apps/web/.env.production's VITE_API_BASE went empty in 96fd97e to fix the
booth/browser same-origin case, but the desktop build shares that file and
was never given its own override — login broke with WebKitGTK's "The
string did not match the expected pattern." (a relative fetch() URL with
no base, from tauri://localhost). beforeBuildCommand now sets
VITE_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:3000 inline for the desktop build only;
verified both builds independently produce the right output.
The updater endpoint pointed at mca/parking_solution's own Gitea "latest
release" redirect, but that repo is private and field appliances have no
Gitea credentials — every update check was silently failing. release.yml
now mirrors signed installers to mca/public_releases (public, installers
only) under a fixed desktop-latest tag; tauri.conf.json points there.
Rejected embedding a read token in the app instead, given the booth-operator
threat model.
Also: make the appliance-provisioning root_directory gotcha impossible to
skim past (boxed callout + explicit next-step pointers), after it caused a
second missed step on the park-2 install.
actions/upload-artifact@v4's backend fails on the Gitea runner (Upload installers
step errored). Mirror release.yml's proven path instead: curl + the built-in token
to the Releases API, into a ROLLING per-branch prerelease (tag desktop-<branch>,
deleted+recreated each push). Installers renamed space-free
(parking-desktop-<branch>-<sha>.{deb,AppImage}). Signed v* releases unchanged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
createUpdaterArtifacts:true (for release.yml's .sig signing) makes `tauri build`
demand TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY and fail without it — even though the .deb/.AppImage
built fine. Override it off for the unsigned per-commit build via
--config '{"bundle":{"createUpdaterArtifacts":false}}'. release.yml keeps signing.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Self-service profile: any signed-in user edits their OWN fullName/email and
changes their OWN password (proving the current one), without any user:*
permission. New routes PUT /api/auth/profile + /api/auth/password act only on
req.user.sub (cannot touch username/role), CSRF-guarded; SPA screen at /profile
reachable from the header username chip. email added to the session view +
SessionUser. 7 tests (routes/profile.test.ts); 148 server tests green.
Desktop in CI: new .gitea/workflows/build-desktop.yml builds .deb + .AppImage
on every push to dev/main and uploads them as unsigned workflow artifacts
(per-commit test build). Signed/versioned release stays on release.yml (tag v*).
Wiki: local-jwt-auth (self-service routes), desktop-shell-tauri (two-workflow CI
split), log entry.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Point the Tauri updater at the real self-hosted Gitea "latest release" path:
https://git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution/releases/latest/download/latest.json
— redirects to the newest tag's latest.json published by release.yml. Verified
against tauri-plugin-updater: it GETs the endpoint (200 + manifest / 204 = up to
date) and reads platforms.linux-x86_64.{signature,url}.
Document the desktop WS origin: the Tauri window loads from tauri://localhost
(Linux may also send http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the
backend, so WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS must include both or the live feed won't connect.
Added both to apps/server/.env.example.
Updated the as-built in wiki/decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md. Also carries an
unrelated plans.namePlaceholder copy tweak already in the tree. turbo build lint
14/14 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so
the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR),
prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/
ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities.
apps/web (single UI source of truth):
- lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from
VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify.
- lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it +
devtools).
- lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline)
→ downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en).
- .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle.
Desktop:
- window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access).
- auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a
PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json;
private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as
TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets.
- Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter
@parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures).
Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds;
no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo.
Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside):
- new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-
extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by
platform).
- new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu
26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built).
- pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC
caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model.
- open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13
(startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
julian