
- apps/server   Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health)
- apps/web      React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA
- packages/db   Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users
- packages/devices  reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay)
- packages/shared   shared domain types

Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold:
append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters,
"a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local
offline-first auth.

wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested
from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema.

Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves
/health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-14 00:34:11 +02:00
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---
type: concept
tags: [parking, security, platform]
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
updated: 2026-06-14
---
# Disk / OS Hardening
Worthwhile, but **not the main event** — it defends against the outsider-with-physical-access,
not the operator (see [[threat-model]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §3.)
Physical-access attacks on Windows are trivial (boot media + password-reset tools), so a
**dedicated Linux machine is the correct platform** — not Windows or WSL. This is a
[[standing-decisions|standing decision]].
- **LUKS full-disk encryption** — defeats boot-from-USB.
- **GRUB password + Secure Boot** — prevents boot-parameter tampering / unsigned loaders.
- **No desktop environment** — single-purpose appliance.
- **Key-based SSH only.**
With LUKS in place, **SQLCipher becomes optional** defence-in-depth rather than the critical
layer. (The custom controller adds its own: ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot — see
[[esp32-custom-controller]].)