Skeleton of the host-side vision service per the packaging decision: a Python/FastAPI
app at apps/vision/, uv-managed, wired into the Turbo graph via a thin package.json
shim (dev/lint/test/build → uv/uvicorn/ruff/pytest). A per-package turbo.json sets
build outputs [] so the no-op build is warning-free.
Endpoints: GET /health (readiness + model version) and POST /analyze (raw
octet-stream body, so Node POSTs Snapshot.bytes directly; empty→400, oversize→413,
recognizer-not-ready→503). The recognizer is a Protocol with a StubRecognizer (no
models, boots/tests offline — the dev/CI default) and a FastAlprRecognizer (the real
MIT YOLOv9+CCT/ONNX stack, lazily imported; missing models ⇒ ready=False, not a crash)
— the device-adapter pattern applied to the model. fast-alpr + onnxruntime are an
optional `alpr` extra, so `uv sync` needs no model download.
Verified: turbo run lint|test|build includes @parking/vision and stays green; uv run
mypy strict-clean; uvicorn boots and serves /health + /analyze live; pnpm workspace
6→7. Not built yet: the Node VisionClient adapter, a Dockerfile + model fetch, and
Job 2 (vehicle verification). Updates the packaging decision (As-scaffolded) + log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Settle WHERE the host-side ANPR service lives and how it joins the build: in this
monorepo at apps/vision/ (not a separate repo), still a separate OS process called
over localhost HTTP, wired into the Turbo graph via a thin package.json shim whose
scripts shell to Python tooling (uv/uvicorn/ruff/pytest). Co-located source honors the
vision-service runtime+license isolation decision (AGPL reach is a linking boundary,
not a folder); the fast-alpr MIT baseline removes most of the split-repo pressure
anyway. New page vision-service-packaging; updates vision-service, opencv-anpr-service,
the CLAUDE.md layout, index, log. Not built yet — packaging decision only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Research note from the recognizer-options query. fast-alpr v0.4.0 (MIT) — a swappable
YOLOv9-detector + CCT-OCR pipeline on ONNX Runtime, CPU-only and offline — fits the
decided vision-service architecture and is MIT end-to-end (code + published weights),
so the ANPR path may not need the scoped AGPL exception. Flags the open caveats:
verify model-weight provenance, and benchmark AL-plate accuracy (default global vs.
the 40+ country EU model). fast-alpr is plate-only, so the vehicle-verification job
stays ours to build. Decision kept open. Updates opencv-anpr-service (new "Recognizer
evaluation" section + licensing nuance), vision-service (open/next), index, log.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Sync the two canonical reference pages with this session's features: local-jwt-auth
gains the new log resource / log:read permission in the RBAC grid (links app-logs);
first-run-setup notes the one-car-one-ticket presence-loop/cooldown guard the admin
configures on a relay (links entry-double-press).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Three booth-integrity improvements that share the entry/exit flows and activity log.
Refusal snapshots: previously only an accepted open captured a camera image; now
every refusal/hold anomaly fires the directional camera too (a turned-away car is
exactly the evidence wanted) — entry refused-full/held, exit refused
closed/no-session/unpaid/grace-expired (booth + reader paths), refused subscription.
A refused entry has no ticket id, so a synthetic REFUSED- ref keys the anomaly + photo
together. Same fire-and-forget contract; failed captures still show as tiles.
Subscriber access medium: the subscription flow already signed `via`
(qr|card|plate) into entry/exit payloads; surface it as a typed LedgerPayload.via, a
cyan chip in the ticker, and an "Entry medium" modal row (sq+en). Display-only.
One car = one ticket: the entry button could be mashed to mint many tickets per car
(corrupting occupancy + enabling ticket-shopping at exit) — the old #inFlight guard
only blocked overlapping presses. Add a per-relay guard configured on the relay spec:
PRESENCE mode (presenceInput ties ticketing to a vehicle loop on a Dingtian input —
one ticket per car, re-armed when the loop clears) or COOLDOWN fallback
(entryCooldownSec) when there's no barrier feedback. A suppressed press is unsigned
device_events telemetry, not a signed anomaly. SetupWizard exposes both fields.
Fail-closed entry and barrier-is-not-a-door invariants untouched; guard state is
in-memory/rebuildable, starts armed after restart.
Wiki: new entry-double-press; updated entry-exit-points, booth-console, index.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Add a third data stream (app_logs), distinct from the signed ledger and device
telemetry, for operational/diagnostic logs — an offline appliance has no Sentry to
ship to, so the host is the log store.
Backend: a pino stream tees warn/error/fatal into app_logs (info/debug stay
stdout-only) with no call-site change; the DB is built before Fastify so the logger
has its sink. Frontend (lib/logger.ts): ships failed API requests (minus 401 churn),
window.onerror, unhandledrejection, and a top-level React ErrorBoundary; console
warn/error forwarded only at debug/trace. Batched/throttled POST, sendBeacon on
pagehide, loop-safe (never logs the /api/logs call), best-effort everywhere.
POST /api/logs (any signed-in user, CSRF, tolerant) + GET /api/logs gated by a new
log:read permission (new `log` RBAC resource; admin holds it). Retention: pruned by
age + row cap, hourly + at startup. UI: a Logs screen under /setup (filter
level/source/since, expand to context+stack), sq+en. Migration 0009_app_logs.
