fcea992e1eb50958ec38216e73211621d48a52a0
158 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 julian
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81bc2e357c |
fix(devices): USB printing dropped the job tail — chunked write loop
Field bug (ICS XP-K200L over USB): text printed, barcode + cut missing; same bytes over TCP fine. sendRawUsb did ONE write() on an O_NONBLOCK usblp fd and never checked bytesWritten — the kernel accepts only what fits the printer's ~8 KB USB buffer and returns a short write, so the tail of any job bigger than one buffer (the barcode mid-payload, the cut at the end) was silently discarded. The regular-file test stand-in can't short-write, which is why tests never caught it. writeAllUsb now pushes 4 KB chunks until every byte is accepted, continues after partial writes, retries EAGAIN/zero-byte with a short pause, and fails at the deadline with an (N/M bytes) diagnostic. Driven by fake-handle tests (short writes, EAGAIN interleave, wedged-printer timeout, non-EAGAIN passthrough). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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7ef332999e |
feat(reports): occupancy curve, hour×dow heatmap, stay histogram, fraud KPIs
The dashboard had generic BI views but nothing parking-shaped. Added: - Occupancy step-area over the range with the configured capacity as a red reference line. occupancyStart folds the ENTIRE prior ledger (voided entries excluded, clamped ≥0); each series point carries occupancyEnd. Answers "when are we near full". - Entries heatmap hour × day-of-week (7×24, row 0 = Monday, site tz) as a pure CSS-grid intensity map — weekday-vs-weekend at a glance, the direct evidence for tariff windows. Replaces the flat hour histogram (strictly contains it). - Stay-duration histogram at tariff-shaped edges (30m/1h/2h/4h/8h/24h/ tail): where ladder/up-to breakpoints should sit. - Voids + anomalies KPIs (accented when >0) — the look-closer counters the signed chain exists for; peak-occupancy KPI (peak / capacity). - Revenue bars stacked cash vs card (the drawer's money vs the bank's); CSV export gains cash, card, occupancy_end columns. Internals: localParts caches its Intl formatter per tz (was one new formatter per ledger row); @parking/db re-exports lt/gt. 5 new tests. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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14638c2e13 |
docs(wiki): industry survey of parking tariff systems + session log
New reference page tariff-industry-survey.md (2026-07 web research): field taxonomy — per-started-increment hourly (per-minute tried and rolled back in practice), degressive ladders, day caps, up-to matrices, day tickets, evening/overnight packages, event rates, early bird (entry-time-conditioned), day/night + weekend/holiday/seasonal windows, category pricing, contracts, merchant validations (amount/percent/ time-credit/re-rate), SFpark-style dynamic pricing. Coverage map: our engine expresses everything a staffed single lot advertises; real gaps = early bird (the pick-table-by-entry-time future design, same mechanism as weekend menus) and validation overlays; anti-features = per-minute billing + dynamic pricing. Indexed + logged. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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4f902d869e |
feat(web): published-versions sidebar on the composer page
The lab redesign gave only the lab tab the published-history sidebar; the composer page was expected to have it too. /setup/tariff now lists every published version (name or effective date, active badge, currency) on the right; clicking one loads it into the editor as the SEED for the next publish — which always creates a new immutable version (the sidebar hint states this), making "roll back to last month's prices" a two-click republish while the history stays append-only. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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c5ed3f1308 |
feat(drawer): drawer hub — balance now, this-shift figure, daily activity, shift history; busy spinners
/drawer was record + review only: no current balance, no sight of the open shift's incomings, no daily activity, no shift history. Rebuilt as a hub: - Drawer now: the till's running balance (new GET /api/drawer/balance, shift:read — exposes the service's existing drawerBalance(); the drawer is one site-wide till, same exposure the X-report already had) with the open shift's X-report breakdown alongside (float + takings + vouchers = expected = balance) and a "This shift: ±X" figure (expected − opening float — the shift's own contribution vs what it inherited). - Today's cash activity: every cash payment + voucher since local midnight from the signed chain, live, with day totals (card never enters the till). - Record + movements/review: the 2026-07-01 flow, unchanged. - Closed shifts: drawer-focused history via the scope-aware /api/shifts (float → takings ± vouchers → expected per shift). Also: every shift open/close button (header, /shifts, pay modal, end- shift confirm) now shows an animated spinner + dims while busy — the old label-swap-only feedback read as a dead click when a shift open ran slow. The slowness itself (drawer/shift reads fold the WHOLE chain, O(chain)) is recorded as an open item in wiki/concepts/shift.md with the fix sketch: fold from the last z-report's signed expectedDrawerMinor forward. No new ledger surface — one read-only endpoint; RBAC test added. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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fd9885e9ec |
feat(tariff-lab): DB-backed draft tariffs + named published versions
Experimenting used to mean publishing — churning the immutable version
history and risking real tickets pricing against a half-baked card while
the admin iterated. The lab is now a true sandbox:
- tariff_drafts table (migration 0021): MUTABLE by design — the one
exception to "editing publishes a version"; a draft prices nothing and
signs nothing. Drafts are validated + tz-stamped on save exactly like a
publish, so a saved draft always simulates and never fails at publish.
- CRUD under /api/tariff/drafts (list tariff:read, mutations
tariff:update); publishing a draft goes through the normal immutable
POST /api/tariff/versions path.
- Lab UI rebuilt: sidebar lists lab drafts AND the full published history
(click any to price against it); main pane cut to pure entry/exit
(ticket loader, payment, category inputs dropped); the composer form is
extracted to TariffEditorForm.tsx and reused in a modal (new drafts
prefill from the active card); per-draft Publish with confirm.
- tariff_versions.name (migration 0022): optional label stamped at
publish — carried from the lab draft, or typed in the composer's new
optional field — so history reads "Winter 2027", not UUID prefixes.
- Includes the composer UI + sq/en labels for the package mode (engine
landed in
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julian
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d9e6c13831 |
feat(tariff): whole-window package pricing mode (packageMinor)
A windowed card can now charge ONE total for any presence in its window —
the real night rate ("20:00–07:00 = 400, leave earlier and it's still
400"), which the per-increment flatMinor could not express (park-buzi's
"night 400" card billed 400/HOUR). Engine charges once per contiguous run
of increments the card wins, tracked across rolling-day segments so a
night crossing the 24h boundary charges once; out-of-window increments
price by the base card as usual.
Operator decisions (2026-07-05): per-occurrence repeat (two nights = two
charges), any-touch-pays-full, windowed cards only (a base "price per
day" is a 1-row up-to table). Validator: mutually exclusive with
flat/blocks/steps, no per-card cap, forbidden on the defaultCard.
flatMinor docs clarified as PER INCREMENT. 6 new engine tests.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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c21babf293 |
feat(logging): ~2-month container rotation, ISO timestamps, level names
Operator asked for bounded container logs (~2 months of history), human- readable timestamps, and clarity on levels. Levels already existed (LOG_LEVEL env → pino, default info; warn+ teed into app_logs, queryable at /setup/logs) — the "level":30 / epoch-ms "time" in docker logs were pino defaults. - server.ts logger: stamp ISO-8601 UTC time (timestamp fn) and level NAMES (formatters.level) so `docker logs` reads human. - log-service.ts pinoDbStream: accept BOTH level encodings (name + numeric) — the label switch would otherwise have silently stopped warn+ persistence into app_logs. New log-service-stream.test.ts pins both encodings, the info-stays-stdout-only rule, and the never-throws fallback. - docker-compose.prod.yml: json-file caps resized from 10m×3 (≈30 MB — days, not months) to ≈2 months by volume: server 20m×30, vision 20m×10, proxy 10m×5. json-file rotates by SIZE; time-based isn't a driver feature — comment says to revisit if `docker logs` holds under ~60 days. - app_logs retention default aligned 30→60 days (LOG_RETENTION_DAYS still overrides). Wiki: app-logs.md gains the container-log store section (rotation, format, LOG_LEVEL knob) + retention update; log.md entry. Suite 282 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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43c1f45e29 |
feat(reader): channel tagging (clone defense) + structural filter for phantom scans
Two reader-hardening changes born from the park-buzi phantom-scan investigation
(empty pre-opening site, exit reader pushing sun-decoded garbage codes).
