8b65e199a3e7070923eb0aad5e2dc151bf1765dd
31 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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306d136a08 |
feat(setup): operator-tested relay pulse, signed into the ledger
Add a per-relay "Test" control on each saved controller in /setup so an admin can prove barrier wiring without a vehicle. POST /api/setup/test-relay pulses a barrier relay — but because a physical open with no matching signed command is the fraud signal, the route SIGNS a barrier_open_command (reason setup.relayTest, source manual, attributed to the acting admin) BEFORE it fires. Reconciliation then reads the open as explained, not an anomaly, and there's an audit trail. - Admin-only (site:update), CSRF-guarded; fires only against a SAVED controller (real id → clean attribution; also stops a redirected/unsaved config from opening an arbitrary host's barrier). Sign-before-fire; a pulse failure is reported, not a 500. radarAlert relays (lamps) are excluded from the UI. - New reason code setup.relayTest in @parking/shared (+ EN template); sq/en keys. - EventLog constructed before setupRoutes so the route can sign. - Integration test (stub controller, no hardware): RBAC 403, CSRF 403, signed barrier_open_command on success, 400 unknown relay w/ no ledger row, 404 unknown controller, 400 bad relay value. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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33c4ea1e91 |
feat(entry): operator-issued entry + exit plate-swap reconciliation
Two halves of one anti-fraud design.
(A) Operator-issued entry — when the physical entry button is broken, an
operator can issue an entry ticket so a real car isn't blocked out of the lot.
This hands the operator-adversary a mint, so it is:
- PRESENCE-GATED like the physical button: a real car must be present (radar/
loop AND camera busy). Enforced BOTH sides — the server re-checks current
presence so a direct POST can't bypass a disabled button; no presence loop
=> feature unavailable; a no-presence attempt signs an anomaly.
- FLAGGED: vehicle_entry source=manual + operatorInitiated + operator, PLUS a
companion entry.operatorIssued anomaly (the adversary path always leaves a
red-flag row).
- capacity-OVERRIDE allowed but stamped lotFull (a broken button mustn't trap
a legit car).
New session:create permission (migration 0019 -> operator role, admin-
revocable), POST /api/entry/issue (open-shift gated), EntryFlow.
issueForOperator; the fraud-critical print->sign->open->snapshot sequence is
factored into one shared #issueTicket (button + operator). UI: the entry
BarrierLight becomes a clickable issue-control when presence+permission+shift
meet (confirm -> issue).
(B) Exit plate-swap reconciliation — defends the ticket-swap fraud the mint
enables (paid car let out on a fresh $0 ticket, original ticket lingers
"inside", occupancy drifts up by phantom cars). The plate is the invariant:
ExitFlow.#reconcilePlateAtExit compares the exiting plate against all OPEN
sessions' entry plates, EXACT + HIGH-CONFIDENCE only (>=0.85; a fuzzy read never
gates — ANPR is advisory). On a match under a DIFFERENT ticket:
- BOOTH path: returns swap_suspected + signs exit.plateSwapSuspected; the
pay/exit modal shows a red warning + "Override & release" (override signs an
attributed exit.plateSwapOverride). Flag+override, never a silent hard block
(exit fails-open; a plate is never the sole gate).
- READER path (no operator): log-only anomaly + fail-open.
Extended BoothExitResult + /api/exit (override); boothExit client returns a
structured swap result.
Verified: full monorepo build/lint/test green (229 server tests incl. 4 new:
hold-on-swap, override-releases-with-attribution, low-confidence-no-warning,
own-plate-no-warning). New wiki: operator-issued-entry.md +
plate-reconciliation.md; cross-linked from entry-exit-points, capacity-
occupancy, index. Preserves "a plate never OPENS a barrier alone — and now never
TRAPS a car alone either."
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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114a32e6f2 |
feat(drawer): operator records cash movements, admin reviews after (own /drawer route)
Rework drawer cash movements from synchronous admin-authorization-at-creation
(operator typed an admin's password inline for every receipt/disbursement) to
operator-records-freely -> admin-reviews-after.
- New `drawer` resource: drawer:create (operator records; admin-revocable per
role) + drawer:review (admin authorizes/denies). Migration 0018 grants the
default operator role drawer:create; admin gets all in code.
- New signed `cash_review` ledger event { refId, decision, reviewedBy, note? }.
A DENIAL is a FLAG, not a reversal: it never appends reversing cash and never
touches the drawer balance (the correction is settled outside the app). This
is what keeps a late review from leaking into the next operator's inherited
drawer — a denial that lands after the reviewed shift closed moves no cash.
Regression test: op1 disburses -> closes -> op2 inherits -> admin denies ->
op2 drawer unchanged.
- Move the feature OFF the polluted /shifts route to a top-level /drawer
(operator: record + own; admin: review queue + all). routes/drawer.ts lifted
from routes/shift.ts (retired the authorizer-password gate; kept shift:cash
for its other job = admin-sees-all-shifts). New DrawerManager.tsx.
Display fixes bundled:
- Render cash_review in the event-detail modal (decision / reviewed-by / note /
movement ref) — previously showed nothing.