Verified end-to-end via app.inject: login -> POST 204 -> GET 200 with the record;
backend warn/error persisted, info dropped; non-admin GET 403 / POST 204.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
The dynamic-RBAC management routes are themselves grantable (role:* and
user:*), so a non-admin holding them could self-escalate: edit their own
role to add a permission they lack, mint a privileged role, assign someone
the admin role, or reset/delete a more-privileged account. Found by the
commit security review (2× HIGH).
Fix — enforce the RBAC invariant "you cannot grant beyond yourself":
- roles.ts: role:create/update reject any permission not held by the caller
(escalates()). An admin holds the full set, so it stays unrestricted.
- users.ts: user:create/update reject assigning a role whose permissions
exceed the caller's; update/password-reset/delete reject acting on a user
whose current role exceeds the caller's (exceedsCaller()).
The existing no-lockout + builtin-admin protections are unchanged.
Verified: 10-assertion inject test — manager (role:* + user:* but no
tariff:update, not admin) gets 403 on self-grant, minting a privileged role,
assigning/resetting/deleting an admin; admin stays unrestricted; the manager
can still create peers + in-scope roles (not over-blocked). Full build green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Replace the hardcoded role enum (admin/operator/cashier/readonly, checked
literally as requireRole("admin",...) across ~15 routes) with dynamic RBAC:
roles are DATA, route guards check a PERMISSION.
@parking/shared defines a code-defined grid: RESOURCES (user/role/tariff/
subscription/site/device/shift/payment/session/event/report) × Action
(create/read/update/delete + domain verbs void/cash) -> PERMISSIONS
(resource:action, e.g. tariff:update, payment:create, event:void).
DB: new roles + role_permissions tables; users.role enum -> role_id FK;
migration 0007_rbac (create tables, seed the builtin admin role + all 26
perms, seed operator/cashier/readonly composable roles matching old
behaviour, rebuild users to swap the column copying all rows).
auth.ts: JWT payload role -> roleId; permissionsFor(roleId) with an
in-memory cache + bumpPermsCache(); requirePermission(...perms) preHandler;
requireAuth for /me & /language; initAuth(db) wires the resolver once. Every
route guard mapped to a permission; device ingress (devices/qr-reader) stays
auth-free by design. New routes/users.ts (user:* CRUD, bcrypt 12, last-admin
guard) + routes/roles.ts (role:* CRUD, builtin-protected, perms validated
against the grid, cache bump on write). auth/me + /login return
{roleId, roleName, permissions, language}. seed-admin -> roleId:'admin'.
Frontend: SessionUser carries permissions + can() helper; router nav/route
guards gate by permission (requirePerm replaces adminOnly); SiteSettings
edit gated by site:update; new UsersManager + RolesManager (permission
checkbox grid; admin role locked); i18n nav.users/roles + blocks (sq+en).
Decisions: one role per user; protected built-in admin (no-lockout: the last
admin can't be deleted/downgraded); JWT carries roleId, perms resolved
per-request so role edits apply immediately (no re-login).
Verified: full build green; 20-assertion inject test passes (cashier 403s on
tariff publish + user list, admin passes, granting a perm applies on the next
request, last-admin + builtin-role protections return 409); migration 0007
applied to a copy of the live DB (incl WAL/shm) — existing admin maps to
role_id='admin', all rows preserved. Append-only event chain untouched
(event:void gates appending a void, not a delete).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
After a completed payment the customer always gets a transparency record:
entry time, payment time, duration parked, amount + tender. One shared
ESC/POS renderer (renderReceipt + ReceiptData in @parking/devices), two
modes: VOUCHER = those figures PLUS the scannable Code128 barcode and an
emphasised walk-back-grace line, so the one slip both proves payment and
self-exits at a distant exit reader (replaced the old barcode-only voucher);
STANDALONE = detail-only, auto-printed at payment when no voucher is issued.
Figures fold from the SIGNED ledger (latest payment event); printed on the
booth printer (failover to dispenser). Best-effort: a printer fault never
blocks the exit that already happened — the modal shows a note and offers
"Reprint receipt".
Server: booth-print.ts printPaymentReceipt() + receiptFigures(); routes
POST /api/voucher (voucher) + new POST /api/receipt (standalone/reprint).
Both ESC/POS drivers gained printReceipt(). Web: BoothPayModal auto-prints
after a non-voucher payment + reprint button; api.ts printReceipt().
CP852 fixes found on a real printout: (1) uppercase Ë was mapped to 0xEB
(that's ű) — correct byte is 0xD3; (2) Intl.NumberFormat injects a NO-BREAK
SPACE (U+00A0/U+202F) that isn't in CP852 and printed as "?" — line() now
normalises it to a plain space ("1000 Lekë"); (3) grace line wrapped
mid-word — split into two short lines.