1. CHANNEL TAGGING — closes the printed-card-clone hole. The DT-008 push is
channel-blind (one opaque cardid from either engine) and SubscriptionFlow
matched by value only, so printing an RF card's UID (often written on the
card face, e.g. 86A158) as a barcode cloned the card. Now:
- Vendor tool sets output prefixes (QRCode "Q:", Card "K:"; server env
overrides READER_QR_PREFIX / READER_CARD_PREFIX).
- routes/qr-reader.ts strips the prefix and tags the read's confirmed
channel (DeviceReadEvent.channel optical|rf; kind qr|card). Enrollment
capture stores the BARE value. READ log lines carry ch=… (permanent
phantom attribution).
- SubscriptionFlow.match requires channel agreement: an optical decode may
not claim an rf credential (and vice versa) — refused + signed
sub.refused.channelMismatch anomaly (a clone attempt is a fraud signal).
- Unprefixed reads keep the legacy untagged shape and match as before, so
enforcement only bites where prefixes are deployed. Deploy server FIRST,
then set prefixes in the vendor tool.
2. STRUCTURAL FILTER — phantom decodes out of the signed feed (operator-
requested, reverses the earlier "record every probe" position — red
"who is exiting?" rows for NOBODY train the operator to ignore the feed).
read-dispatch.ts drops a no-match reader value that cannot possibly be a
credential we issue (no ticket Luhn shape, no SUB-/SUBSESS- prefix, not
confirmed-RF, not a plate) to UNSIGNED device_events telemetry
(unrecognizedRead:true). Deliberately WIDE plausibility: forged ticket
shapes, unknown physical cards, unknown SUB- codes all still sign the
normal refusal anomaly; enrolled credentials match before the filter and
can never be hidden. Works for legacy unprefixed reads too — the feed
cleans up on deploy, before any vendor-tool change.
Wiki: dingtian-dt008-reader.md records the clone hole + fix, the filter (as a
recorded position reversal), and the two device-side settings now part of the
credential contract (output prefixes + Card Input format, moving 6H→8H at the
next vendor-tool session; both live ON the device — re-apply after any
factory reset/swap).
Tests: qr-reader-channel.test.ts (prefix split, route tagging, bare-value
capture), subscription-channel.test.ts (channel agreement matrix + anomaly),
read-dispatch-filter.test.ts (filter boundary: phantoms dropped, probes kept,
enrolled never hidden). Suite 278 green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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35e593ab63 |
docs(wiki): DT-008 phantom-scan diagnosis + backfill bypass/relay-test concept pages
Two independent wiki updates bundled (all docs):
1. dingtian-dt008-reader.md: phantom optical decodes on the park-buzi EXIT
reader (empty pre-opening site, low-sun afternoons). Chain of evidence:
READ log lines carry the reader's own serial (H05MA5B0) → physical device,
not a network source; snapshot shows nobody present; code shapes are the
giveaway (6-digit numerics = checksum-less Interleaved 2-of-5, lone "C" =
Code39/Codabar artifact) → 1D engine decoding sun-made stripe patterns
(striped arm, fence shadows, glare). No fraud exposure (11-digit Luhn ids
can't match); noise only. Fix on the entity page: vendor-tool symbology cut
to QR+Code128 + min decode length, BOTH readers; config lives ON the device
→ re-apply after any factory reset/swap. Deliberately NOT filtering
impossible codes server-side — probe recording is the anomaly path's job.
2. Backfilled two shipped-but-undocumented features (six code files already
linked the first page as if it existed):
- concepts/entry-presence-bypass.md — admin drops a FAULTY presence signal
(granular radar/camera by decision, not a master switch); every flip is a
signed config_change; persists till off; tickets stamped presenceBypassed;
radar-bypass cooldown tradeoff; "the admin is not the adversary, but
trusted never means invisible".
- concepts/setup-relay-test.md — admin-only commissioning pulse, signed
barrier_open_command BEFORE the fire so a test open never reads as the
out-of-band-open fraud signal; saved controllers/declared relays only;
radarAlert lamps excluded; pulseOpen only.
Cross-linked from operator-issued-entry.md, cataloged in index.md, logged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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b4f1418858 |
fix(entry): enforce the camera press-gate + duplicate-ticket defenses
Field report (park-buzi): a BLINKING entry button still printed — the lamp encoded blink-vs-solid (radar-only vs radar+camera) but #suppressReason only checked the radar, so a radar false-positive (rain, pedestrian) minted a real signed ticket. Three layered fixes: 1. CAMERA gate on the physical press: with an entry camera configured, a press is live only in the lamp's SOLID state (LaneStatus.entry busy, mirrored into EntryFlow via onLaneStatus). Suppress-only — the camera stays advisory (never opens, never traps). Camera-less sites keep the radar-only gate; a faulty camera is dropped via the existing bypassPresenceCamera admin toggle. 2. Cooldown as a REAL backstop behind presence: the presence branch returned early, so entryCooldownSec was dead wherever a loop was wired. Now it bounds the stationary-car double-ticket (a motion radar drops a motionless car → spurious loop-clear re-arms one-car-one-ticket → same car reprints). 3. Post-hoc duplicate-plate anomaly (entry-side twin of plateSwapSuspected): when entry ANPR recognizes a plate already OPEN under another session entered within ENTRY_DUP_PLATE_WINDOW_MIN (default 15 min), sign ONE entry.duplicatePlate anomaly naming both tickets for the operator to void. ANPR stays non-blocking (rides the post-open snapshot as before). REJECTED: camera-vetoed re-arm (defer re-arm until the lane flips free). The camera has no leave events — "free" is a ~30s silence timeout that never lapses inside a queue, so every queued car after the first would be suppressed until an operator intervened. Blocking legit entry at peak beats nothing; the proper preventive fix is a pass-through sensor (passedInput) — recorded as open in wiki/concepts/entry-double-press.md. Also: setup.relayTest reason was missing from both web catalogs (parity is only enforced sq<->en, so the build passed) — added. Tests: entry-press-gate.test.ts (blink suppresses / solid prints / camera-less unaffected / bypass honored / cooldown catches the dropout re-press / residual risk documented / still-present re-press stays suppressed) + entry-duplicate-plate.test.ts (flags open dup, ignores closed/stale/self/other plates). Suite 258 green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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f486dcbbfc |
docs(wiki): vision-service hardening backlog + boot-migration data-seed note
Two unrelated leftover wiki edits from earlier sessions:
- NEW concepts/vision-service-hardening.md: the prioritised to-do list from the
2026-07-02 code + security reviews of apps/vision/ (DoS gaps, unauthenticated/
operator-writable model weights, 0.0.0.0 default bind). Cross-linked from
opencv-anpr-service.md ("consult before touching this service").