- Relabel the shift drawer figures for clarity: Daily takings / Receipts /
Disbursements (was Cash payments / Cash added / Cash removed).
- Hide the Card figure everywhere when CARD_PAYMENTS_ENABLED is false (no POS
on-site), matching the card-tender gate.
shared/db/server/web all typecheck; 225 server tests pass (incl. the drawer
review + cross-shift-leak regression); web build + i18n parity green. Verified
end-to-end via Playwright. Recorded in wiki/concepts/shift.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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0c218179c4 |
feat(backup): encrypted on-site DB backup engine + local target
The SQLite DB is the signed append-only ledger, so a disk failure / stolen or destroyed PC means total revenue-history loss (open-question #5). This is the first slice of the backup-recovery design: the engine + a local/mounted target + a daily timer + a manual route. Engine (apps/server/src/backup.ts): - Consistent online copy of the live WAL DB via better-sqlite3's native .backup() (not a raw file copy, which can capture a torn WAL) — the restored copy is a byte-identical, queryable DB. - AES-256-GCM with a scrypt-derived key from BACKUP_KEY; self-describing header (magic|version|salt|iv|...|authTag) so a restore tool needs only the key + file. Zero new dependencies (Node crypto). - The plaintext intermediate is kept in scratch (not the removable/network target) and wiped in a finally, success or fail. - Retention: keep-last-N + one-per-day within N days. Wiring: - BackupService (env config, single in-flight guard, last-success/last-error). - routes/backup.ts: GET /api/backup/status (backup:read), POST /api/backup/run (backup:create), 409 when unconfigured. No restore route — restore is an out-of-band runbook action on a fresh appliance, not a console call. - New permission resource in @parking/shared. - server.ts: an unref'd daily timer, a no-op until BACKUP_TARGET_DIR + BACKUP_KEY are set, deliberately not run at startup (a just-power-cut booth shouldn't write to a possibly-unmounted disk). - openRawDb() added to @parking/db/testing (open a file without migrating, for restore-verification tests). BACKUP_KEY is deliberately SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (independent rotation; backups travel, the signing key shouldn't). SMB/NFS work as mount paths; SFTP + admin UI + restore runbook are deferred slices. Tests: round-trip byte-identical, GCM tamper/wrong-key fail, short-key rejected, scratch cleaned, route auth/RBAC + 409. build/lint/test green (212 server tests). Wiki + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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8a437d0c4b |
feat(booth): cancel wrongly-printed ticket (signed void) + refused-vs-anomaly display; fix CI uv
CI / check (push) Failing after 56s
Cancel a misprinted/test/wrong-vehicle ticket via a SIGNED `void` event — the
vehicle_entry is never edited/deleted (append-only). VoidFlow appends void{
voidedEntryRef, voidReason, operator, reasonCode:"void.ticketCancelled" }; route
POST /api/tickets/void gated event:void + open shift; reason REQUIRED. Refuses a
subscription / already-exited / already-voided / paid ticket (refund out of scope).
The void folds the session CLOSED everywhere it's counted — occupancy (count +
reserved spots), pay-station (lookup/activeSessions), exit-flow (#sessionFor), and
reports (excluded from entries) — so a voided car stops occupying a spot, can't be
paid/exited, and doesn't inflate "cars entered". No barrier action. Booth UI: a
"Cancel ticket" action in the pay/exit lookup modal (transient + unpaid + open;
gated on event:void) with a preset-or-free reason prompt.
Reclassify the Live feed: refused-action events (exitRefused/entryRefused/
permitRefused — e.g. a double card-scan, at-capacity subscriber, exit on a closed
session) are benign warnings, not red anomalies. event-detail.tsx now shows them as
amber REFUZUAR/REFUSED, reserving red ANOMALI for genuine red-flags. Display-only —
no ledger change, so historical events reclassify too.
CI: install uv + sync vision deps before the Turbo run. @parking/vision's lint/
typecheck/test shell to `uv run …`, but CI set up only Node+pnpm, so `uv run ruff`
failed ("uv not found") and broke the whole Turbo run. The Python checks pass once
uv provisions the toolchain.