Full build green; both receipt modes render-verified; routes live.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
The rongta-printer "Deployment" section still described a single
2026-06-14 unit. The live site now runs two: entry-dispenser 10.0.10.9
(Cashino, `cashino` ping-only driver) and booth-receipt 10.0.10.10
(Rongta, full status-page monitoring). Follow-up to 3e6773a.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
The Cashino 80mm printer reported wrong status: it ran on the `rongta`
driver, whose readStatus() scrapes the Rongta board's /prn_stat.htm status
page — which the Cashino does not serve — yielding a bogus degraded/page-
error verdict while the printer was online and printing fine. Root cause:
the Cashino is an ESC/POS PRINT clone with no trustworthy STATUS mechanism.
Fix: extract the shared ESC/POS rendering + transport (renderTicket/
renderReport/renderSubscriptionCard/sendRaw/probe + CP852 map + code128/
qrCode) from printer-rongta into drivers/printer-escpos.ts, and add a
dedicated `cashino` driver that reuses that print path but is deliberately
NOT MonitorableDevice (no readStatus). isMonitorable() is then false, so the
device monitor falls back to healthCheck() — a plain TCP reachability ping:
reachable -> ready, unreachable -> offline, never a guessed paper/cover
state it cannot sense. Rongta driver unchanged (still scrapes its page,
still monitorable). Register + re-export cashinoDriver.
Verified at runtime (cashino registered, isMonitorable=false, no readStatus,
healthCheck->offline on unreachable) and live: /api/devices/status shows both
printers ready (lane via ping, booth via page). The live entry-dispenser at
10.0.10.9 was switched rongta->cashino in the operator DB (backed up).
Also fix the Albanian device-role chip wording, which read wrong as a
"{category} {role}" label: access mixed "i përzier" -> "hyrje/dalje"
(it means a barrier spanning both directions); printer lane "korsia" ->
"në korsi"; booth "kabina" -> "në kabinë". English tidied to match
(mixed->entry/exit, lane->at lane, booth->at booth).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Bring the legacy ParkSQL2017 pricing BREADTH onto our engine while keeping
integer-minor-unit money + immutable signed versions (rejecting legacy's
float money / mutable rows). TariffStructure becomes a discriminated union:
V1 = the original bare ladder (UNCHANGED, verbatim algorithm, golden-
regression-tested against the live version); V2 = {version:2, tz, shared
knobs, defaultCard, windowedCards[]} where each card is flat OR a block
ladder and may be scoped by wall-clock hour window / day-of-week / date
range / vehicle category.
computeFeeV2 prices by stepping one increment at a time, advancing the
ladder by ELAPSED minutes (continuous) while selecting the active card by
WALL-CLOCK time in the version's FROZEN tz. Decisions: tz is a per-site
setting (site_config.timezone, default Europe/Tirane) stamped server-side
into each version on publish — never the host clock (reproducibility);
default-card cap governs a mixed day; precedence = specificity
(date>dow>hour) -> priority -> name (total, order-independent), validation
rejects ambiguous ties; category = a card FIELD, frozen in the signed
vehicle_entry payload (site_config.default_vehicle_category default), read
at both pricing call-sites.
Composer: default card front-and-centre (flat/ladder toggle), tiers under
an "Advanced" disclosure; emits BARE V1 when no tiers (back-compat). DB:
migrations 0005 (timezone) + 0006 (default_vehicle_category). Stood up
vitest in @parking/shared (was zero tests on the ledger-feeding fee fn);
36 tests incl. golden V1 regression, happy-hour/overnight/dow/flat/category/
cap edges, precedence shuffle-invariance, Europe/Tirane DST determinism,
validation matrix — all green. No event-chain change.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Linked Claude Design project "TRM — Tracking & Race Management" is a
race-timing kit, not a parking design. Adopted its TOKENS only — no TRM
components. Aligned the existing term-* accents onto TRM's exact night/
semantic values (surfaces → night scale; amber→#f2a516, green→#2e8c4a,
red→#e8412b flag, cyan→#2563c8 blue) so the whole booth UI shifts palette
with zero component edits. Exposed TRM's full vocabulary (night/ink/paper
scales, flag/amber/green/blue, viz-1..8, 4px spacing, type scale, square
radii, sharp offset shadows) as Tailwind v4 utilities for new work.
Offline appliance: dropped TRM's Google-Fonts @import (no runtime network);
Goldplay display face not self-hosted yet — falls back to a sans stack.
Web build green; login renders on the new palette.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
The stepped-block engine already does "first N hrs x X, next N hrs x Y, ...,
24h cap" (ordered blocks, per-block rate, rolling-24h cap). No new axis; this
completes the model and removes its footgun.
- validateTariffStructure (shared) now REQUIRES the last block to be open-ended
(uptoMin: null). A bounded final block silently inherited its own rate past
its bound (a hidden, never-stated price — e.g. the live ALL tariff billed
hour 4+ at the 3rd-hour rate). rateAt() still prices legacy bounded-tail
versions; validation is publish-only, so published immutable versions are
unaffected (no migration).
- TariffComposer edits bands as a DURATION in hours ("first 2 hours, then next
3 hours"), accumulated into the engine's cumulative uptoMin (minutes) on
submit. The last row is a pinned, non-removable "thereafter (open-ended)"
band, so a published card always satisfies the open-ended-last rule.
blocksToForm round-trips stored minutes back to band hours (legacy loads).
- i18n: replaced upToMin/egExample with bandDuration/hoursUnit/egHours (sq+en,
catalog parity green).