- container-deployment.md: note that a boot-time migration can be a DATA SEED
(e.g. an RBAC permission granted to the operator role via INSERT OR IGNORE),
and that a built-in-role grant does not auto-apply to a custom role.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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c142166972 |
docs(wiki): ATECC608 is upcoming — retag ledger signing to the on-host reality
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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33c4ea1e91 |
feat(entry): operator-issued entry + exit plate-swap reconciliation
Two halves of one anti-fraud design.
(A) Operator-issued entry — when the physical entry button is broken, an
operator can issue an entry ticket so a real car isn't blocked out of the lot.
This hands the operator-adversary a mint, so it is:
- PRESENCE-GATED like the physical button: a real car must be present (radar/
loop AND camera busy). Enforced BOTH sides — the server re-checks current
presence so a direct POST can't bypass a disabled button; no presence loop
=> feature unavailable; a no-presence attempt signs an anomaly.
- FLAGGED: vehicle_entry source=manual + operatorInitiated + operator, PLUS a
companion entry.operatorIssued anomaly (the adversary path always leaves a
red-flag row).
- capacity-OVERRIDE allowed but stamped lotFull (a broken button mustn't trap
a legit car).
New session:create permission (migration 0019 -> operator role, admin-
revocable), POST /api/entry/issue (open-shift gated), EntryFlow.
issueForOperator; the fraud-critical print->sign->open->snapshot sequence is
factored into one shared #issueTicket (button + operator). UI: the entry
BarrierLight becomes a clickable issue-control when presence+permission+shift
meet (confirm -> issue).
(B) Exit plate-swap reconciliation — defends the ticket-swap fraud the mint
enables (paid car let out on a fresh $0 ticket, original ticket lingers
"inside", occupancy drifts up by phantom cars). The plate is the invariant:
ExitFlow.#reconcilePlateAtExit compares the exiting plate against all OPEN
sessions' entry plates, EXACT + HIGH-CONFIDENCE only (>=0.85; a fuzzy read never
gates — ANPR is advisory). On a match under a DIFFERENT ticket:
- BOOTH path: returns swap_suspected + signs exit.plateSwapSuspected; the
pay/exit modal shows a red warning + "Override & release" (override signs an
attributed exit.plateSwapOverride). Flag+override, never a silent hard block
(exit fails-open; a plate is never the sole gate).
- READER path (no operator): log-only anomaly + fail-open.
Extended BoothExitResult + /api/exit (override); boothExit client returns a
structured swap result.
Verified: full monorepo build/lint/test green (229 server tests incl. 4 new:
hold-on-swap, override-releases-with-attribution, low-confidence-no-warning,
own-plate-no-warning). New wiki: operator-issued-entry.md +
plate-reconciliation.md; cross-linked from entry-exit-points, capacity-
occupancy, index. Preserves "a plate never OPENS a barrier alone — and now never
TRAPS a car alone either."
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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114a32e6f2 |
feat(drawer): operator records cash movements, admin reviews after (own /drawer route)
Rework drawer cash movements from synchronous admin-authorization-at-creation
(operator typed an admin's password inline for every receipt/disbursement) to
operator-records-freely -> admin-reviews-after.
- New `drawer` resource: drawer:create (operator records; admin-revocable per
role) + drawer:review (admin authorizes/denies). Migration 0018 grants the
default operator role drawer:create; admin gets all in code.
- New signed `cash_review` ledger event { refId, decision, reviewedBy, note? }.
A DENIAL is a FLAG, not a reversal: it never appends reversing cash and never
touches the drawer balance (the correction is settled outside the app). This
is what keeps a late review from leaking into the next operator's inherited
drawer — a denial that lands after the reviewed shift closed moves no cash.
Regression test: op1 disburses -> closes -> op2 inherits -> admin denies ->
op2 drawer unchanged.
- Move the feature OFF the polluted /shifts route to a top-level /drawer
(operator: record + own; admin: review queue + all). routes/drawer.ts lifted
from routes/shift.ts (retired the authorizer-password gate; kept shift:cash
for its other job = admin-sees-all-shifts). New DrawerManager.tsx.
Display fixes bundled:
- Render cash_review in the event-detail modal (decision / reviewed-by / note /
movement ref) — previously showed nothing.
- Relabel the shift drawer figures for clarity: Daily takings / Receipts /
Disbursements (was Cash payments / Cash added / Cash removed).
- Hide the Card figure everywhere when CARD_PAYMENTS_ENABLED is false (no POS
on-site), matching the card-tender gate.
shared/db/server/web all typecheck; 225 server tests pass (incl. the drawer
review + cross-shift-leak regression); web build + i18n parity green. Verified
end-to-end via Playwright. Recorded in wiki/concepts/shift.md.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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018328a877 |
feat(booth): disable card tender until a P2PE POS is on-site (cash-only)
No card processor / POS terminal on any site yet. Offering "Card" would let an operator record a card payment that never cleared a terminal, corrupting the till reconciliation — a fraud/error surface on an operator-adversary system. Add apps/web/src/lib/features.ts → CARD_PAYMENTS_ENABLED=false, gating both tender pickers (BoothPayModal, SubscriptionManager). With card off there's nothing to choose, so the tender row is suppressed and payment defaults to cash. UI-only gate: the Tender type, payment events, shift accounting, and reports still understand `card`, so historical card events and a future re-enable stay coherent. Verified via Playwright: an unpaid-ticket modal shows Total + "Pay + open barrier" with no tender/cash/card row. Wiki: new concepts/card-payments.md records the current cash-only state, the PCI-scope-out-of-app constraint, the future-POS device requirements, and the re-enable path (flip the flag once a bank-certified P2PE terminal is provisioned). Linked from index, parking-session, open-questions #3. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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266e9b0027 |
docs(wiki): record session findings — snapshot fix, booth rework, db reset
- entry-exit-points.md: the snapshot content-type bug + serve-side cleanType fix (Hikvision image/jpeg; charset="UTF-8" broke every legacy render). - booth-exit-flow.md: the Active-Sessions/modal rework — inline barrier button removed -> modal; closed-within-grace view; live grace countdown; actual paid amount; read-only snapshot review in the closed-session view. - local-dev-workflow.md: the gated `pnpm db:reset` training tool + flag table + the booth (docker exec, no pnpm) note. - appliance-provisioning.md: new §7d — reset on the booth via docker exec into the server container (script ships in the deploy bundle; DATABASE_URL= /data/parking.sqlite), ledger-truncation warning + the two safety gates. - index.md catalog line; log.md entries. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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1b86750b0d |
docs(wiki): firmware/dbx-vs-TPM hardening + create disk-os-hardening page
