feat(desktop): Tauri v2 kiosk shell — maximized window, prod right-click block, auto-update + code-signing

Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so
the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR),
prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/
ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities.

apps/web (single UI source of truth):
- lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from
  VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify.
- lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it +
  devtools).
- lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline)
  → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en).
- .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle.

Desktop:
- window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access).
- auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a
  PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json;
  private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as
  TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets.
- Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter
  @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures).

Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds;
no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo.

Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside):
- new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-
  extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by
  platform).
- new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu
  26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built).
- pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC
  caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model.
- open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13
  (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V

wiki/decisions/standing-decisions.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: decision
 tags: [parking, decisions]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
-updated: 2026-06-14
+updated: 2026-06-21
 status: settled
 ---
 
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-arch
     [[vision-service]].
 - **Platform:** a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance** (LUKS + GRUB password + Secure Boot),
   **not Windows/WSL** — see [[disk-os-hardening]].
+- **Desktop shell:** the operator UI ships as a **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk wrapper
+  (chosen over Electron, 2026-06-21) — small footprint, no bundled Chromium to patch, and a
+  deny-by-default native surface that fits [[threat-model|the booth-operator threat model]]. The
+  shell stays **thin**: all privileged logic remains in [[fastify]]. One open dependency — the
+  appliance's WebKitGTK version (see [[open-questions]] #11).
 - **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-signed event log
   ([[append-only-event-chain]]); **[[reconciliation]] is the anti-fraud control**; encryption
   protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).