- new: void-flow.ts (+ tests, 8) ; occupancy void-fold test
- shared: reason code void.ticketCancelled ; both web catalogs (sq/en parity)
- wiki: parking-session (ticket-void folds + guards, refused/anomaly split), log
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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7680d9a0ed |
feat(recycle-bin): soft delete + restore for master data
Accidental admin deletes of users/roles/subscriptions/plans/tariffs were hard and unrecoverable. Now they soft-delete into a recycle bin. Schema (migration 0012): nullable deleted_at + deleted_by on users, roles, subscriptions, subscription_plans, tariffs. Additive ADD COLUMN; verified against a copy of the live DB. Backend: each resource's DELETE route STAMPS instead of removing; every catalog list filters deleted_at IS NULL. New recycle-bin module + routes (GET /api/recycle-bin, POST .../restore, DELETE .../:id purge) gated on a new recyclebin:read/update/delete permission. A 6-hourly + startup sweep auto-purges items older than RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30; 0 = forever). Invariants: soft-deleted users can't log in (login rejects deleted_at; no-lockout counts live admins only); a soft-deleted subscription doesn't open the barrier; plans are versioned so a delete stamps all versions of the plan_id (bin shows one item); username/role-name UNIQUE spans deleted rows so reuse returns a clear 409 pointing at the bin; restore doesn't auto-cascade a dangling role (guard resolves missing role to empty perms). The signed append-only ledger is OUT of scope (no delete path). Web: a Recycle bin tab under Setup (RecycleBin.tsx) with Restore/Purge + purge confirm; api client + i18n (sq + en parity). Tests: recycle-bin.test.ts (9 unit) + recycle-bin-routes.test.ts (4 integration: delete -> can't-login -> restore -> login, purge, gating, 409 reuse). server 103/103; build+lint+test 19/19. Wiki: new concepts/soft-delete.md; local-jwt-auth + index + log updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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0985b86fa7 |
test(server): add fresh-SQLite test harness + anti-fraud core suites
Foundation for testing every service. Adds @parking/db/testing — createTestDb() spins a fresh in-memory SQLite and applies the real Drizzle migrations, so server tests run against the production schema with zero live-DB risk. Wires Vitest into apps/server (test script + config; test signing keys via env) and adds the first Phase-1 suites against the anti-fraud core: - signer.test.ts (10): sign/verify round-trip, tamper + forgery rejection, malformed-signature guard, determinism, keyId rotation (buildVerifier). - event-log.test.ts (12): monotonic index, prevHash linkage, payload-in-signature, append serialization, and verifyChain() catching every tamper class — edited payload, deleted row (index gap), broken prevHash, unknown keyId — plus canonicalize byte-stability. Also stops *.test.ts leaking into shipped dist/ (tsconfig exclude in server + shared; shared had been emitting compiled tests all along). server 22/22, shared 87/87 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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8acef0464c |
fix(subs): price out-of-window charge from minutes actually parked, not a fixed entry stamp
An out-of-window subscriber entry stamped a FIXED windowOwedMinor = the whole gap to window-open (e.g. 800 ALL for a 13:21 arrival to a 20:00 window) and deferred it to exit. That over-charged anyone who left before the window opened — a 1-hour visit was billed as 6.5 hours. The amount isn't knowable at entry: a subscriber may enter early, leave after an hour, come and go several times before the window opens, and linger past window-close. They should pay only for the minutes actually parked outside the window (capped at the window edges) — exactly what minutesOutsideWindow already computes. So the entry now stamps a MARKER only (outOfWindow: true + windowTariffVersionId for reproducible pricing), no fixed amount. The exit gate and booth quote price it live via windowOwedBetween(entry → settle-time), which already caps at the window edges (early entry stops accruing at window-open; the in-window portion of a crossing stay is free; the late-exit tail keeps accruing until payment). Both already called that one function, so they agree. - subscription-flow: entry stamps outOfWindow marker; the advisory slip is now a scannable out-of-window TICKET (Code128 + QR of the occurrence id). - shared LedgerPayload: add outOfWindow; mark windowOwedMinor/windowGap*/ windowCurrency deprecated read-only (historic signed events still type-check). - BoothScreen: window-charge badge keys on outOfWindow (or the old stamp). - ActiveSessions: drop the always-on "Open barrier" for subscribers — the assist-open / window-charge payment live in the pay modal, so the list can't one-click past an unpaid out-of-window charge. Verified the live model on a DB copy: 13:21→14:30 = 200 ALL; 19:55(in grace)→ 23:00 = 0; 19:00→21:30 (crosses into window) = 100 ALL. Existing signed occurrences left untouched (immutable). build+lint 14/14, shared 87/87. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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294ca85ded |
fix(subs): out-of-window charge was a phantom 12h span (4,100 ALL bug)
The tariff-bridge owed amount summed TWO charges — the early-entry gap + a "late-exit" gap — and the exit gap (outOfWindowGap edge:"exit") always measured back to the PREVIOUS window close, even for a subscriber still BEFORE their window. So a car that entered ~30 min early showed ~12h owed (4,100 ALL) the moment it was looked up, instead of ~100 ALL. Replace the two-gap sum with a single correct primitive, minutesOutsideWindow(timeframes, tz, from, to): the minutes within the actual stay [entry, now] that fall outside the allowed window (covering early entry AND late exit, bounded by the stay, weekend/off-days free). windowOwedBetween prices those minutes once as a transient stay (so increments + daily cap apply) against the tariff in force at entry. Both the exit gate (subscription-flow) and the booth quote (pay-station) now use this one source of truth — they can't disagree. Verified on the live occurrence: was 4,100 ALL, now 100 ALL (9 min outside → one increment). 87 shared tests (6 new regression cases incl. the phantom span). Build+lint 12/12. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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eafbc3ddbb |
feat(booth): badge subscriber out-of-window entries in the live feed
A subscriber entering outside their plan's allowed window gets a deferred transient charge (windowOwedMinor, collected/gated at exit) — but it was SILENT at the booth: the entry showed as a plain subscriber pass with no hint money is owed, so the operator only discovers it at exit. Surface it: add a "out-of-window — owes fee" badge on any entry/exit event carrying windowOwedMinor > 0, so the operator sees immediately that this subscriber owes a fee. Also type the window-charge fields on LedgerPayload (were riding the open-ended index signature). Behaviour is otherwise unchanged and correct — verified the live "Mon Kukaleshi" entry: entered 20:29 local (before the 21:00 Mon–Sat window, grace 5m), owes 100 ALL for 18:29–18:55Z, stamped on the signed entry, still owed, gated at exit. Subscribers get no ticket by design. Build+lint 12/12. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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e0e218fa61 |
refactor: plan timeframes use a per-day-of-week picker (like the V2 tariff)
The timeframes model was a coarse weekday/weekend split, which couldn't express
"open Saturdays" or different rules on a specific day — and it didn't match the
V2 tariff, which already has a proper per-day-of-week picker (Hën–Die).