Real-world park-buzi episode: a UEFI dbx update (delivered via fwupd/LVFS, NOT apt) revoked a stale GRUB -> panic, and moved PCR 7 -> broke TPM-sealed LUKS auto-unlock -> passphrase prompt. Recovered by re-sealing PCR 7. - appliance-provisioning.md: extend the §4 re-seal runbook to name dbx; new §4a (fwupd-not-apt, GRUB-panic ordering, PCR-7 re-seal, operator lockdown: mask fwupd + remove firmware-updater snap + BIOS-password + passphrase escrow) incl. the --test-passphrase-silently-passes-via-TPM trap (--disable-external-tokens); gotchas #12/#13. - disk-os-hardening.md: NEW — resolves a long-dangling wikilink referenced from ~18 pages. The *why* of host hardening (5 controls + firmware lockdown); commands stay in appliance-provisioning; reconciliation remains the primary anti-fraud control. - index.md: expand the disk-os-hardening catalog line. - log.md: two note entries. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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9c6741a485 |
docs(wiki): record backup deploy gotchas (compose allowlist + host mount)
CI / check (push) Successful in 40s
Two lessons from the first park-buzi staging deploy, both in backup-recovery.md: - A new server env var (BACKUP_KEY) must be added to docker-compose.yml's server.environment: allowlist, not just the Komodo secret/Stack env — otherwise the container never receives it (inspect shows it absent, not empty). - The backup target must be a host path bind-mounted into the container; a desktop- automounted USB (/run/media/...) is invisible inside the container, so Test target reports 'does not exist'. Destinations are admin-provisioned (fstab + compose bind- mount), not operator-pluggable — partly a threat-model feature. Acknowledged as a flexibility limitation; USB-automount-to-container flow deferred. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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381046190b |
feat(deploy): add stage tier — park-buzi as the staging booth
Model the staging-vs-production split that fleet-deployment-komodo flagged as open. Three tiers: dev (working, no booth) -> stage (staging booth park-buzi, real-world test) -> main (production, manual + pinned). - build-images.yml: trigger on [dev, stage, main]. The tag computation is already branch-derived, so :stage / :stage-<sha> build with no other change. - komodo/resources.toml: park-buzi now branch=stage + TAG=stage-<sha> (pinned; no webhook even on staging). BACKUP_KEY already wired as a per-booth secret. - komodo/README.md: a Promotion (dev->stage->main) section; per-booth secret list now includes backup_key; hard-rule #1 generalised to pinned <branch>-<sha>. - wiki: fleet-deployment-komodo open-item resolved + a Promotion-tiers table; deploy-trigger choice generalised; container-deployment tag list gains :stage. Promotion is a merge: when dev is ready, merge dev->stage, CI builds the image, bump TAG=stage-<sha> in resources.toml, deploy from Core. stage is branched from dev HEAD so the first real-world test carries the full current app. Per-booth secrets must pre-exist in Core; migrations run at boot so a promotion auto-migrates the staging ledger (where a bad migration is caught before production). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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84f00db48b |
feat(backup): admin-tunable retention + BACKUP_KEY as a Komodo secret
Retention (keep-last / keep-daily-days) is operational policy the on-site admin should tune, not a server env var requiring a redeploy -- same reasoning that moved the target directory to the UI. - Migration 0017: site_config.backup_keep_last + backup_keep_daily_days (nullable; null = code default 7 / 30 per field). - BackupService reads retention fresh each run; status() exposes keepLast + keepDailyDays. DEFAULT_BACKUP_RETENTION is now a pure code default (env reads gone). - PUT /api/backup/config accepts keepLast / keepDailyDays (non-negative int, or null to reset to default; 400 on negative). - UI: two retention fields on the Backup config card; one Save covers target + retention. i18n sq + en. BACKUP_KEY wired into Komodo: - komodo/resources.toml: BACKUP_KEY=[[park_buzi_backup_key]] (per-booth secret, alongside JWT / signing keys). - komodo/.env.komodo.example: documents it as the ONLY backup env var -- escrow it offsite alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (recovery needs both); target + retention are admin-chosen in the UI / DB, not env. Server .env.example trimmed to just BACKUP_KEY. Also carries the small in-progress setup-intro i18n copy trim. Tests: 218 server tests green, incl. retention persist / reset-to-default / reject- negative and the updated status shape. Migration applies cleanly (needed a statement-breakpoint between the two ALTERs). Wiki backup-recovery updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
d5e41500a8 |
feat(backup): admin UI with admin-chosen target directory
The backup destination is now chosen by the on-site admin in the UI (Setup -> Backup), not a server env var. An env-pinned target defeats the purpose: the admin can't point backups at a freshly-plugged USB or a NAS mount without editing .env and restarting. The encryption key stays a server secret. Target storage: - New site_config.backup_target_dir (migration 0016, nullable; null = not configured). BackupService reads it fresh each run, so a UI change takes effect with no restart. Only BACKUP_KEY stays env -- a key must never live in the DB it backs up. Routes: - PUT /api/backup/config -- set/clear the target (backup:update; upserts id=1). - POST /api/backup/test -- probe a candidate path server-side (exists / is a directory / writable) so the admin gets feedback before relying on it. - status() now exposes targetDir + keyPresent, so the UI distinguishes 'no target set' from 'BACKUP_KEY missing'. UI (apps/web/src/BackupSettings.tsx): - A Setup -> Backup tab (gated backup:read): an editable target-path field with a Test-target probe (localized ok/missing/not-a-dir/not-writable), Save, the status panel (config state, last-run size/pruned/error, a distinct amber missing-key warning), a Back up now button, and the restore-is-out-of-band note. Full i18n (sq + en); nav.backup. - API client: fetchBackupStatus / setBackupTarget / testBackupTarget / runBackup. Also includes a small in-progress copy trim to the setup-intro i18n strings. Verified live with Playwright: typed a path -> Test reported writable -> Save persisted it -> status reflected it and showed the key-missing warning. Whole monorepo build/lint/test green. Wiki backup-recovery + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
0c218179c4 |
feat(backup): encrypted on-site DB backup engine + local target
The SQLite DB is the signed append-only ledger, so a disk failure / stolen or destroyed PC means total revenue-history loss (open-question #5). This is the first slice of the backup-recovery design: the engine + a local/mounted target + a daily timer + a manual route. Engine (apps/server/src/backup.ts): - Consistent online copy of the live WAL DB via better-sqlite3's native .backup() (not a raw file copy, which can capture a torn WAL) — the restored copy is a byte-identical, queryable DB. - AES-256-GCM with a scrypt-derived key from BACKUP_KEY; self-describing header (magic|version|salt|iv|...|authTag) so a restore tool needs only the key + file. Zero new dependencies (Node crypto). - The plaintext intermediate is kept in scratch (not the removable/network target) and wiped in a finally, success or fail. - Retention: keep-last-N + one-per-day within N days. Wiring: - BackupService (env config, single in-flight guard, last-success/last-error). - routes/backup.ts: GET /api/backup/status (backup:read), POST /api/backup/run (backup:create), 409 when unconfigured. No restore route — restore is an out-of-band runbook action on a fresh appliance, not a console call. - New permission resource in @parking/shared. - server.ts: an unref'd daily timer, a no-op until BACKUP_TARGET_DIR + BACKUP_KEY are set, deliberately not run at startup (a just-power-cut booth shouldn't write to a possibly-unmounted disk). - openRawDb() added to @parking/db/testing (open a file without migrating, for restore-verification tests). BACKUP_KEY is deliberately SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (independent rotation; backups travel, the signing key shouldn't). SMB/NFS work as mount paths; SFTP + admin UI + restore runbook are deferred slices. Tests: round-trip byte-identical, GCM tamper/wrong-key fail, short-key rejected, scratch cleaned, route auth/RBAC + 409. build/lint/test green (212 server tests). Wiki + open-question #5 updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
