fix(desktop): WS ticket auth for the live feed; desktop logs never reached the server

The v0.1.4 Origin fix cleared only the first of two gates in /api/ws's
preHandler. The second, req.jwtVerify(), reads the HttpOnly cookie — which
tauri-plugin-websocket (a bare tungstenite client, no cookie jar) can never
send. Every desktop handshake 401'd and use-live-feed reconnected every 10s
(confirmed in the park-2 server log).

- routes/ws.ts: POST /api/ws/ticket (cookie + CSRF auth) mints a 30s,
  single-use, in-memory ticket; the WS preHandler accepts it via an
  x-ws-ticket header after the Origin check, then the same report:read
  role check. Browser cookie path unchanged; JWT stays out of JS.
- platform-ws.ts: fetch a ticket before connect, send it with the Origin
  header; connect failures now go through logClient (rate-limited).
- logger.ts: flush read the CSRF token from document.cookie, null on
  desktop, so every desktop POST /api/logs 403'd and was dropped silently —
  no desktop client log had ever reached app_logs. Stash moved to a
  dependency-free lib/desktop-csrf.ts shared by api.ts and logger.ts.
- backend-config.ts: ConnectScreen probe uses the unauthenticated /health
  (now also returns app: "parking-system") instead of accepting any 401.
- README: local-AppImage release gate — tauri dev runs at
  http://localhost:5173, not tauri://localhost, so none of these
  origin-dependent bugs reproduce there.
- wiki: new section + log entry; four citation corrections.

Requires the server image with this commit deployed before the new desktop
build connects (the ticket endpoint must exist).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU

apps/desktop/README.md

@@ -44,6 +44,27 @@ see that workflow's header and `wiki/decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md`). The upd
 signing pubkey live in `tauri.conf.json`; the private signing key is held outside the repo, never
 committed.
 
+## Release gate — run the REAL bundle locally before tagging
+
+`tauri dev` loads the SPA from `http://localhost:5173`, a plain http origin. The shipped bundle
+loads it from `tauri://localhost`, a *secure* custom-scheme origin — and every desktop-only bug
+found in the field on 2026-09-03/04 (relative-URL DOMException, mixed content, missing WS
+`Origin`, the reqwest-vs-webview cookie split, the WS handshake that can't carry the cookie)
+depends on that difference. **Dev mode cannot reproduce any of them**, so "works in `tauri dev`"
+carries no information about a release. Before pushing a `vX.Y.Z` tag:
+
+1. `pnpm --filter @parking/server dev` (local backend; `.env` must have `COOKIE_SECURE=0` and
+   `tauri://localhost` in `WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`).
+2. `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` and run the produced AppImage from
+   `src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage/` (WSLg is enough).
+3. On the ConnectScreen enter `127.0.0.1:3000`, **Test** must say reachable, then **Save**.
+4. Log in. The booth header must show **LIVE** (not "JASHTË LINJË") within a few seconds.
+5. Perform one mutation (e.g. change your UI language) — it must succeed (proves CSRF).
+6. Open Setup → Logs and confirm a `frontend`-sourced row from this desktop session exists
+   (proves the desktop log channel; historically it was silently 403'd).
+
+Only then tag. If a release still fails in the field, the gap is in this list — fix the list.
+
 ## Not here (deliberately)
 
 Kiosk lockdown (fullscreen/no-decorations) and launching Fastify from the shell are out of scope for

apps/server/src/routes/routes.test.ts

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ describe("health + login", () => {
   it("GET /health is open", async () => {
     const res = await app.inject({ method: "GET", url: "/health" });
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
-    expect(res.json()).toEqual({ status: "ok" });
+    expect(res.json()).toEqual({ status: "ok", app: "parking-system" });
   });
 