Replace PlanTimeframes { weekday, weekend } with { days[], fromMin, toMin }: the
allowed window applies only on the selected days (0=Sun..6=Sat; empty = every
day); on unselected days the subscriber parks free. A "night plan, free
weekends" is just days [Mon..Fri] with a 20:00→08:00 window — the exact case
from before, now expressible alongside any other day combination.
outOfWindowGap reworked to the days model (per-day membership test instead of
the weekend helper); the plans editor reuses the tariff composer's Mon-first
checkbox row and the shared tariff.dow0..6 labels. No production plans carry
timeframes yet (feature shipped today), so the shape changed directly with no
migration. Unit tests updated + extended (Saturday-only, every-day, weekday
night); 81 shared tests pass. Build+lint 12/12.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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53e1e7b25c |
feat: subscription v2 — quantity pricing, plan timeframes (tariff bridge), reserved spots
Three subscriber enhancements driven by real scenarios (migration 0011, all
additive columns — backward-compatible).
1. QUANTITY. One subscription covers N cars (a family pays once for two). Sale
amount = span price × quantity; maxConcurrent defaults to the quantity so all
N cars can be inside. Quantity rides in the payment payload.
2. PLAN TIMEFRAMES → TARIFF BRIDGE. A plan may restrict WHEN a subscriber may
park (e.g. weekday 20:00→08:00, weekend all-day). A scan outside the window is
NOT refused — the out-of-window minutes are charged at the normal TRANSIENT
tariff (the subscriber is a transient for that time):
- early entry: arrival → window-open, DEFERRED (signed as windowOwedMinor on
the vehicle_entry payload), collected at exit;
- late exit: window-close → departure, and exit is GATED
(sub.refused.unpaidWindow) until paid at the booth.
Pure, tz-aware outOfWindowGap in @parking/shared (12 unit tests); pricing
reuses computeFee + the active tariff version
(apps/server/src/subscription-window.ts). The exit refusal is a host-ONLINE
business gate — the fail-open rule still governs the offline path.
3. RESERVED SPOTS. Site toggle reserve_subscriber_spots: occupancy holds
max(0, quantity − itsCarsInside) per active subscription, so transients see
"full" sooner; effectiveFree = capacity − count − reserved. Subscribers are
never gated by full.
UI: quantity field + ×N quote (SubscriptionManager); timeframes editor
(SubscriptionPlansManager); reserve checkbox (SiteSettings); booth pay modal
shows an "OUT-OF-WINDOW" charge and takes payment to clear the exit gate.
Verified on a copy of the live DB: qty 2 = 2× price; a night-plan 19:30 entry →
30min/15,000 ALL owed, stamped + paid → gate clears, chain verifies; the reserve
toggle holds a qty-2 sub's 2 spots. Build+lint 12/12; 80 shared tests pass.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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fd4608a8f1 |
feat: subscription plan catalog — config-defined pricing, dated spans, no typed amounts
Re-model subscription pricing from per-row, operator-typed prices into an admin-composed, versioned PLAN CATALOG (the tariff pattern). The operator now SELLS by picking a plan over a date span; the price is LOOKED UP, never typed — removing the fat-finger risk on a money field — and day/week/month periods make the hotel "guest stays 1–N days" case a daily plan over a check-in→check-out span. - Schema/migration 0010: new `subscription_plans` (immutable, effective-dated, keyed by a stable planId; period day/week/month + per-period price + active flag). `subscriptions` gains planId/planVersionId; period enum widened. Seeds a "Monthly" plan from the existing site default price (no data loss). - Pricing (pure, unit-tested in @parking/shared): periods = ceil(span / period), amount = periods × per-period price. Ceil = any started period is full (hotel practice). `resolvePlanVersion` picks the latest active version ≤ sale instant. - Backend: new admin-only plan CRUD (`subscription:plan` permission); reworked sell path derives the amount from the plan; `POST /api/subscriptions/quote` returns a server-computed quote so the operator can't override it. The signed-payment sale fix is unchanged — only the amount SOURCE moved; payload now carries planId/planVersionId/periods. Updates never re-sell (price frozen). - Frontend: SubscriptionManager sell form swaps the price field for a plan picker + start/end dates + a live quote line. New SubscriptionPlansManager (Setup tab) for the admin catalog. i18n (sq+en) for both. Verified on a copy of the live DB: 0010 applies (existing subs intact), a 3-night hotel sale prices to 2,400 ALL, appends one signed payment with planVersionId, chain verifies. Build+lint 12/12; 68 shared tests pass. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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2835f78635 |