9e442586af |
docs(wiki): settle on-site encrypted backup + disaster-recovery design
New concept page backup-recovery.md resolving the design half of open-question #5. Driving scenario: a stolen/destroyed PC whose LUKS+TPM disk is unrecoverable by design — recovery stands up a NEW PC, restores a backup, and keeps signing the SAME chain. Settled: admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (SQLite online-backup/VACUUM INTO, snapshots included) to local/USB, SMB/NFS, or SFTP targets; manual button + an in-process daily timer; keep-last-N + dailies retention; restore is admin-only / out-of-band (operator-adversary surface). A restored copy must still verifyChain. Key custody (the load-bearing decision, bears on #6): three independent keys — EVENT_SIGNING_KEY kept an extractable, escrowed software key DECOUPLED from the TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss (the conscious trade: a TPM-sealed signing key would be unforgeable but permanently unverifiable after the machine dies); a NEW dedicated park_buzi_backup_key in Komodo for backup encryption, separate from the signing key; the LUKS/TPM disk key, appliance-only and deliberately non-recoverable. Keys are never inside the backup they unlock. Updated open-questions #5 (design SETTLED) + #10 note; disk-os-hardening deploy runbook (why the signing key is not sealed + park_buzi_backup_key); index catalog + concept count. Design only — not yet built. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
11567a417f |
docs(wiki): catch concept pages up to the booth-UX/shift/font-scale work
Bring three queryable pages current with the booth-UX commit (
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julian
|
f6e35bbebf |
fix(reader): correct the QR reader's identity — Dingtian DT-008, not "GEE"
An early wrong assumption named the QR/RFID access reader "GEE" / "GEE/Fondvision" / "GEE-QR-ER80" (and summarized a raw GEE PDF as its datasheet). There is no GEE device — it's the Dingtian DT-008 (dingtian-tech.com/en_us/qr_code_reader.html), the same vendor as the relay board, which is why it integrates the identical HTTP-GET-push way. Code: - Driver symbol geeQrReaderDriver → dingtianQrReaderDriver; label → "Dingtian DT-008 QR/RFID reader (HTTP push)"; comments/description rewritten to the real DT-008 facts (Wiegand 26/34, TCP/IP, USB, RS485 — not RS-232; QR/barcode + ID/IC/NFC — not DataMatrix/1D). - Persisted driverId "gee-qr-reader" → "dingtian-qr-reader" (the registry lookup key + the row created on assign in qr-reader.ts). - Migration 0015 rewrites existing devices.driver_id rows so configured readers keep resolving (applied to the dev DB — 2 rows; the booth applies it on boot). Behaviour is unchanged: naming + the persisted id only. Wiki + memory: - Renamed entities/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008-reader.md and sources/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008.md; rewrote both to the real DT-008 product-page specs while KEEPING all the verified-on-hardware protocol facts (cjihao serial, .jsp path, Connection: close). Fixed every cross-reference + "GEE" mention in 6 other pages. Memory gee-reader-serial-binding → dingtian-reader-serial-binding. The only surviving "GEE" mentions are deliberate naming-correction notes, the raw PDF filename, and the append-only log history. Full workspace build/lint/test green; dev DB readers verified resolving to the registered dingtian-qr-reader driver. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
96acd6b662 |
feat(snapshot): re-encode captures + disk-pressure retention
Camera snapshots were stored RAW — the camera's full-res JPEG straight into the BLOB, no resize/recompress. Measured on the dev DB: 300 snapshots = 81.7 MB = ~72% of the 114 MB SQLite file (the big ones 2688×1520 / ~600 KB, Hikvision main stream). They dominated the appliance's single backed-up DB file. Re-encode on capture (snapshot.ts): - Downscale each frame to SNAPSHOT_MAX_EDGE (1280px long edge) + recompress at SNAPSHOT_JPEG_QUALITY (80) via sharp (libvips, Apache-2.0) before storage — ~6-10× smaller (verified 2688×1520 → 1280×724, ~8×), plate still readable, clean image/jpeg (drops the camera's charset cruft). STORAGE-ONLY: recognition keeps the ORIGINAL full-res bytes (downscaling hurts OCR). Fail-soft — a re-encode error stores the original, never drops the snapshot or blocks the (already-open) path. sharp lives in apps/server (owns the capture path), where bcrypt already establishes the native-dep pattern. Disk-pressure retention (snapshot-retention.ts) — a SAFETY VALVE, not the daily mechanism (the re-encode does that). Daily check reads the DB filesystem used% (statfs on db.$client.name); no-op unless ≥ SNAPSHOT_DISK_HIGH_PCT (70). Over the mark: delete the OLDEST until an estimated SNAPSHOT_DISK_FREE_TARGET_PCT (10%) of disk is freed — never below SNAPSHOT_MIN_KEEP (500) — then VACUUM once to return space to the OS. A DELETE only frees SQLite pages (disk doesn't drop until VACUUM), so the loop is driven by estimated freed bytes (SUM(length(bytes))), not a live disk re-read; the prune owns the DB-locking VACUUM, run daily off-peak. diskUsage is injectable for tests. None of this touches the signed ledger — snapshots are unsigned/advisory, referenced only by id. Tests: encodeForStorage (downscale / clean-type / no-enlarge / fail-soft) + pruneSnapshots (no-op below mark / delete-oldest-to-target + VACUUM / MIN_KEEP floor / skip-VACUUM-when-empty). All four snapshot env knobs documented in the komodo env reference. Full workspace build/lint/test green; the prune smoke-verified on a scratch DB copy (file shrank after VACUUM). Existing ~81.7 MB of raw snapshots are unchanged (a one-off re-encode backfill is a separate optional follow-up). Updated entry-exit-points + technology-stack wiki. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
cce99aadfd |
fix(web): booth UI/UX pass — readable font scaling + booth layout/report clarity
A round of operator-facing fixes on the booth screen, shift views, and the
font-scale control. (Follows the font-scale feature in
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julian
|
f706726eeb |
feat(prefs): per-user UI font scale (A−/A+), saved to the profile
A header A−/value/A+ control scales the whole UI, persisted per user and restored on login from any booth — cloning the theme-pref pattern end to end. - DB: users.font_scale (migration 0014; percent, 100 = base, NOT NULL default). - Server: PUT /api/auth/font-scale (auth-guarded; clamps to 80–160, snaps to a 10-step); fontScale flows through sessionView → login + /me. - Client: setFontScalePref + applyFontScale; applied in App alongside theme; FontScaleToggle in the header; i18n sq+en. Scaling uses CSS `zoom` on the root, NOT root font-size: the app's type is pinned in px (text-[12px] etc., ~230 spots), which a font-size change would not scale — so the dense Active-sessions / Live-feed logs stayed tiny. `zoom` scales everything uniformly (text, spacing, icons) like the browser's Ctrl+/−, which is the readability win for operators who need larger text. Tests: 4 font-scale auth-route cases (persist + /me, clamp/snap, 400, default-100). Full workspace build/lint/test green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
38481f105f |
feat(booth): blink the Entry/Exit lights on radar presence (mirror relay 3)
The on-screen Hyrje/Dalje barrier lights were 2-state (green=free / red=busy)
off the camera lane-status only — they couldn't show the radar-only "detected,
not yet confirmed" state that makes the physical button lamp (relay 3) blink.