   it("login with bad credentials is rejected", async () => {

apps/server/src/routes/ws.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import type { Db } from "@parking/db";
 import type { LedgerEvent } from "@parking/shared";
-import { roleHasPermissions } from "../auth.js";
+import { requireAuth, roleHasPermissions } from "../auth.js";
 import {
   deviceEvents,
   type LaneStatusEvent,
@@ -31,11 +32,57 @@ import { getOccupancy } from "../occupancy.js";
 // an Origin allowlist: the handshake's Origin must be same-origin (or an explicitly
 // allowed booth UI origin). Non-browser clients (no Origin) are rejected too.
 // See auth.ts, event-log.ts (emitLedger), capacity-occupancy.md.
+//
+// Desktop shell (Tauri) exception — the WS TICKET. The desktop app's HTTP goes
+// through tauri-plugin-http (reqwest, its own cookie jar) and its WebSocket
+// through tauri-plugin-websocket (bare tungstenite, NO cookie jar at all), so
+// the JWT cookie set at login can never ride on the WS handshake — jwtVerify()
+// would 401 every connect (found 2026-09-04: the desktop live feed reconnected
+// every 10s forever). The JWT is HttpOnly and must stay out of JS, so instead
+// the desktop client POSTs /api/ws/ticket (normal cookie + CSRF auth) to get a
+// single-use, 30-second random ticket bound to its user, and presents it in an
+// `x-ws-ticket` header on the handshake. A browser page cannot set custom
+// headers on a WebSocket, so this path is unreachable from a browser and adds
+// no CSWSH surface; the Origin allowlist still applies to both paths.
 
 /** Permission required to watch the live feed (a read-only stream of ledger +
  *  device status). Any role granted `report:read` may watch. */
 const WATCH_PERMISSION = "report:read" as const;
 
+/** Handshake header carrying a desktop WS ticket (see file header). */
+const WS_TICKET_HEADER = "x-ws-ticket";
+/** A ticket is only good for the connect that immediately follows its issue. */
+const WS_TICKET_TTL_MS = 30_000;
+
+interface WsTicket {
+  sub: string;
+  roleId: string;
+  expiresAt: number;
+}
+
+/** Outstanding tickets. Tiny (one per desktop connect attempt), in-memory only —
+ *  a server restart invalidates them, which is fine: the client just asks for
+ *  another on its next reconnect. */
+const tickets = new Map<string, WsTicket>();
+
+function issueWsTicket(sub: string, roleId: string): string {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  for (const [key, t] of tickets) {
+    if (t.expiresAt <= now) tickets.delete(key);
+  }
+  const ticket = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
+  tickets.set(ticket, { sub, roleId, expiresAt: now + WS_TICKET_TTL_MS });
+  return ticket;
+}
+
+/** Single-use: the ticket is removed whether or not it turns out to be valid. */
+function consumeWsTicket(ticket: string): WsTicket | null {
+  const t = tickets.get(ticket);
+  if (!t) return null;
+  tickets.delete(ticket);
+  return t.expiresAt > Date.now() ? t : null;
+}
+
 /**
  * Is the handshake's Origin trusted? Same-origin (Origin host === Host header) is
  * always allowed; additional origins can be allowlisted via WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
@@ -80,19 +127,43 @@ export async function wsRoutes(
   laneStatus: LaneStatus,
   lanePresence: LanePresence,
 ): Promise<void> {
+  // Desktop-only: mint a WS ticket for the signed-in session (see file header).
+  // Ordinary cookie + CSRF auth — the desktop client CAN do that over HTTP (via
+  // tauri-plugin-http), it just can't carry the cookie onto the WebSocket.
+  app.post("/api/ws/ticket", { preHandler: requireAuth }, async (req) => ({
+    ticket: issueWsTicket(req.user.sub, req.user.roleId),
+    expiresInMs: WS_TICKET_TTL_MS,
+  }));
+
   app.get(
     "/api/ws",
     {
       websocket: true,
-      // Origin allowlist (anti-CSWSH, replaces CSRF — see file header) THEN JWT +
-      // role. Reject a cross/absent origin before touching the token, so a hijack
-      // attempt never reaches an authenticated socket. jwtVerify reads the cookie.
+      // Origin allowlist (anti-CSWSH, replaces CSRF — see file header) THEN
+      // session (JWT cookie, or a desktop WS ticket) THEN role. Reject a
+      // cross/absent origin before touching either credential, so a hijack
+      // attempt never reaches an authenticated socket.
       preHandler: async (req) => {
         if (!isAllowedOrigin(req.headers.origin, req.headers.host)) {
           throw Object.assign(new Error("forbidden origin"), { statusCode: 403 });
         }
-        await req.jwtVerify();
-        if (!req.user || !roleHasPermissions(req.user.roleId, [WATCH_PERMISSION])) {
+        const rawTicket = req.headers[WS_TICKET_HEADER];
+        const ticket = Array.isArray(rawTicket) ? rawTicket[0] : rawTicket;
+        let roleId: string;
+        if (ticket !== undefined) {
+          const t = consumeWsTicket(ticket);
+          if (!t) {
+            throw Object.assign(new Error("invalid or expired ws ticket"), { statusCode: 401 });
+          }
+          roleId = t.roleId;
+        } else {
+          await req.jwtVerify(); // reads the HttpOnly cookie (browser path)
+          if (!req.user) {
+            throw Object.assign(new Error("forbidden"), { statusCode: 403 });
+          }
+          roleId = req.user.roleId;
+        }
+        if (!roleHasPermissions(roleId, [WATCH_PERMISSION])) {
           throw Object.assign(new Error("forbidden"), { statusCode: 403 });
         }
       },