feat: re-model drawer cash as directional vouchers (Mandat Arkëtimi / Pagese)
Replace the single signed-± cash_movement with two distinct financial documents — the direction is the event TYPE, not the sign of an amount: cash_in = Mandat Arkëtimi (receipt / pay-IN, +) voucher AR-NNNN cash_out = Mandat Pagese (disbursement / pay-OUT, −) voucher PA-NNNN Each carries a positive magnitude, voucher number, reason, the operator who raised it and the admin who authorized it, and prints an Albanian slip. Authorization changes from admin-only to operator-RAISED / admin-AUTHORIZED: any shift:create holder raises the voucher, but POST /api/cash-voucher only commits when authorizedBy is a real admin (shift:cash) re-entering their password (verified server-side). Keeps the float control while letting the operator do the booth paperwork. Legacy cash_movement events are kept — they still verify and still fold into the drawer (signed-±); the append-only chain is never rewritten. The drawer fold and the Z-report window now sum all three types. Verified against a copy of the live DB with the real signing modules: cash_in 3000 + cash_out 5000 → drawer −2000, hash-chain verifies OK. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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cdb55a8652 |
feat: show recognized plate in live feed + active sessions
Surface the advisory ANPR plate (device_events kind="read", keyed by session identity — unsigned, prunable, never an access decision) next to entry/exit events in the live feed and on active-session rows. Resolved at serialize time (new plate-lookup.ts; prefers an entry read; one device_events scan per page) like subscriber-name enrichment — the signed ledger is untouched. Adds plate? to the shared LedgerEvent and to ActiveSession/SessionLookup; a small amber badge in the UI. Caveat: a vehicle_entry is signed + pushed over WS before the async ANPR read lands, so a fresh feed row may show no plate until reload; always present on active sessions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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9a1feeeb20 |
fix(tariff): reject stepped base combined with time/seasonal tiers
A stepped ("up-to") default card prices the whole stay as one total, so the V2
engine short-circuits to steppedFee and NEVER consults windowed cards — any
time/seasonal tiers would silently never fire. Found live: an active tariff had a
stepped base plus weekday-night + weekend tiers, and every 3h stay priced 600 ALL
regardless of hour/day because the tiers were dead.
- validateTariffV2 now rejects a stepped defaultCard combined with windowedCards,
with an actionable message (switch the base to ladder/flat, or remove the tiers).
- Composer shows an inline red warning the moment base mode is stepped and tiers
exist; publishing is blocked server-side regardless.
- ApiError now carries the server's problems[], so the publish error surfaces the
SPECIFIC reason instead of a generic "invalid tariff structure".
- 2 new validation tests (55 pass).
Wiki: tariff, log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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cc507f490f |
feat(tariff): stepped ("up-to") pricing mode — total-by-duration
Owners often state rates as a total-by-duration matrix (0-1h=200, 0-3h=500,
0-6h=800, 0-9h=900, 0-12h=1000) that the marginal hourly ladder can't express
(the ladder sums per-increment rates; this is cumulative totals at thresholds).
Add STEPPED as a third pricing mode alongside the ladder and flat.
- @parking/shared: TariffStep {uptoMin, totalMinor} + a `steps[]` field on V1
structures and V2 cards (mutually exclusive with blocks/flatMinor). steppedFee():
smallest tier with uptoMin >= duration wins (INCLUSIVE boundary), the top tier
repeats as a per-day cap; wired into computeFeeV1 + computeFeeV2 (V2 default card
only — a whole-stay total can't be sliced per-increment by a windowed card).
Validation: ascending uptoMin, non-negative totals, no daily-cap-with-steps,
steps-only-on-default. priceSession/quote/booth/Lab price it via the shared core.
- Composer UI: a "By duration (up-to)" mode with an up-to/total table (base card
only). i18n modeStepped/steppedHint/stepUpTo/stepTotal/addStep (sq+en).
- 8 new unit tests incl. the exact owner matrix, multi-day repeat, overstay, and
validation (53 pass). Verified end-to-end via the UI: authored + published the
matrix, Tariff Lab prices it exactly (3h->500, 6h->800, 12h->1000, 2d->2000).
