feat(desktop): Tauri v2 kiosk shell — maximized window, prod right-click block, auto-update + code-signing

Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so
the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR),
prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/
ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities.

apps/web (single UI source of truth):
- lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from
  VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify.
- lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it +
  devtools).
- lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline)
  → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en).
- .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle.

Desktop:
- window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access).
- auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a
  PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json;
  private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as
  TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets.
- Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter
  @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures).

Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds;
no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo.

Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside):
- new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-
  extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by
  platform).
- new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu
  26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built).
- pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC
  caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model.
- open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13
  (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V

wiki/overview.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type: overview
 tags: [parking, overview, synthesis]
 sources: [parking-system-architecture]
-updated: 2026-06-14
+updated: 2026-06-21
 ---
 
 # Parking System — Overview
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
 
 - **Stack** ([[technology-stack]] / [[standing-decisions]]): [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] ·
   [[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] + [[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]] — all open-licensed to
-  avoid lock-in (cf. rejected [[payload-cms]], [[refine]], [[logto-zitadel-oidc]]).
+  avoid lock-in (cf. rejected [[payload-cms]], [[refine]], [[logto-zitadel-oidc]]). The operator UI
+  ships as a thin **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk shell (chosen over Electron).
 - **Integrity** is the heart of it: an [[append-only-event-chain]] (hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-
   signed) plus external [[reconciliation]] — *that's* what remote sync really is. Encryption at
   rest ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.