apps/server/src/server.ts

@@ -106,7 +106,10 @@ export async function buildServer(opts: BuildOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyInsta
     cookie: { cookieName: TOKEN_COOKIE, signed: false },
   });
 
-  app.get("/health", async () => ({ status: "ok" }));
+  // Unauthenticated liveness probe. `app` lets a client (the desktop ConnectScreen
+  // test — apps/web/src/lib/backend-config.ts) tell THIS server apart from any
+  // other service that happens to answer on the address the operator typed.
+  app.get("/health", async () => ({ status: "ok", app: "parking-system" }));
 
   // Local username/password login → JWT in an HttpOnly cookie + CSRF cookie.
   await authRoutes(app, db);

apps/web/src/api.ts

@@ -5,18 +5,14 @@
 // back in the X-CSRF-Token header (double-submit). See
 // wiki/entities/local-jwt-auth.md.
 //
-// Desktop shell exception: tauri-plugin-http's fetch() runs through Rust's
-// reqwest, which keeps its OWN cookie jar separate from the webview —
-// document.cookie on the tauri://localhost page never sees a cookie set on a
-// plugin-routed response (open upstream bug, tauri-apps/tauri#13045). The
-// cookie itself IS still sent back to the server by reqwest on later
-// requests (only the client-side *read* is broken), so the server also
+// Desktop shell exception: document.cookie can't see the CSRF cookie there
+// (reqwest's separate jar — see lib/desktop-csrf.ts), so the server also
 // echoes the token in the login/me response BODY (sessionView's csrfToken —
-// see routes/auth.ts) purely as a second channel for the desktop client to
-// learn the value; desktopCsrfToken below stashes it in memory and
-// setSessionUser() (called wherever a SessionUser is received) keeps it
-// current. The browser path is untouched — it still reads document.cookie.
+// see routes/auth.ts) and setSessionUser() (called wherever a SessionUser is
+// received) stashes it via setDesktopCsrfToken(). The browser path is
+// untouched — it still reads document.cookie.
 
+import { getDesktopCsrfToken, setDesktopCsrfToken } from "./lib/desktop-csrf.js";
 import { logFailedRequest } from "./lib/logger.js";
 import { apiUrl, platformFetch } from "./lib/origin.js";
 import { inTauri } from "./lib/tauri-env.js";
@@ -30,16 +26,11 @@ function readCookie(name: string): string | null {
   return m ? decodeURIComponent(m[1]!) : null;
 }
 
-/** Desktop-only in-memory CSRF stash — see file header. Never persisted (a
- *  fresh app launch always logs in again, or bootstraps via /api/auth/me
- *  which re-supplies it). */
-let desktopCsrfToken: string | null = null;
-
 /** Update the desktop CSRF stash. Called wherever a SessionUser is received
  *  (login, fetchMe). No-op / cheap in the browser (the value just goes
  *  unused there — reads still come from document.cookie). */
 function setSessionUser(user: SessionUser): void {
-  if (user.csrfToken) desktopCsrfToken = user.csrfToken;
+  if (user.csrfToken) setDesktopCsrfToken(user.csrfToken);
 }
 