Verified: validator rejects bounded-last / accepts open-ended; computeFee
correct at 1/2/3/5/6/24h for a 0-2h@200,2-5h@100,5h+@50 + 1000 cap card. Full
build green. Wiki (tariff.md, log.md) updated.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Rounds out subscriptions across enrollment, the barrier flow, and the booth.
- RFID credentials enabled with a "Read card" enrollment flow: the operator
arms ONE chosen reader (CredentialCapture, single-shot + ~30s TTL); that
reader's next read is captured into the form and NOT dispatched to the access
flow — the OTHER reader keeps serving live entry/exit. Routes:
/api/subscriptions/readers + /capture/{arm,cancel} + poll.
- Enter with one credential, exit with another: sessions are keyed by a
per-occurrence id (SUBSESS-<short>), not the credential value, with
permitId in the payload. Direction is decided by the barrier the reader sits
at (entry-lane→entry, exit-lane→exit; "both" infers); a fleet (maxConcurrent>1)
admits several cars and exits any with any credential, FIFO (oldest first).
- Booth treats a subscription occurrence as PREPAID: never quoted/charged; the
pay/exit modal shows a subscription mode (snapshots + a single audited
Open-barrier action) to assist a faulty exit reader / missing card;
reopenBarrier authorizes paidAt!=null OR subscription. Active Sessions badges
"abonim" and labels by holder name (not the raw key).
- Plus a per-read diagnostic log in the QR-reader route (serial → device →
verdict/dir), which surfaced the earlier duplicate-reader-IP misroute.
Verified via buildServer+inject + reader-scan/TCP-capture simulations
(enrollment isolation, cross-credential + FIFO fleet, prepaid-not-charged,
subscription reopen, unpaid-transient guard). Updated wiki (subscription,
booth-exit-flow). No migration.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Builds out subscription credentials on top of the rename.
- Operator chooses the credential type; only QR is live (RFID shown disabled
"soon"). Backend/schema keep accepting both — re-enabling RFID is UI-only.
- QR codes are AUTO-GENERATED server-side (SUB-<base32>, crypto-random,
globally-unique-checked) — the customer/operator never picks the value.
RF stays operator-entered (the physical card id). Reader output decided =
TCP/IP full string (Wiegand-numeric fallback noted).
- Multi-month: form takes a `months` count → server sets validTo =
validFrom + N months (day-clamp); one record/one window; total = N×monthly.
- The QR card is PRINTED so the operator can hand it over: real ESC/POS 2D QR
(GS ( k) added to the Rongta driver (printSubscriptionCard); auto-print on
create (best-effort — never fails the create; returns {printed,printError})
+ reprint via POST /api/subscriptions/:id/print and a "Print code" button.
Verified via buildServer+inject incl. a TCP capture of the on-wire QR bytes
(autogen+uniqueness, Jan31+3mo→Apr30, auto-print, GS ( k QR with embedded
code, reprint, no-QR→409). Updated wiki (subscription, rongta-printer). No
migration.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
The "permit/lejet" feature is really a subscription. Full rename of the
mutable master data, plus a recurring monthly price.
- DB (migration 0004, data-preserving ALTER RENAME): permits→subscriptions,
permit_credentials/_plates→subscription_*, sessions.permit_id→subscription_id.
- Pricing: per-subscription priceMinor + period(monthly) + currency, with a
site default (site_config.subscription_monthly_price_minor) pre-filling the form.
- Server: subscription-flow.ts (SubscriptionFlow), routes/subscriptions.ts
(/api/subscriptions). Web: SubscriptionManager, route, i18n (sq Abonimet/en).
- The signed ledger `permitId` payload is intentionally kept — immutable
hash-chained history; renaming it would break verification of past events.
Deferred (wiki notes): fee collection into the ledger/shift (a shift-attributed
payment), LPR/ANPR plate source, time-of-day access windows (overnight subscriber).
Also carries the device-footer UI surface (api DeviceStatus, router mount,
i18n devices) due to shared-file overlap with the preceding footer commit.
Verified end-to-end on a fresh DB and migration on a live-DB copy (sessions
preserved). Live DB migrated. Full monorepo builds clean.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
A paid car that left via a manual barrier re-open kept no vehicle_exit, so
activeSessions() saw it as permanently open and the grace-expiry eviction
(which only ran for exited sessions) never fired — it lingered forever
(ticket T-397815c0).
- reopenBarrier() now signs a vehicle_exit (source:manual) when the session
is still open, closing it; still no second exit when already exited
(phantom re-close — no double-count).
- activeSessions() ages out a PAID open session past grace even with no exit
(unpaid open sessions never age out — a car owing money stays). Pure
display filter; the signed log is untouched.
Verified both fixes + chain integrity on a fresh DB. A one-off corrective
vehicle_exit was appended to the live ledger to clear T-397815c0.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Generalise printer-only monitoring to every configured device. New
DeviceMonitor polls all enabled devices each tick (default 8s): printers
via rich readStatus(), relays/readers/cameras via the generic healthCheck()
reachability probe, flattened to one traffic-light (ready/degraded/offline)
+ detail, deduped (emit on change only), fail-toward-offline.