Wiki: tariff (three pricing modes + stepped semantics), log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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3d02134711 |
feat(tariff): Tariff Lab — pure session-pricing simulator
Test rates "in time" (overnight windows, daily caps, overstay) in seconds against any tariff version, instead of waiting hours/days. No real ledger writes. - Extract priceSession() into @parking/shared: the grace/overstay wrapper over computeFee (unpaid -> entry..now; within-grace -> settled 0; grace-expired -> overstay, a fresh period from grace-expiry). PayStation.quote() now calls it so the booth and the lab can never diverge. - API (tariffs.ts, tariff:read, read-only): POST /api/tariff/simulate prices a hypothetical session (active/any version/inline structure) and returns the priceSession outcome + a 30m..3d duration curve (see where the daily cap flattens); GET /api/tariff/simulate/session/:identity prefills from a real ledger session. - UI TariffLab.tsx at Setup -> "Tariff Lab": version picker, entry/asOf times, optional payment+grace, category, and load-a-real-ticket. Admin-gated, available on-site (useful to quote a dispute). - 4 new priceSession unit tests incl. the ticket-1245791632490 overstay-not-zero regression (40 pass). i18n lab.* + nav.tariffLab (sq+en). Verified live via the UI. Wiki: tariff (priceSession + Tariff Lab as-built), log. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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30e7fe85de |
feat(booth): refusal snapshots, subscriber access medium, one-car-one-ticket entry
Three booth-integrity improvements that share the entry/exit flows and activity log. Refusal snapshots: previously only an accepted open captured a camera image; now every refusal/hold anomaly fires the directional camera too (a turned-away car is exactly the evidence wanted) — entry refused-full/held, exit refused closed/no-session/unpaid/grace-expired (booth + reader paths), refused subscription. A refused entry has no ticket id, so a synthetic REFUSED- ref keys the anomaly + photo together. Same fire-and-forget contract; failed captures still show as tiles. Subscriber access medium: the subscription flow already signed `via` (qr|card|plate) into entry/exit payloads; surface it as a typed LedgerPayload.via, a cyan chip in the ticker, and an "Entry medium" modal row (sq+en). Display-only. One car = one ticket: the entry button could be mashed to mint many tickets per car (corrupting occupancy + enabling ticket-shopping at exit) — the old #inFlight guard only blocked overlapping presses. Add a per-relay guard configured on the relay spec: PRESENCE mode (presenceInput ties ticketing to a vehicle loop on a Dingtian input — one ticket per car, re-armed when the loop clears) or COOLDOWN fallback (entryCooldownSec) when there's no barrier feedback. A suppressed press is unsigned device_events telemetry, not a signed anomaly. SetupWizard exposes both fields. Fail-closed entry and barrier-is-not-a-door invariants untouched; guard state is in-memory/rebuildable, starts armed after restart. Wiki: new entry-double-press; updated entry-exit-points, booth-console, index. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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bfb6ab0b36 |
feat(logs): app log store — backend pino DB sink + frontend error collection
Add a third data stream (app_logs), distinct from the signed ledger and device telemetry, for operational/diagnostic logs — an offline appliance has no Sentry to ship to, so the host is the log store. Backend: a pino stream tees warn/error/fatal into app_logs (info/debug stay stdout-only) with no call-site change; the DB is built before Fastify so the logger has its sink. Frontend (lib/logger.ts): ships failed API requests (minus 401 churn), window.onerror, unhandledrejection, and a top-level React ErrorBoundary; console warn/error forwarded only at debug/trace. Batched/throttled POST, sendBeacon on pagehide, loop-safe (never logs the /api/logs call), best-effort everywhere. POST /api/logs (any signed-in user, CSRF, tolerant) + GET /api/logs gated by a new log:read permission (new `log` RBAC resource; admin holds it). Retention: pruned by age + row cap, hourly + at startup. UI: a Logs screen under /setup (filter level/source/since, expand to context+stack), sq+en. Migration 0009_app_logs. Verified end-to-end via app.inject: login -> POST 204 -> GET 200 with the record; backend warn/error persisted, info dropped; non-admin GET 403 / POST 204. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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f31e57b4ae |
feat: explainable activity log — reasons, subscriber names, snapshot gaps
The live activity feed flagged anomalies with no explanation and showed opaque session keys. Make events self-describing and clickable. - Clickable feed rows → read-only event-detail modal: humanized fields, entry/exit snapshots, and signed-chain provenance collapsed behind an audit disclosure (operator sees the story, auditor expands for crypto). - Localized reason codes (backend i18n): the signed ledger now carries a stable REASON_CODE + params (+ English fallback) instead of free-text English. The UI translates via reason.<code> catalogs in sq/en, so an Albanian operator reads Albanian — from the same immutable event. Adding a language is a catalog change, no re-signing. (@parking/shared REASON_CODES, reasonPayload; entry/exit/subscription flows emit codes.) - Subscriber-name resolution: a SUBSESS-… occurrence now shows the subscription holder's name (fallback "Abonent"/"Subscriber"). Resolved read-time server-side (events API + WS push) as a non-signed subscriberLabel; cached with invalidation on subscription edit/delete. - Failed-snapshot visibility: a camera that was attempted but unreachable now shows a "⚠ camera unreachable" tile instead of a silent gap. The snapshots API returns failures[] from telemetry, filtered so a recovered capture shows no stale warning. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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d0841c8601 |
feat(auth): dynamic RBAC — composable roles + resource×CRUD permissions
Replace the hardcoded role enum (admin/operator/cashier/readonly, checked
literally as requireRole("admin",...) across ~15 routes) with dynamic RBAC:
roles are DATA, route guards check a PERMISSION.
@parking/shared defines a code-defined grid: RESOURCES (user/role/tariff/
subscription/site/device/shift/payment/session/event/report) × Action
(create/read/update/delete + domain verbs void/cash) -> PERMISSIONS
(resource:action, e.g. tariff:update, payment:create, event:void).