 /** fetch wrapper: sends cookies, adds CSRF header on mutations, parses errors. */
@@ -50,7 +41,7 @@ export async function apiFetch<T>(path: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise
     headers.set("content-type", "application/json");
   }
   if (method !== "GET" && method !== "HEAD") {
-    const csrf = inTauri() ? desktopCsrfToken : readCookie(CSRF_COOKIE);
+    const csrf = inTauri() ? getDesktopCsrfToken() : readCookie(CSRF_COOKIE);
     if (csrf) headers.set(CSRF_HEADER, csrf);
   }
   const res = await platformFetch(apiUrl(path), { ...init, headers, credentials: "include" });
@@ -129,10 +120,19 @@ export async function login(username: string, password: string): Promise<Session
 
 export async function logout(): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> {
   const res = await apiFetch<{ ok: boolean }>("/api/auth/logout", { method: "POST" });
-  desktopCsrfToken = null;
+  setDesktopCsrfToken(null);
   return res;
 }
 
+/** Desktop only: mint a single-use, short-lived ticket that authenticates the
+ *  live-feed WebSocket handshake in place of the session cookie — the native WS
+ *  plugin has no cookie jar, so the cookie can never ride along (see
+ *  routes/ws.ts and lib/platform-ws.ts). Normal cookie + CSRF auth on the way in. */
+export async function fetchWsTicket(): Promise<string> {
+  const { ticket } = await apiFetch<{ ticket: string }>("/api/ws/ticket", { method: "POST" });
+  return ticket;
+}
+
 /** Persist the current user's UI language preference (restored on next login). */
 export function setLanguagePref(language: Lang): Promise<{ language: Lang }> {
   return apiFetch("/api/auth/language", { method: "PUT", body: JSON.stringify({ language }) });

apps/web/src/lib/backend-config.ts

@@ -56,27 +56,28 @@ export interface BackendCheck {
   detail?: string;
 }
 
-/** Probe a candidate origin by hitting /api/version. That route is behind
- *  requirePermission("site:read") (session cookie + site:read — see
- *  apps/server/src/routes/site.ts), so a pre-login probe can never get a 2xx;
- *  we're not checking "is this reachable and mine to use", only "is something
- *  that speaks our Fastify auth protocol listening here" — a 401 (missing/bad
- *  JWT) or 403 (valid session, wrong permission) from THIS specific route is
- *  as strong a signal of that as a 200 would be, and both are expected outcomes
- *  pre-login. Uses the same tauri-plugin-http path platformFetch does (raw
- *  fetch from the webview can't reach an arbitrary LAN host — mixed content,
- *  see origin.ts). */
+/** Probe a candidate origin via GET /health — the server's one unauthenticated
+ *  route (server.ts), which answers `{status:"ok", app:"parking-system"}`. We
+ *  require BOTH a 2xx and that `app` value: the previous probe hit an
+ *  auth-guarded route and accepted 401/403 as "ours", which any password-
+ *  protected service on the LAN would also have passed. Uses the same
+ *  tauri-plugin-http path platformFetch does (raw fetch from the webview can't
+ *  reach an arbitrary LAN host — mixed content, see origin.ts). */
 export async function testBackendUrl(url: string): Promise<BackendCheck> {
   const origin = url.replace(/\/$/, "");
   try {
     const { fetch: tauriFetch } = await import("@tauri-apps/plugin-http");
-    const res = await tauriFetch(`${origin}/api/version`, {
+    const res = await tauriFetch(`${origin}/health`, {
       method: "GET",
       signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),
     });
-    if (!res.ok && res.status !== 401 && res.status !== 403) {
+    if (!res.ok) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "bad_response", detail: `HTTP ${res.status}` };
     }
+    const body = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as { app?: unknown } | null;
+    if (body?.app !== "parking-system") {
+      return { ok: false, reason: "bad_response", detail: "unexpected /health body" };
+    }
     return { ok: true };
   } catch (err) {
     return {