Now they mirror the lamp's 3-state rule per lane:
radar present + camera not busy → BLINK green↔red (~1 Hz)
camera busy → SOLID red
otherwise → SOLID green
End-to-end:
- LanePresence (lane-presence.ts): subscribes to deviceEvents.onInput, resolves
each presence edge to its lane via the new direction-agnostic presenceLaneOf()
(device-resolve.ts) — entry AND exit, unlike the entry-gated relayForPresence
the one-car-one-ticket gate uses — and emits a lane-presence {entry,exit} bus
event on change. Wired in server.ts (start + onClose).
- WS forwards it (hello snapshot + push) into live-store.radar.
- BarrierLight (BoothScreen.tsx) is now 3-state; blinks via the .lane-blink
keyframe (index.css), which holds solid-red under prefers-reduced-motion.
Same input + same rule as the lamp, so the screen and the post never disagree.
A new test (lane-presence.test.ts) caught a real bug: the first cut reused
relayForPresence, so the EXIT lane never resolved (it's entry-gated) and never
blinked — presenceLaneOf fixes it. Covers entry/exit independence, de-dupe
across several radars on one lane, and ignoring non-presence inputs.
Full workspace build/lint/test green (185 server tests). Updated the
button-light-indicator wiki page ("On-screen twin").
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
|
4418594af0 |
refactor(setup): unify controller I/O — event-driven relays[] + generic inputs[]
The controller new/edit modal hardcoded both its outputs and its inputs, so an
operator could neither add a generic event-driven relay nor a free-standing input
(e.g. a second radar at the exit). This unifies both into symmetric, first-class
lists. Behaviour for existing booths is unchanged (back-compat, no DB migration).
Outputs — one event→action relays[] list:
- A relay is "when EVENT X happens, do its action": entry/exit/both pulse a
barrier; a new `radarAlert` event drives a non-barrier alert lamp (blink while
its trigger input is active, SOLID once the camera confirms a car).
- Dropped the separate config.buttonLight block — the lamp is just a relays[] row
with direction:"radarAlert" (triggerInput + blink cadence). `alertRelaysOf()`
replaces `buttonLightOf()`; ButtonLightController keeps its proven 3-state
machine (serialized UDP, fail-OFF, hot-reload), now keyed per controllerId:relay
so several alert lamps on one controller run independently. Every barrier
resolver skips radarAlert rows (no auto-open; barrier-not-a-door intact).
Inputs — one first-class config.inputs[] list (the twin of relays[]):
- Each row is { input, role, relay?, kind?, activeLow?, cooldownSec? } with a
"+ Add input" button. role ∈ button | presence | alertTrigger; button/presence
name the relay they serve. An exit radar is just another presence row.
- Keystone `inputsOf(row)`: returns config.inputs[] or SYNTHESIZES it from the
legacy relays[].button/presenceInput/... fields, so relayForButton /
relayForPresence resolve identically from either shape — zero-downtime, no
migration. entry-flow.ts is unchanged (resolves through the same functions).
- Fixed a latent bug this exposed: the alert lamp's camera lock was hardcoded to
the ENTRY camera. Added relays[].lockLane ("entry"|"exit", default entry); the
lamp now locks on its own lane's camera, so an exit radar's lamp tracks the exit
camera. button-light tracks both #entryBusy/#exitBusy.
- Driver: extracted activeLowFrom(config) — merges inputs[] activeLow, legacy
relays[].presenceActiveLow, and the inputActiveLow escape hatch.
UI: the relay dropdown gained a "Radar alert" option (reveals trigger/lock/blink
inputs); InputEditor is rewritten to a generic list (role select folds loop/radar);
i18n sq+en kept at type-parity.
Tests: new device-resolve.test.ts (inputs[] resolution + legacy fallback identical
+ exit-radar resolves to the exit relay); button-light gains a two-independent-
alert-relays case and an exit-lamp lockLane case; access-dingtian gains
activeLowFrom cases. Full workspace build/lint/test green (i18n parity included).
Wiki + memory updated (button-light-indicator, entry-double-press, dingtian-relay).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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25a72ff20a |
feat(anpr): per-camera auto-open toggle (anprAutoTrigger) for shared lanes
A shared entry/exit lane has both an entry and an exit camera on ONE lane: a subscriber driving IN is admitted by the entry cam, but the exit cam sees the same car leaving its frame and phantom-EXITs the occurrence just opened (its back plate). Separate RECOGNITION from AUTO-OPEN per camera: - config.anpr (unchanged) = run snapshots through the recognizer, record the plate (evidence), BOTH directions — stays on. - config.anprAutoTrigger (new, absent ⇒ on when anpr is on) = may THIS camera auto-open the barrier. Set false on the shared-lane exit cam: it still recognises plates but never auto-triggers. The bridge gates on it (anpr-entry.ts), before the poll loop. UI: a "Auto open/close on subscriber plate" checkbox under ANPR in the camera setup (shown when anpr is on); persisted true/false so a park can explicitly disable it. i18n sq+en (also corrected the now-stale anprHint "never opens a barrier" wording — it does, via the bridge). +1 server test (anprAutoTrigger=false → no snapshot, no read); 172 green. Documented the two toggle levels (site-wide + per-camera) in lane-presence-and-anpr-entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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c2a861208f |
fix(anpr): sliding poll window so a car arriving mid-loop isn't lost
A loop started by a far/early car would (a) give up before the REAL car settled at the barrier, and (b) swallow the real car's pushes (the #polling guard dropped them). So a confident-but-wrong far-car plate could win, or the intended car get debounced out after the loop ended — wrong car acted on, right car blocked. Fix: a push that JOINS a running loop now EXTENDS the deadline (lastPush + ANPR_POLL_WINDOW_MS) instead of being dropped, capped at start + ANPR_POLL_MAX_MS (30s) so a continuously-busy lane can't slide forever. Each tick still pulls a FRESH frame, so the loop tracks whoever is at the barrier NOW, not the car that started it. Per-camera sliding deadline in #pollDeadline (cleared with #polling in finally). +1 test (push mid-poll keeps the loop alive past the initial deadline); 171 server tests green. New knob ANPR_POLL_MAX_MS documented in the komodo env reference + the two concurrency guards written up in lane-presence-and-anpr-entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
f77ed11782 |
feat(anpr): poll snapshots until a confident plate, so auto-exit works
The ANPR bridge took ONE snapshot at the camera's vehicle-alarm instant — but the
alarm fires as the car APPROACHES, so that frame's plate is small/blurry/half-in-
frame and ANPR returns a low-confidence misread ('111'@0.20). The manual test reads
the SAME car at ~100% because by then it's STOPPED at the barrier, well-framed. So
subscriber auto-exit silently never fired (read below the 0.85 floor → ignored).
Fix (the car-stops-at-the-barrier insight): the bridge now PULLS A FRESH FRAME every
ANPR_POLL_MS (1000) and re-runs ANPR until one clears VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE, or
ANPR_POLL_WINDOW_MS (8000) elapses (drove off / non-subscriber → give up cleanly).
- One loop per camera (#polling set) — the camera's ~1Hz alarm re-fires JOIN the
running loop instead of spawning N concurrent loops.