- device-status bus event + GET /api/devices/status snapshot.
- Pushed over the existing /api/ws (hello carries the initial set;
device-status frame per change).
- Web: live-store devices map, WS handler, DeviceFooter chip-per-device
(role label not vendor; click a degraded/offline chip for an issues panel).
Verified roleKind resolution + change-only emit on a fresh DB.
Note: the footer's UI surface (api type, router mount, i18n devices) rides
in the subsequent subscription commit due to shared-file overlap.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
A shift becomes a SITE-WIDE accountability period — at most one open at a
time — so every taking is unambiguously attributed to one operator. Login
stays decoupled from shifts (an operator can log in off-shift to review).
Backend:
- ShiftService.currentOpenShift()/requireOpenShift(); open() refuses when ANY
shift is open and throws ShiftAlreadyOpenError{heldBy} (self vs. other).
- requireShift preHandler gates /api/pay, /api/exit, /api/voucher,
/api/barrier/reopen → 409 {code:"no_shift"}; read-only lookups stay open.
- GET /api/shift/current returns site-wide {open:{startedAt,operator},isMine}.
- GET /api/events?since=<iso> for per-shift log scoping (db: re-export gte).
Frontend:
- Header shift button: open / close-mine / disabled-when-another-holds-it.
- Pay/exit modal gate banner (one-click open; "held by X" when another's);
pay/exit/voucher disabled until this operator's shift is open.
- Active-Sessions barrier re-open gated the same way.
- Live feed scoped to the open shift's window; shared useShift() Query
invalidated over the WS on shift_open/shift_z_report/cash_movement.
- sq/en strings for the control + gate.
Wiki: shift.md (site-wide single-open + gate; superseded per-operator note),
booth-console.md (header control + gate), log entry.
Verified: site-wide invariant + heldBy + handover + chain integrity on a
fresh migrated DB (11/11); db/server/web build clean.
File concept pages for the operator-UI architecture ([[booth-console]]: stack,
/api/ws live feed, anti-CSWSH) and [[i18n]] (per-user server-stored language;
resolves a dangling code-comment link). Qualify the stale 'plain React' note on
react-vite-spa. Backfill log entries for the live WebSocket, frontend foundation,
and i18n builds (which had none), plus a reconciliation lint entry. Catalog
booth-exit-flow + the two new pages in index; fix the concept count (27→41).
Catalog the new concept/source pages and append chronological log entries for the
tariff research, live WebSocket, booth pay/exit, active sessions, and shift drawer
work.
New signed cash_movement event (admin-only): load/remove drawer float, signed +
attributed. ShiftService folds cash payments + movements by time into a drawer
balance; shift open auto-inherits the prior shift's expected closing drawer as its
opening float; the Z-report reports opening/taken/added/removed/expected (= next
shift's opening float). Card payments excluded (settle to bank). Routes: POST
/api/cash-movement, drawer in GET /api/shift/current. ShiftControl shows the live
drawer + admin load/remove form + Z-report drawer block. Wiki: shift.md.
Active Sessions panel lists sessions that are open OR exited-but-within-grace
(barrier state is unconfirmed, so a paid car is presumed possibly-present until
grace expires). Row click → pay/exit modal; 'Open barrier' (paid sessions only —
no payment, no button) fires a human-intervention re-pulse signed as an attributed
anomaly, never a second vehicle_exit. Wiki: booth-exit-flow.md.
Note: the backend (PayStation.activeSessions, ExitFlow.reopenBarrier, routes,
api.ts) landed with the prior commit's shared files.
Ingest the predecessor SQL Server schema (raw + source summary) and file design
pages for time-of-day/seasonal tariff tiers and merchant validation/postpaid
sponsorship. Cross-link tariff.md and validation-discounts.md. No code.
- site_config gains optional park identity (park_name, operator_name, nius,
address, phone, email); additive Drizzle migration 0001. GET/PUT
/api/site-config read/write the full config (PUT partial patch, admin only);
SiteSettings + SetupWizard expose the fields.
- renderTicket() prints an Albanian header sourced from site_config, the
all-numeric 13-digit ticket id (12 random + Luhn) as Code128, large digits,
and a lost-ticket footer. CP852 codepage so ë/ç render.
- Widen the Code128 module width 2->3 and height 80->100 dots so the
short-range "Simple" QR/barcode reader decodes reliably (was barely reading
at module width 2 on the 80mm head).
See wiki/concepts/site-metadata.md and ticket-encoding.md.
A parking lot is one pool of spaces with a flexible set of entry/exit
points — no "lane". Direction is a property of each RELAY inside an access
controller; readers/cameras bind to a controller relay and inherit it.