apps/web/src/lib/desktop-csrf.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// Desktop-only in-memory CSRF token stash.
+//
+// tauri-plugin-http's fetch() runs through Rust's reqwest, which keeps its OWN
+// cookie jar separate from the webview — document.cookie on tauri://localhost
+// never sees the parking_csrf cookie the server sets (open upstream bug,
+// tauri-apps/tauri#13045). The cookie IS still sent to the server by reqwest;
+// only the client-side READ is broken. So the server echoes the same value in
+// the login / me response body (sessionView's csrfToken, routes/auth.ts) and
+// the desktop client keeps it here, echoing THIS in X-CSRF-Token instead of
+// reading document.cookie.
+//
+// One module, no imports, so BOTH echo sites can share it without a cycle:
+// api.ts (sets it, uses it for apiFetch mutations) and logger.ts (uses it for
+// the /api/logs flush — which api.ts imports, so it can't import api.ts back).
+// Never persisted: a fresh launch re-learns it via login or /api/auth/me.
+
+let token: string | null = null;
+
+export function setDesktopCsrfToken(value: string | null): void {
+  token = value;
+}
+
+export function getDesktopCsrfToken(): string | null {
+  return token;
+}

apps/web/src/lib/logger.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
 //    high-signal sources (failed requests, uncaught errors) are always captured.
 
 import { LOG_LEVEL_ORDER, type ClientLogInput, type LogLevel } from "@parking/shared";
+import { getDesktopCsrfToken } from "./desktop-csrf.js";
 import { apiUrl, platformFetch } from "./origin.js";
+import { inTauri } from "./tauri-env.js";
 
 const ENDPOINT = "/api/logs";
 const FLUSH_MS = 4000;
@@ -75,7 +77,11 @@ async function flush(): Promise<void> {
   flushing = true;
   try {
     const headers: Record<string, string> = { "content-type": "application/json" };
-    const csrf = readCookie(CSRF_COOKIE);
+    // /api/logs is behind requireAuth → assertCsrf on POST. On desktop the
+    // cookie is unreadable (see desktop-csrf.ts) — without this branch every
+    // desktop flush 403'd and was dropped here, silently, by design (found
+    // 2026-09-04: no desktop client log had EVER reached app_logs).
+    const csrf = inTauri() ? getDesktopCsrfToken() : readCookie(CSRF_COOKIE);
     if (csrf) headers[CSRF_HEADER] = csrf;
     await platformFetch(apiUrl(ENDPOINT), {
       method: "POST",

apps/web/src/lib/platform-ws.ts

@@ -17,8 +17,16 @@
 // Browser build: plain pass-through to the real WebSocket (this file's
 // createPlatformSocket is only called from inside inTauri() callers).
 
+import { fetchWsTicket } from "../api.js";
+import { logClient } from "./logger.js";
 import { inTauri } from "./tauri-env.js";
 