- Fresh camera.captureSnapshot each tick, NOT captureSnapshotShared (its 1.5s TTL
would re-serve the same bad approach frame).
- Camera-level debounce stamp moved to AFTER a successful emit (suppresses re-fires
for ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS once we've acted), not before the loop.
VERIFIED on hardware (DS-2CD1047G3H-LIU exit lane): 7 garbage approach frames →
AA890XX@0.999 at the barrier → signed vehicle_exit. Still advisory + fail-soft; a
barrier never opens on a low-confidence read. anpr-entry.test.ts +1 (poll
escalation low→low→high); 169 server tests green. Documented in
lane-presence-and-anpr-entry + the lpr-camera camera-fault writeup.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
|
7eadf71a0b |
docs(wiki): appliance-provisioning — Komodo deploy is now the primary flow
§6 split: §6 = Docker engine only; new §7 = the Komodo Periphery deploy (PRIMARY, verified end-to-end on park-buzi 2026-06-27): - 7a install Periphery (onboarding key, user-mode/outbound, runs as admin, no inbound port; core_address = Core's proxy URL) - 7b deploy the Stack in Core (registry+git accounts, per-booth [[..]] secrets, env incl. COOKIE_SECURE=0; seed admin via Komodo's container terminal — no SSH) - 7b-bis fleet-as-code via komodo/resources.toml + ResourceSync (empty diff = in sync) - 7c break-glass: manual booth.sh when mesh/Core is down Added Komodo deploy gotchas 7-11 (core_address is the proxy URL not :9120; git-auth ≠ registry-auth; user-mode vs /etc/komodo root_directory; core_address singular; empty-diff/disabled-Execute = success). §5b SSH TODO reframed (Komodo removes SSH from routine ops). Header + date updated; log entry added. Fixed a stale [[atecc608-secure-element]] alias in the prior log entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
|
9918f278b2 |
feat(deploy): Komodo fleet deployment — resources.toml + decision
CI / check (push) Successful in 36s
Adopt Komodo Periphery (over the NetBird mesh) as the booth fleet control plane, superseding SSH-and-booth.sh. The booth runs the SAME compose files; Komodo Core drives them remotely. booth.sh is demoted to a break-glass local fallback. - komodo/resources.toml mirrors the working park-buzi Stack (built by hand in the Core UI, then exported to TOML — field names match the running v2.2). Stack-only: servers are created by the agent onboarding OUTBOUND (one-time onboarding key → Periphery self-registers, auto-rotating keys, booth opens no inbound port), so there is no [[server]] block. Per-booth secrets via [[...]] refs to Core's store. - komodo/README.md + .env.komodo.example document the flow and the hard rules (no webhook; onboarding/outbound/mesh-only; per-booth unique secrets; never down -v the ledger volume). - wiki/decisions/fleet-deployment-komodo.md records the decision + threat-model analysis (Periphery is a root agent → mesh-bound; EVENT_SIGNING_KEY-in-Core is a fraud-root blast radius until ATECC608 signs; Core is now Tier-0; GPL-3.0 is fine as external ops tooling). container-deployment reframed (booth.sh = fallback); index + log updated. Verified end-to-end against a real booth (park-buzi): onboarded OK, Stack deployed, all containers green, admin seeded. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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898cf1953a |
docs(wiki): camera 503/stream, alarm URL helper, reader ICMP liveness
- lpr-camera.md: "503 Device Busy" can be PERSISTENT (main-stream saturation on the G3H) — the real fix is sub-stream selection, not just retry. - device-status-monitoring.md: QR reader health was false-healthy (hardcoded "ready") until the ICMP-ping fix; document the push-device monitoring model. - log entries for both 2026-06-26 sessions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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40ffa90dac |
fix(vision): self-heal local real ANPR — dev scripts sync the alpr extra
The dev box runs vision as bare `uv run uvicorn`, and a plain uv run/uv sync
re-resolves the venv to the lockfile DEFAULTS, stripping fast-alpr/onnxruntime.
So after any `pnpm dev` real ANPR silently degraded to "snapshot, no plate"
(diagnosed 2026-06-25: real reads through 06-22, venv frozen lean since 06-19,
no other env with fast_alpr). The BOOTH was never affected — it runs the Docker
image, which bakes `uv sync --frozen --extra alpr` at build (immutable, weights
pre-warmed); a booth ModuleNotFoundError is a STALE image (fix: booth.sh update).
Vision package.json dev/start/recognize now run `uv sync --extra alpr &&` first
so pnpm dev is self-healing; added a dev:stub escape hatch for a lean run.
Documented in wiki/decisions/vision-service-packaging.md ("Two runtimes, one
fragile") + a log entry.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
|
b1c4109045 |
docs(wiki): document scripts/booth.sh in container-deployment
Add a "Booth operator wrapper" section (commands, the update flow, env handling, the volume/ledger safety notes) + a log entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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6d7682ab4a |
docs(wiki): printer USB transport + open-question for the provisioning
New concepts/printer-usb-transport.md (the seam, usblp char device, reachability-only status, threat model). open-questions #14: confirm the on-site printer is USB and bake the usblp + udev write-access rule into the appliance image (provisioning, not app code; unverified on hardware). Updated rongta-printer.md (USB transport note), index.md, log.md. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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5a5fedf4f4 |
docs(wiki): booth bring-up fixes — relay password, secret re-merge, lamp concurrency
- dingtian-relay: the "offline despite ping" gotcha (relay_pw in every binary frame, missing form field → Test connection sent 0 → timeout) + the identity-gated secret re-merge that stops a redirected probe exfiltrating the password. - button-light-indicator: serialized desired-state worker (UDP is unordered → the lamp stuck on/off) and hot-reload of the lamp config (no restart). - log entry for the three fixes (commits |
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julian
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2915d141aa |
feat(devices): radar presence input + button-light output on the controller
Model the entry button (I1) and a Hikvision radar (I2) as named children of the access controller, and drive the button's 12V lamp on a spare relay. - Radar = the existing relays[].presenceInput one-car-one-ticket gate, now labelled presenceKind: loop|radar. A radar may idle opposite the button, so add a per-input active-level override: relays[].presenceActiveLow -> driver inputActiveLow set, inverting just that terminal (pure helper inputActive()). The Dingtian has one board-wide resting level otherwise. - AuxOutputDevice.setAux(channel,on) capability on the device interface (Dingtian latch) so business logic drives a NON-barrier lamp through the interface. Barriers still only pulseOpen — barrier-not-a-door preserved. - ButtonLightController: subscribes to the radar input edge + the camera lane status and drives a 3-state lamp — radar+car=solid, radar-only=blink (~1Hz), else off. Fails OFF on host loss/error; de-duped. A radar detection never opens a barrier on its own (advisory; threat model). - SetupWizard: presence kind + active-low + a button-light relay picker; sq+en i18n. Tests: button-light.test.ts (truth table + blink + fail-OFF + de-dupe), access-dingtian.test.ts (active-level inversion). Workspace build+lint+test green (158 server tests). Wiki: hikvision-radar, button-light-indicator + updates. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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215a3ac405 |
fix(ci): publish desktop installers via Gitea Release, not upload-artifact
actions/upload-artifact@v4's backend fails on the Gitea runner (Upload installers
step errored). Mirror release.yml's proven path instead: curl + the built-in token
to the Releases API, into a ROLLING per-branch prerelease (tag desktop-<branch>,
deleted+recreated each push). Installers renamed space-free