Schema:
- drop `lane` from ledger_events, device_events, sessions
- rename lane_devices -> devices (no lane/direction columns)
- access config.relays=[{relay,direction,button?}]; reader/camera
config.controllerId+relay binding
- fresh 0000_baseline migration (history reset; dev data was throwaway)
Signed ledger:
- remove `lane` from canonicalize(); bump signer keyId sw-hmac-v1 -> v2
(v1 events won't verify under v2 — intentional, gated per-event by keyId)
Server:
- new device-resolve.ts (replaces lane-map.ts): relayForButton,
relayForDevice, firstRelayByDirection, devicesByDirection
- entry-flow: button terminal -> its relay; exit/permit: reader's bound
relay; dispatcher resolves the bound relay + inherited direction
- camera snapshots fire by direction site-wide, async, never block open
- DeviceConfig widened to nested JSON for relays[]
Web:
- wizard: no lane selector; add controllers (relay map + entry-button
terminal) first, then bind readers/cameras/printers to a controller relay
Wiki: new entry-exit-points.md (replaces lane-direction); reworked
entry-exit-readers, parking-session, first-run-setup, device-registry,
append-only-event-chain, device-events; removed stale lane/LaneMap mentions.
The reader sends Connection: keep-alive but only acts on the verdict (beep,
output) once the TCP socket closes. Fastify's default kept the connection alive,
so the reader waited out a ~10s keep-alive timeout before beeping — even though
the server replied in ~15ms. Every vendor demo replies Connection: close and
shuts the socket. Set reply.header('connection','close') on the QR endpoint.
Verified the header is now sent; symptom was correct accept/reject with a ~10s
lag before the beep.
A live QR scan reached the app but rejected: 'reader not on an access-equipped
lane' — the dispatcher requires an access device on the reader's lane. Add a
no-op stub-access driver (access category, no config) whose pulseOpen only logs
and does no device I/O, so the QR->permit->accept flow (incl. the beep) can be
tested without the Dingtian relay connected. Not for production; registered in
the catalog.
The QR reader is a push device and the setup wizard assigns random-UUID ids, so
'id = serial' can't be set via the UI. Add a dedicated gee-qr-reader driver
(reader category) with a single 'serial' config field; the admin assigns it
normally and enters the device's serial (its cjihao).
The QR endpoint now resolves the lane by matching lane_devices.config.serial to
the scan's cjihao (instead of row id == cjihao), so no DB hand-editing. An
unassigned serial resolves to no lane -> status:0, gracefully.
Verified via inject through the real /api/setup/assign: assign {serial:
H05M2AFA} -> .jsp scan with a matching permit QR -> status:1 (accept) + open;
re-scan -> permit exit; unknown card -> status:0; unassigned serial -> status:0.
Hardware capture: the GEE/Fondvision reader (serial H05M2AFA) scans + sends +
beeps fine — the earlier 'no beep' was just nothing answering :3000. Real
request: GET /qa/mcardsea.jsp?cardid=...&cjihao=H05M2AFA&... — the 'server
language' setting (JSP here) selects the URL EXTENSION, so it posts .jsp, not
.php. Our route was .php-only and would have 404'd it.
Register the endpoint at php/jsp/asp/aspx/cgi so it works whatever the device is
configured to. cjihao (serial) is the lane key: assign the reader as
lane_devices.id = its serial.
The reader HTTP-GETs on each scan and beeps/acts on our JSON reply (host-in-the-
loop, synchronous). New route GET/POST /qa/mcardsea.php parses the SDK query,
runs the scan through the read dispatcher (permit match -> permit flow; else
transient exit), and replies the SDK verdict: status 1=valid (beep 2x) /
0=invalid (beep 1x), output, time-sync.
Refactored the read flows to return a ReadOutcome {accepted, direction, reason}
so the reply reflects the real accept/reject decision (ReadDispatcher.dispatch,
ExitFlow.handleAt, PermitFlow.run). Fire-and-forget readers ignore it.
Reader's lane is keyed off its serial (cjihao) as lane_devices.id for now;
endpoint is public (reader has no auth, on the device subnet).
Verified via inject: valid permit QR -> status:1 + open; re-scan -> permit exit;
unknown QR -> status:0; barrier-less lane -> status:0.
The QRCode SDK v1.6.5 settles the reader protocol (supersedes the earlier
serial guess). On each scan the reader HTTP-GETs the host
(/qa/mcardsea.php?cardid&mjihao&cjihao&status&time); the host replies JSON
{data:[{...,status,output}],code:0}. Reply status 1=valid(beep 2x)/0=invalid
(beep 1x); output 0=Access/1=WG26/2=WG34; time syncs the clock. The GET's status
low digit is the direction (1=in/0=out).
Key: the beep/accept is decided by the SERVER REPLY, not locally -- the 'no
beep' during bring-up was a plain-text reply, not a scan failure. Host-in-the-
loop and synchronous. 'Server language' only selects the URL path; transport is
plain HTTP.
New source page qrcode-sdk; updated gee-qr-er80 (protocol resolved), index.
The reader on hand is a GEE-QR-ER80 QR/DataMatrix/1D barcode access reader
(not an EM4100 prox-card reader as first guessed). Interfaces: Wiegand 26/34,
RS-232, RS-485, USB, TCP/IP; 4-15 VDC; Linux-supported. Variant on hand: -Q-W
(QR scanner, Wiegand/RS-232/485).
This is the QR-ticket scanner the design already needed: a host-side reader
whose scans become read-bus events consumed by the (already-built) exit flow
and QR-permit path. Prefer RS-232/485 over Wiegand (Wiegand can't carry a
variable-length QR string; autonomy is moot with the no-ACL Dingtian).
New source + entity pages; updated ticket-encoding, entry-exit-readers, index.