+/** Rate-limit the "connect failed" log: use-live-feed reconnects every ≤10s
+ *  forever, and each attempt is a fresh adapter, so without this an outage
+ *  would write six near-identical app_logs rows a minute. */
+const CONNECT_FAIL_LOG_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
+let lastConnectFailLogAt = 0;
+
 export interface PlatformSocket {
   onopen: (() => void) | null;
   onmessage: ((ev: { data: string }) => void) | null;
@@ -64,13 +72,21 @@ class TauriSocketAdapter implements PlatformSocket {
     try {
       const { default: TauriWebSocket } = await import("@tauri-apps/plugin-websocket");
       if (this.#closed) return; // close() called before connect resolved
-      // Runs on Tauri's native (Rust) side, NOT inside the webview page — there
-      // is no page context to auto-attach an Origin header the way a real
-      // browser WebSocket would. The server's anti-CSWSH check (routes/ws.ts)
-      // rejects any handshake with a missing/mismatched Origin, so it must be
-      // set explicitly here to match what WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS expects
-      // (tauri://localhost — see apps/server/.env.example).
-      const conn = await TauriWebSocket.connect(url, { headers: { Origin: "tauri://localhost" } });
+      // The native WS plugin is a bare tungstenite client: no page context AND
+      // no cookie jar. Two consequences, both handled via explicit headers:
+      //  - Origin: nothing auto-attaches `Origin: tauri://localhost` the way a
+      //    browser WebSocket would, and routes/ws.ts's anti-CSWSH check rejects a
+      //    missing/mismatched Origin — so set it to match WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS.
+      //  - Session: the HttpOnly JWT cookie lives in tauri-plugin-http's reqwest
+      //    jar and can't ride on this handshake, so jwtVerify() would 401 every
+      //    connect (the 2026-09-04 "reconnects every 10s forever" bug). Instead,
+      //    mint a single-use ticket over normal HTTP auth and present it in the
+      //    x-ws-ticket header (see routes/ws.ts).
+      const ticket = await fetchWsTicket();
+      if (this.#closed) return;
+      const conn = await TauriWebSocket.connect(url, {
+        headers: { Origin: "tauri://localhost", "x-ws-ticket": ticket },
+      });
       if (this.#closed) {
         void conn.disconnect();
         return;
@@ -87,7 +103,17 @@ class TauriSocketAdapter implements PlatformSocket {
       });
       this.onopen?.();
     } catch (err) {
-      console.error("Tauri WebSocket connect failed:", url, err);
+      // logClient, not console.error: console output only reaches app_logs at
+      // debug/trace level, which is how the ticket-less 401 stayed invisible
+      // for a full day. A closed-before-connect race isn't a failure.
+      if (!this.#closed && Date.now() - lastConnectFailLogAt > CONNECT_FAIL_LOG_INTERVAL_MS) {
+        lastConnectFailLogAt = Date.now();
+        logClient({
+          level: "error",
+          message: `desktop live-feed connect failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+          context: { kind: "desktop_ws_connect_failed", url },
+        });
+      }
       this.onerror?.();
       this.onclose?.();
     }

komodo/resources.toml

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
 # Staging booth: pinned immutable stage-<sha>. After each promotion (merge dev → stage, CI builds
 # :stage-<sha>), bump this to the new sha and re-sync/deploy from Core. The moving `:stage` tag
 # exists as the pointer; we deploy the sha, not the mover.
-TAG=stage-7d67934
+TAG=stage-5c6a21e
 COOKIE_SECURE=0
 VISION_ENABLED=1
 # Desktop app WS handshake: Origin is tauri://localhost (set explicitly by
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
 # Staging booth: pinned immutable stage-<sha>. After each promotion (merge dev → stage, CI builds
 # :stage-<sha>), bump this to the new sha and re-sync/deploy from Core. The moving `:stage` tag
 # exists as the pointer; we deploy the sha, not the mover.
-TAG=stage-7d67934
+TAG=stage-5c6a21e
 COOKIE_SECURE=0
 VISION_ENABLED=1
 # Desktop app WS handshake: Origin is tauri://localhost (set explicitly by