DB: new roles + role_permissions tables; users.role enum -> role_id FK;
migration 0007_rbac (create tables, seed the builtin admin role + all 26
perms, seed operator/cashier/readonly composable roles matching old
behaviour, rebuild users to swap the column copying all rows).
auth.ts: JWT payload role -> roleId; permissionsFor(roleId) with an
in-memory cache + bumpPermsCache(); requirePermission(...perms) preHandler;
requireAuth for /me & /language; initAuth(db) wires the resolver once. Every
route guard mapped to a permission; device ingress (devices/qr-reader) stays
auth-free by design. New routes/users.ts (user:* CRUD, bcrypt 12, last-admin
guard) + routes/roles.ts (role:* CRUD, builtin-protected, perms validated
against the grid, cache bump on write). auth/me + /login return
{roleId, roleName, permissions, language}. seed-admin -> roleId:'admin'.
Frontend: SessionUser carries permissions + can() helper; router nav/route
guards gate by permission (requirePerm replaces adminOnly); SiteSettings
edit gated by site:update; new UsersManager + RolesManager (permission
checkbox grid; admin role locked); i18n nav.users/roles + blocks (sq+en).
Decisions: one role per user; protected built-in admin (no-lockout: the last
admin can't be deleted/downgraded); JWT carries roleId, perms resolved
per-request so role edits apply immediately (no re-login).
Verified: full build green; 20-assertion inject test passes (cashier 403s on
tariff publish + user list, admin passes, granting a perm applies on the next
request, last-admin + builtin-role protections return 409); migration 0007
applied to a copy of the live DB (incl WAL/shm) — existing admin maps to
role_id='admin', all rows preserved. Append-only event chain untouched
(event:void gates appending a void, not a delete).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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cf1ff5676d |
feat(tariff): V2 — legacy-parity pricing (time-of-day, category, seasonal, flat)
Bring the legacy ParkSQL2017 pricing BREADTH onto our engine while keeping
integer-minor-unit money + immutable signed versions (rejecting legacy's
float money / mutable rows). TariffStructure becomes a discriminated union:
V1 = the original bare ladder (UNCHANGED, verbatim algorithm, golden-
regression-tested against the live version); V2 = {version:2, tz, shared
knobs, defaultCard, windowedCards[]} where each card is flat OR a block
ladder and may be scoped by wall-clock hour window / day-of-week / date
range / vehicle category.
computeFeeV2 prices by stepping one increment at a time, advancing the
ladder by ELAPSED minutes (continuous) while selecting the active card by
WALL-CLOCK time in the version's FROZEN tz. Decisions: tz is a per-site
setting (site_config.timezone, default Europe/Tirane) stamped server-side
into each version on publish — never the host clock (reproducibility);
default-card cap governs a mixed day; precedence = specificity
(date>dow>hour) -> priority -> name (total, order-independent), validation
rejects ambiguous ties; category = a card FIELD, frozen in the signed
vehicle_entry payload (site_config.default_vehicle_category default), read
at both pricing call-sites.
Composer: default card front-and-centre (flat/ladder toggle), tiers under
an "Advanced" disclosure; emits BARE V1 when no tiers (back-compat). DB:
migrations 0005 (timezone) + 0006 (default_vehicle_category). Stood up
vitest in @parking/shared (was zero tests on the ledger-feeding fee fn);
36 tests incl. golden V1 regression, happy-hour/overnight/dow/flat/category/
cap edges, precedence shuffle-invariance, Europe/Tirane DST determinism,
validation matrix — all green. No event-chain change.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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dfa76346d6 |
feat(tariff): complete the progressive ladder — require open-ended last block, hours-based composer
The stepped-block engine already does "first N hrs x X, next N hrs x Y, ...,
24h cap" (ordered blocks, per-block rate, rolling-24h cap). No new axis; this
completes the model and removes its footgun.
- validateTariffStructure (shared) now REQUIRES the last block to be open-ended
(uptoMin: null). A bounded final block silently inherited its own rate past
its bound (a hidden, never-stated price — e.g. the live ALL tariff billed
hour 4+ at the 3rd-hour rate). rateAt() still prices legacy bounded-tail
versions; validation is publish-only, so published immutable versions are
unaffected (no migration).
- TariffComposer edits bands as a DURATION in hours ("first 2 hours, then next
3 hours"), accumulated into the engine's cumulative uptoMin (minutes) on
submit. The last row is a pinned, non-removable "thereafter (open-ended)"
band, so a published card always satisfies the open-ended-last rule.
blocksToForm round-trips stored minutes back to band hours (legacy loads).
- i18n: replaced upToMin/egExample with bandDuration/hoursUnit/egHours (sq+en,
catalog parity green).