Open (blocks the adapter): the RS-232/485 frame + baud (ASCII CR/LF expected).
Occupancy is a fold over the signed ledger (entries minus exits per identity);
getOccupancy returns {count, capacity, free, full}. Capacity is a single-row
site_config table (admin-set; null = uncapped; migration 0001, additive).
FULL gate lives in the transient entry flow: when full, refuse (no ticket, no
vehicle_entry, no open) and sign an anomaly. Permit entry is NOT gated --
subscribers are admitted past transient-full (their own maxConcurrent still
applies), so occupancy can read over capacity by design (reserve-for-permits).
Routes: GET /api/occupancy + GET /api/site-config (any role), PUT
/api/site-config (admin; non-negative int or null). Web SiteSettings: live
occupancy + FULL badge (everyone), capacity editor (admin).
Verified: fill to cap -> 3rd transient refused; permit admitted past full; exit
frees a slot; RBAC (operator can't set, -5 -> 400); verifyChain ok. Physical
FULL-sign relay output deferred.
A shift is two signed ledger events, no mutable table: new shift_open event
type + existing shift_z_report. The operator is the logged-in user (carried in
event identity); a shift is open iff their latest shift event is a shift_open.
ShiftService: close sums payment events in [start,end] by tender (cash/card, by
payment time), appends the signed shift_z_report (totals/counts/window), and
prints via a new generic PrinterDevice.printReport(title, lines) (Rongta ESC/POS
text) to a booth-receipt printer. Print is best-effort — a failed print does not
undo the signed close.
Routes (cashier/operator/admin): GET /api/shift/current, POST /api/shift/open
(409 if open), POST /api/shift/close (409 if none). Web ShiftControl in the
shell (non-readonly): Start/End + Z-report totals.
Verified: open -> double-open 409 -> payments (cash+card; one outside the window
excluded) -> close totals correct + signed + printed -> close-again 409 ->
re-open ok; readonly 403; verifyChain ok.
A permit is an aggregate (row + credentials + bound plates); create/update
treat it as one unit (child sets replaced on update). GET /api/permits (any
signed-in role, for lookup); POST/PUT/DELETE + POST /:id/revoke (admin only).
Validation: maxConcurrent positive-int-or-null (unbound); a permit must have at
least one credential OR one bound plate. Revoke is the soft common case (keeps
history, barred at the barrier); DELETE hard-removes — past ledger events that
reference it are untouched (append-only audit trail, independent of this row).
Web PermitManager in the admin shell: list + add/edit (holder, car-bound toggle,
validity, credentials, plates), revoke, delete. Makes permits usable without
hand-seeding (companion to the tariff composer).
Verified via inject: validation (empty / maxConcurrent=0 -> 400), create -> 201,
operator can LIST but not write (403), update replaces child rows, revoke ->
revoked, delete -> 204 then 404 with children cleaned.
A credential read now routes by what the credential IS: matches a permit
(card/QR credential or a bound plate) -> permit flow; else -> transient exit
flow. Lane resolved once (readerLaneWithAccess); ExitFlow.onRead -> handleAt so
the dispatcher owns lane resolution.
Permit direction is inferred from session state for that car (the read value is
the per-car session key): no open session -> ENTRY (enforce maxConcurrent, sign
vehicle_entry, open); open -> EXIT (sign vehicle_exit, open, close). Fleet
permit = one session per car; anti-passback falls out naturally.
maxConcurrent enforced as a fold over the signed ledger (null = unbound).
Validity window + status + plate-OR-card identity as designed. No ticket/fee;
every use is a signed event carrying permitId. Refusals (revoked / out-of-window
/ at-capacity) are signed anomalies, barrier stays closed.
Verified against stubs: card entry -> inferred exit; fleet cap 2 (F3 rejected
at 2/2, then admitted after F1 exits); plate-bound opens; revoked rejects;
unknown credential falls through to exit reject; verifyChain ok.
validateTariffStructure (shared): non-negative ints, ascending block bounds,
only the last block open-ended — a malformed card can't be published.
Routes: GET /api/tariff (active + history, any signed-in role), POST
/api/tariff/versions (publish an immutable, effective-dated version; admin
only). The single site tariff row is created lazily. Editing = publish a new
version; past sessions keep their pricing.
Web: TariffComposer in the admin shell — edit currency, grace windows,
increment, daily cap, lost-ticket fee, and add/remove rate blocks (major-unit
input -> minor on submit); shows active version + history.
Verified via inject: empty -> active null; invalid blocks -> 400 with problem;
valid -> 201; readonly publish -> 403; after publishing, the pay station quote
returns 404 (no session) instead of 409 (no tariff) -- it now prices against the
active card.
computeFee() in @parking/shared: pure integer fee over a TariffStructure
(stepped blocks, rolling-24h cap). Two edges fixed under test: grace uses RAW
duration (not rounded-up minutes), and the block ladder resets each 24h day.
PayStation + routes (GET /api/pay/quote, POST /api/pay): look up the open
session, resolve the active tariff version (latest effectiveFrom <= entry),
computeFee, append a signed payment event (amount/currency/tender/
tariffVersionId/graceExitMin). overrideMinor handles lost-ticket/dispute. PCI
stays out of the app: tender only records cash/card.