(parking-desktop-<branch>-<sha>.{deb,AppImage}). Signed v* releases unchanged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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e0cfeb5e71 |
fix(ci): unsigned desktop build must disable updater artifacts
createUpdaterArtifacts:true (for release.yml's .sig signing) makes `tauri build`
demand TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY and fail without it — even though the .deb/.AppImage
built fine. Override it off for the unsigned per-commit build via
--config '{"bundle":{"createUpdaterArtifacts":false}}'. release.yml keeps signing.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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julian
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8129b63a8c |
feat(profile): self-service name/email/password + desktop installers in CI
Self-service profile: any signed-in user edits their OWN fullName/email and changes their OWN password (proving the current one), without any user:* permission. New routes PUT /api/auth/profile + /api/auth/password act only on req.user.sub (cannot touch username/role), CSRF-guarded; SPA screen at /profile reachable from the header username chip. email added to the session view + SessionUser. 7 tests (routes/profile.test.ts); 148 server tests green. Desktop in CI: new .gitea/workflows/build-desktop.yml builds .deb + .AppImage on every push to dev/main and uploads them as unsigned workflow artifacts (per-commit test build). Signed/versioned release stays on release.yml (tag v*). Wiki: local-jwt-auth (self-service routes), desktop-shell-tauri (two-workflow CI split), log entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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f9bd586265 |
docs(wiki): session context — first booth go-live (user split, Docker deploy, web access)
appliance-provisioning.md: new §5c (admin/operator OS user split — verified; strip lxd/lpadmin/docker from the operator) + fleshed-out §6 runtime (resolute codename caveat, the standalone deploy dir + .env, the deploy commands, seed-admin, healthy-startup signal, and the web-access gotchas). log.md: the [2026-06-23] go-live entry (CI uv fix, compose env passthrough, relative /api, Caddy proxy). Container-deployment "Web access" section already landed last commit. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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aa546235fb |
docs(wiki): container-deployment — relative /api + Caddy proxy web-access section
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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9d65099d9b |
docs(wiki): appliance provisioning runbook — booth unit 1 hardened (LUKS+TPM+SecureBoot+GRUB)
CI / check (push) Successful in 45s
New wiki/decisions/appliance-provisioning.md: the hardware-verified step-by-step for provisioning a booth PC (Dell OptiPlex 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM 2.0) from factory Windows to a hardened Ubuntu 26.04 LTS appliance. Every command was run on the first real unit (2026-06-23). Captures the firmware-specific gotchas: Ventoy → 0x1A under Secure Boot (flash ISO directly); the 7070 BIOS can't view db (verify via live USB); the installer's hardware-backed encryption fails with PCR_UNUSABLE/dbt (use passphrase LUKS + manual systemd-cryptenroll PCR-7 seal); GRUB password must be edit-only (--unrestricted) to keep unattended boot. OS hardening on unit 1 is COMPLETE + verified: LUKS FDE + TPM auto-unlock (PCR 7, unattended) + Secure Boot (Deployed) + GRUB edit-lock (closes the init=/bin/bash root-shell hole that PCR-7 sealing does not cover). Resolves the implementation half of open-questions #12 for unit 1. Cross-linked from disk-os-hardening; index + log updated. Still TODO on the box: Docker + run the stack. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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8155ff456b |
feat(deploy): Docker images for server (API+SPA) and vision + branch-aware build pipeline
Containerize the two non-desktop apps for the booth appliance. The desktop app stays on its own tag-only release.yml. - apps/server/Dockerfile: multi-stage node:22-alpine. `pnpm deploy --legacy --prod` (NOT prune — the monorepo native better-sqlite3 won't resolve under a root prune) yields a self-contained bundle; build stage adds node-gyp toolchain, runtime adds libstdc++; non-root, healthcheck. Migrates the mounted DB on boot via a drizzle-kit- free runtime migrator (packages/db/scripts/migrate-runtime.mjs) — drizzle-kit is a devDep, pruned from prod. - apps/server/src/static-spa.ts: Fastify serves the built React SPA (one container serves API + UI). GET-only fallback to index.html, excludes /api + /health so it never shadows the backend; a no-op in dev (no dist). Registered last in server.ts. - apps/vision/Dockerfile: uv base, --extra alpr, model weights PRE-WARMED into the image as the runtime user so fast_alpr boots offline (0 downloads at runtime). Engine env- selected (VISION_RECOGNIZER stub|fast_alpr). - Branch-aware: docker-compose.yml (base) + .dev.yml (build local, stub, ports) + .prod.yml (pull pinned, fast_alpr, vision internal, restart always); REGISTRY/TAG from env so a branch deploy pulls that branch's image. - .gitea/workflows/build-images.yml: on push to dev/main, run the full turbo build+lint+ test gate, then buildx push both images to git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution with branch + branch-<sha> tags (registry cache; optional Komodo webhook behind KOMODO_ENABLED). - .dockerignore excludes **/parking.sqlite* so the signed ledger is NEVER baked. Verified locally (Docker 29): server image migrates + serves API+SPA (/health 200, / + /booth HTML, /api/nope JSON 404, no sqlite outside /data); vision image boots fast_alpr with 0 runtime downloads; compose stack healthy with server→vision over the private network. Wiki: new container-deployment.md; vision-service-packaging open Qs resolved; index + log. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V |
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julian
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8a437d0c4b |
feat(booth): cancel wrongly-printed ticket (signed void) + refused-vs-anomaly display; fix CI uv
CI / check (push) Failing after 56s
Cancel a misprinted/test/wrong-vehicle ticket via a SIGNED `void` event — the
vehicle_entry is never edited/deleted (append-only). VoidFlow appends void{
voidedEntryRef, voidReason, operator, reasonCode:"void.ticketCancelled" }; route
POST /api/tickets/void gated event:void + open shift; reason REQUIRED. Refuses a
subscription / already-exited / already-voided / paid ticket (refund out of scope).
The void folds the session CLOSED everywhere it's counted — occupancy (count +
reserved spots), pay-station (lookup/activeSessions), exit-flow (#sessionFor), and
reports (excluded from entries) — so a voided car stops occupying a spot, can't be
paid/exited, and doesn't inflate "cars entered". No barrier action. Booth UI: a
"Cancel ticket" action in the pay/exit lookup modal (transient + unpaid + open;
gated on event:void) with a preset-or-free reason prompt.
Reclassify the Live feed: refused-action events (exitRefused/entryRefused/
permitRefused — e.g. a double card-scan, at-capacity subscriber, exit on a closed
session) are benign warnings, not red anomalies. event-detail.tsx now shows them as
amber REFUZUAR/REFUSED, reserving red ANOMALI for genuine red-flags. Display-only —
no ledger change, so historical events reclassify too.
CI: install uv + sync vision deps before the Turbo run. @parking/vision's lint/
typecheck/test shell to `uv run …`, but CI set up only Node+pnpm, so `uv run ruff`
failed ("uv not found") and broke the whole Turbo run. The Python checks pass once
uv provisions the toolchain.
- new: void-flow.ts (+ tests, 8) ; occupancy void-fold test
- shared: reason code void.ticketCancelled ; both web catalogs (sq/en parity)
- wiki: parking-session (ticket-void folds + guards, refused/anomaly split), log
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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