Verified: validator rejects bounded-last / accepts open-ended; computeFee
correct at 1/2/3/5/6/24h for a 0-2h@200,2-5h@100,5h+@50 + 1000 cap card. Full
build green. Wiki (tariff.md, log.md) updated.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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50a3095ef3 |
feat(shift): cash drawer balance carried across shifts + admin cash movements
New signed cash_movement event (admin-only): load/remove drawer float, signed + attributed. ShiftService folds cash payments + movements by time into a drawer balance; shift open auto-inherits the prior shift's expected closing drawer as its opening float; the Z-report reports opening/taken/added/removed/expected (= next shift's opening float). Card payments excluded (settle to bank). Routes: POST /api/cash-movement, drawer in GET /api/shift/current. ShiftControl shows the live drawer + admin load/remove form + Z-report drawer block. Wiki: shift.md. |
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644bfa1462 |
server+web: shifts — open/close + signed Z-report (manned mode)
A shift is two signed ledger events, no mutable table: new shift_open event type + existing shift_z_report. The operator is the logged-in user (carried in event identity); a shift is open iff their latest shift event is a shift_open. ShiftService: close sums payment events in [start,end] by tender (cash/card, by payment time), appends the signed shift_z_report (totals/counts/window), and prints via a new generic PrinterDevice.printReport(title, lines) (Rongta ESC/POS text) to a booth-receipt printer. Print is best-effort — a failed print does not undo the signed close. Routes (cashier/operator/admin): GET /api/shift/current, POST /api/shift/open (409 if open), POST /api/shift/close (409 if none). Web ShiftControl in the shell (non-readonly): Start/End + Z-report totals. Verified: open -> double-open 409 -> payments (cash+card; one outside the window excluded) -> close totals correct + signed + printed -> close-again 409 -> re-open ok; readonly 403; verifyChain ok. |
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b4d0dfadd6 |
tariff composer: admin publishes rate-card versions (pay station now operable)
validateTariffStructure (shared): non-negative ints, ascending block bounds, only the last block open-ended — a malformed card can't be published. Routes: GET /api/tariff (active + history, any signed-in role), POST /api/tariff/versions (publish an immutable, effective-dated version; admin only). The single site tariff row is created lazily. Editing = publish a new version; past sessions keep their pricing. Web: TariffComposer in the admin shell — edit currency, grace windows, increment, daily cap, lost-ticket fee, and add/remove rate blocks (major-unit input -> minor on submit); shows active version + history. Verified via inject: empty -> active null; invalid blocks -> 400 with problem; valid -> 201; readonly publish -> 403; after publishing, the pay station quote returns 404 (no session) instead of 409 (no tariff) -- it now prices against the active card. |
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f18e28eeca |
server: pay station + fee calc — full transient loop now passes
computeFee() in @parking/shared: pure integer fee over a TariffStructure (stepped blocks, rolling-24h cap). Two edges fixed under test: grace uses RAW duration (not rounded-up minutes), and the block ladder resets each 24h day. PayStation + routes (GET /api/pay/quote, POST /api/pay): look up the open session, resolve the active tariff version (latest effectiveFrom <= entry), computeFee, append a signed payment event (amount/currency/tender/ tariffVersionId/graceExitMin). overrideMinor handles lost-ticket/dispute. PCI stays out of the app: tender only records cash/card. Verified end to end: entry -> quote (300 for 90min) -> pay -> exit opens and closes the session, verifyChain ok. |
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8c2cf93067 |
db: business-layer schema — ledger/device event split, tariffs, permits, sessions
Implements the wiki design in packages/db + packages/shared. Event split: rename events -> ledger_events (signed business ledger) and add device_events (unsigned telemetry). ledger_events gains a signed JSON payload (amount/tariffVersionId/sessionRef/tender…) + keyId; canonicalize() includes the payload via sorted-key serialization so business data is tamper-evident. Raw Dingtian input now writes device_events, not a signed input_received. New tables: tariffs + immutable tariff_versions (composable/versioned, currency + FX-ready), permits (+ permit_credentials, permit_plates; maxConcurrent default 1), blocklist, sessions (rebuildable projection cache — not a source of truth). shared: split ParkingEvent/Type into LedgerEvent/LedgerEventType + DeviceEventKind; add LedgerPayload, Tender, TariffStructure/TariffBlock. Regenerated a single baseline migration (no production chain data existed). Verified: chain appends + verifyChain ok; tampering a payment payload breaks the signature. Full repo builds (5/5). |
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add5fc0166 |
Append-only signed event log; persist Dingtian input pushes
Implement the core anti-fraud primitive: an append-only, hash-chained, signed event log (the schema + types predated this; the writer/signer are new). - EventLog (apps/server): serialized append, monotonic index, prevHash chain, signature; verifyChain() detects tamper/reorder/delete. No update/delete paths. - Signer abstraction (packages/shared) over the ATECC608 secure element, with a SoftwareSigner (HMAC, EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) shipped now since the chip is still open-question #6. Documented: software signer is tamper-evident but NOT unforgeable-by-owner. - Add ParkingEventType "input_received" for raw device inputs (not yet a vehicle_entry, which the entry flow will append later). - Read API: GET /api/events; integrity self-check: GET /api/events/verify (admin). Verified on hardware: shorting the Dingtian inputs produced signed, chained input_received events; verifyChain ok; direct DB tamper/delete detected. NOTE: the log captures host-originated actions only. Out-of-band relay actuation (sniffed relay_pw, string protocol, ip_watchdog) produces no event by design -- the control is reconciliation vs. an independent witness, which is not yet built. See wiki/concepts/append-only-event-chain.md. |
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bfe64032d8 |
Initial scaffold: Turborepo monorepo + design wiki
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration. |