docs(wiki): ATECC608 is upcoming — retag ledger signing to the on-host reality
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, security, integrity, crypto, hardware, threat-model]
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sources: []
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updated: 2026-07-02
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---
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# Hardware signer options (non-extractable ledger signing key)
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Where the **[[append-only-event-chain|signed ledger]]'s** private signing key should live so that an
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adversary who **owns the host** — including one who decrypts the disk via the [[disk-os-hardening]]
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physical-tamper chain — still cannot **forge** the ledger. This is the still-open
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[[open-questions|open-question #6]], reframed once it became clear (2026-07-02) that **no secure
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element is on-site** and the [[atecc608]] isn't even the right part for a PC.
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## The problem in one line
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Today signing uses the software `SoftwareSigner` — **HMAC-SHA256, key in `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY`, an env
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var on the host disk**. HMAC is symmetric: the same secret signs *and* verifies, and it sits on the
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box. So the chain is tamper-**evident** (a blind editor without the key breaks it, and `verifyChain()`
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pinpoints where) but **not unforgeable** — anyone who reads the key re-signs a doctored chain and it
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verifies clean. The fix is a signer whose **private key is non-extractable**: the host can ask it to
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sign, but can never read the key. That is a property of an HSM / smartcard / TPM — **not** of anything
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that merely *stores* a key.
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## The four options
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### 1. USB HSM — Nitrokey HSM 2 / SmartCard-HSM *(recommended target)*
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A ~€50 USB device with a non-extractable EC key (secp256r1 — same curve family as the ATECC608). The
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host signs each event over **PKCS#11**; the key never leaves the token. It's essentially "the
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ATECC608, but on USB instead of soldered", so it drops into the existing `signer.ts` seam (the
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`keyId` field + the `TODO(atecc608)` public-key-verifier hook).
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- **License fit:** OpenSC (the PKCS#11 stack) is LGPL/permissive — no vendor lock-in, matches the
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all-MIT/Apache/BSD [[technology-stack|stack constraint]].
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- **Downside:** it's *removable* — an operator can pocket it. But that fails **closed** (no token →
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can't sign → visibly noticed), and it can be epoxied / locked inside the case.
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### 2. YubiKey (PIV or OpenPGP applet)
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Also a non-extractable EC/RSA key over PKCS#11; very robust, widely deployed; works the same way as
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the Nitrokey for this purpose. Slightly more oriented to human 2FA than to an always-present signing
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oracle, and the vendor stack is less fully-open than OpenSC. **~$50–70.** Fine as a substitute for
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option 1.
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### 3. Reuse the on-board TPM 2.0 *(recommended interim — free)*
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The booth PC already has a TPM (it's what seals LUKS — [[tpm]]). A TPM can also hold a non-extractable
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signing key and sign over it. **Zero extra hardware, closes the "key in a plaintext env file" hole
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immediately.**
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- **The nuance:** don't reuse the *LUKS* sealing arrangement. That key is PCR-7-sealed, and the
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battery-pull → live-USB → PCR-7 chain ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defeats PCR-7-only policies. Bind the
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**signing** key to the TPM **without a PCR policy** (or with a PIN) so it's about non-extractability,
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not boot-state — then an attacker who decrypts the disk still can't pull it.
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- **Weaker than a dedicated HSM** against a sophisticated bus-sniffing attacker, but far stronger than
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today's on-disk HMAC.
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### 4. Plain USB "sentinel" / dongle *(the trap — avoid)*
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A generic USB flash drive holding a key file, or a license-dongle that only gates "is this USB
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present". **Useless here:** if the key is *readable* off the stick, the host-owner copies it, exactly
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like the env var. Presence-gating is not integrity. Only a device that **signs internally** delivers
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non-extractability. Do not go this route.
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## Recommendation
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1. **Now (free):** move signing to a **TPM-held key** (option 3, no PCR policy) — kills the
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plaintext-key-on-disk exposure using hardware already present.
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2. **Target (purchasable):** a **USB HSM (Nitrokey HSM 2)** as the concrete stand-in for the still-
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planned [[atecc608]] — same non-extractable-EC model, fits `signer.ts`, open tooling; physically
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lock it in the case.
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3. **[[atecc608]]** stays reserved for the **deferred** [[esp32-custom-controller]] (embedded), not
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the PC host.
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Whichever is chosen, the code seam already exists: each event stores its `keyId`, so a swap is a new
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`Signer` impl and **old events stay verifiable** under their original key — no migration of history.
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## The mental model to keep
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Against the physical adversary who opens the case, **the only real protection for the financial
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record is a signing key even root can't read.** That is an HSM/smartcard/TPM property, never a
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USB-storage property — and it's precisely what's missing today. Note the layering: [[disk-os-hardening]]
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raises the cost of *reaching* the disk; a hardware signer makes the ledger unforgeable *even after*
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the disk is reached; and [[reconciliation]] against records the box doesn't hold is the backstop that
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survives a fully-owned host. They are complements, not substitutes.
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## Relates
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- [[append-only-event-chain]] — the ledger this key signs; why software signing isn't enough.
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- [[atecc608]] — the originally-specified secure element (upcoming; embedded, not PC).
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- [[tpm]] — the on-board part; option 3, and the LUKS-sealing analysis.
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- [[disk-os-hardening]] — the physical-tamper chain that makes a non-extractable key necessary.
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- [[open-questions]] #6 (secure-element integration), #7 (JWT symmetric→asymmetric — same key-custody
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argument for auth tokens).
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- [[threat-model]] / [[reconciliation]] — the adversary and the backstop control.
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