Verified end to end: entry -> quote (300 for 90min) -> pay -> exit opens and
closes the session, verifyChain ok.
Booth reality breaks a fixed clock (relief late/absent, forced double shifts),
and a shift is a separate explicit boundary. Drop expiresIn from the global jwt
config and from login; the token carries no exp. Cookie maxAge = 30 days so a
browser restart doesn't log out an active operator; logout still clears it.
A credential read at an exit lane validates the session, then opens. Adds a
'read' channel to the device bus (DeviceReadEvent: ticket/plate/qr/card);
entry stays button-driven so reads are exit/identity events.
Flow: read -> fold the SIGNED ledger for that identity -> validate open + PAID
+ within gracePeriodExitMin -> signed vehicle_exit -> pulseOpen -> close the
session cache. Unpaid / grace-expired / unknown -> signed anomaly, barrier
stays closed (a deliberate business reject, not a fail-state; 'exit fails open'
is about host/power loss). Validation reads the ledger (authoritative), not the
cache.
No payment events exist until the pay station is built, so every transient exit
currently rejects -- the correct end-state, not yet passable. Verified against
stubs: unpaid->anomaly+no-open; paid+grace->exit+open+closed; expired->anomaly;
unknown->anomaly; verifyChain ok across entry->pay->exit.
Flagged: lane_devices has no entry/exit direction model (exit door hardcoded to
1); needs a lane-direction/role model before multi-reader lanes.
Capture that refusing at capacity is the default, not absolute: an operator
may opt into valet over-capacity (customer hands over keys, operator stacks
the car into custody). Manned-only, new custody/session shape. Deferred;
not built into the entry flow. Made capacity-occupancy's FULL gate a soft
policy knob.
Correction before schema work: the events table conflated the anti-fraud
business ledger with device telemetry. Decision: ledger_events (signed,
chained, reconciled) holds only business facts; device_events (unsigned,
prunable) holds relay/printer/camera/reader/input telemetry. A raw button
press is telemetry; the entry flow mints a signed vehicle_entry. Drops
input_received-as-signed-event.
New: decisions/event-streams-split, concepts/device-events; updated
append-only-event-chain, index, log.
Mirrored mode re-clones the Windows NIC's addresses each boot, so the kernel
keeps picking the wrong source for stacked device subnets (10.0.10.x sourced
from 192.168.1.123) — ARP resolves but ping/TCP dies, and every runtime
ip-route fix is wiped by wsl --shutdown.
deploy/wsl-fix-route-source.sh pins each scope-link route's src to this
host's own address in that subnet (no hardcoded IPs, idempotent, preserves
metric, non-fatal per route, waits for the route at boot). deploy/parking-net
.service reapplies it on every boot.
Dev-box only; the appliance is bare-metal Linux with static networkd config.
Verified: camera pings with no -I flag; driver pulls a snapshot with no
localAddress set.
Replace the camera stub with HttpCamera: Hikvision ISAPI and Dahua CGI
snapshots over client-side HTTP Digest (new drivers/http-digest.ts).
healthCheck() now pulls a real frame instead of returning ready/stub.
Snapshot carries bytes (driver fetches); storage/imageRef is the caller's
job, keeping the adapter free of storage deps.
Fix the cosmetic Backend-push-IP field: add pushesToBackend to DeviceDriver
(only Dingtian sets it), expose as pushCapable in the catalog, and gate the
wizard's backend-IP fetch + field on it so pull-only devices hide it.
Verified on hardware (Hikvision 10.0.10.121): healthCheck ready,
captureSnapshot returns a valid JPEG.
Replace the hardcoded lane: 0 on input_received events with a real
device->lane lookup. A new LaneMap caches lane_devices.id -> lane,
built at startup and refreshed by the setup routes on assign/unassign.
An unmapped device logs lane: -1 + a warning (0 is a real lane) and is
still recorded faithfully (append-only chain).
source stays null for raw inputs by design: it's an IdentitySource
(how a vehicle was identified), not a device field; device provenance
remains in identity. Documented both in the wiki.
Fix two bugs found running the real assign flow: the saved web password
didn't match the device (login stayed admin/admin), and the UDP2 warning
never reached the admin.
Web password:
- Split the conflated field into webPassword (the DESIRED login; blank ->
auto-generate) and webPasswordCurrent (the device's EXISTING password used
as the old cred, default admin). Before, an admin typing a desired password
made harden send it as the old cred -> rotation failed -> but the DB still
saved the typed value, so it claimed a password the device never accepted.
- harden() now rotates current -> desired, VERIFIES by re-authenticating with
the new password, and only returns secrets.webPassword on success (else a
warning, nothing saved). Stores webPasswordCurrent for future re-runs.
- assign strips the typed webPassword/webPasswordCurrent and persists only the
verified secret -- the DB never claims an unapplied password.
Warnings to the UI:
- assignDevice returns warnings[]; SetupWizard shows them in an amber
"saved, but action needed" banner per category. This is how the admin learns
the firmware wouldn't disable UDP2 (finish in the device web UI).
Verified on hardware: after harden the device rejects admin/admin and accepts
the chosen password; the UDP2 warning surfaces.
julian