wiki/decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md

@@ -144,8 +144,11 @@ Per the user's choices — the operator **keeps OS access** (no fullscreen lockd
   `VITE_API_BASE` correctly set (below), login still failed with WebKit's generic `"Load failed"`.
   Root cause is a separate, deeper issue: WebKitGTK treats `tauri://localhost` as a **secure
   origin**, so a plain `http://127.0.0.1:3000` `fetch()` — or a `ws://127.0.0.1:3000` WebSocket —
-  from inside it is blocked as **mixed content**, a long-standing WebKit limitation
-  ([bugs.webkit.org #171934](https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=171934)). `connect-src` in the
+  from inside it is blocked as **mixed content**. (Nearest upstream ticket:
+  [bugs.webkit.org #171934](https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=171934) — note that one is
+  specifically about *loopback* addresses from https pages; a LAN IP such as `192.168.1.50:3000`
+  would stay mixed content even if it were fixed, so the plugin route below is the right
+  architecture for a remote booth regardless, not a stopgap.) `connect-src` in the
   CSP does **not** override this — it's a different browser security layer entirely, so the request
   never even reaches the network layer to be diagnosable via server logs. **Fix:** two Tauri plugins
   route the SPA's traffic through Tauri's native (Rust) side instead of the webview's own
@@ -167,7 +170,9 @@ Per the user's choices — the operator **keeps OS access** (no fullscreen lockd
   - **Gotcha (found immediately after shipping the above): the native WS plugin sends no `Origin`
     header.** `tauri-plugin-websocket`'s `connect()` runs on Tauri's Rust side, not inside the
     webview page — there's no page context to auto-attach `Origin: tauri://localhost` the way a real
-    browser `WebSocket` would. The server's anti-CSWSH check (`routes/ws.ts`, `isAllowedOrigin`)
+    browser `WebSocket` would. (The **HTTP** plugin, by contrast, *does* attach that Origin itself —
+    `tauri-plugin-http/src/commands.rs`, "ensure we have an Origin header set" — so only the WS
+    path needs the explicit header.) The server's anti-CSWSH check (`routes/ws.ts`, `isAllowedOrigin`)
     treats a missing Origin as untrusted and 403s the handshake before touching auth — the live feed
     showed **"JASHTË LINJË"** (offline) in the desktop app while the browser showed **"LIVE"**, same
     server, same moment. **Fix (two parts, both needed):** `platform-ws.ts`'s `connect()` call now
@@ -332,8 +337,9 @@ runtime-persisted** value.
   anyway (the WebKit mixed-content fix above), and those plugins run on the Rust side, **outside**
   `connect-src`'s jurisdiction entirely. The real access boundary moved to
   `capabilities/default.json`'s `http:default` scope, which is now wildcarded
-  (`http://*`, `https://*`, `http://*:*`, `https://*:*` — all four forms needed, a known Tauri
-  scope-matching quirk drops bare `http://*` matches for a `host:port` URL otherwise). `websocket:
+  (`http://*`, `https://*`, `http://*:*`, `https://*:*` — all four forms needed: the scope is a
+  URLPattern, and a pattern with no port matches only the scheme's *default* port, so `http://*`
+  covers `:80` (Caddy) while `http://*:*` is what covers `:3000`). `websocket:
   default` already had no scope restriction. Net effect: **the app can now reach any host the
   operator types in, and nothing else** — same shape of guarantee as before, just operator-directed
   instead of build-directed.
@@ -351,10 +357,12 @@ runtime-persisted** value.
   a `tauri-plugin-http` response is stored in that reqwest jar and IS correctly re-sent by
   reqwest on later requests (so plain session auth — GETs — silently worked) — but it is **never**
   synced into the webview's own cookie store, so `document.cookie` on the `tauri://localhost` page
-  can never see it. This is an open, unresolved upstream Tauri bug
-  ([tauri-apps/tauri#13045](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/issues/13045),
-  [#11518](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/issues/11518)) — not something fixable on our side by
-  changing how/when we read the cookie. Since `api.ts`'s `apiFetch` reads the readable `parking_csrf`
+  can never see it. Upstream: [tauri-apps/tauri#13045](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/issues/13045)
+  (open — asks for exactly this jar→webview sync) and
+  [#11518](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/issues/11518) (closed, without adding a sync) — not
+  something fixable on our side by changing how/when we read the cookie. The reqwest jar itself
+  IS persisted (`.cookies` in the app cache dir), so a desktop session survives an app restart
+  just like the browser's 30-day cookie does. Since `api.ts`'s `apiFetch` reads the readable `parking_csrf`
   cookie via `document.cookie` to echo it in `X-CSRF-Token` (double-submit — see
   [[local-jwt-auth]]), this meant **every mutating request from the desktop app was silently sending
   no CSRF header at all**, pre-dating this runtime-URL change (it was equally true against the old
@@ -369,3 +377,46 @@ runtime-persisted** value.
   `assertCsrf()` checks server-side (and reqwest still sends it correctly, per above) — this only
   fixes how the desktop *client* learns what value to put in the header, so browser behavior and
   server verification are both completely unchanged.
+
+### Live feed needs a WS *ticket*, not the cookie — and desktop logs never reached the server (2026-09-04, v0.1.6)
+
+A retrospective of the 2026-09-03/04 run found that v0.1.4's Origin fix cleared only the **first**
+of two gates in `routes/ws.ts`'s preHandler, and that the diagnostic channel everyone was staring
+at was itself broken on desktop. Booth evidence: `docker logs park-2-server-1 | grep /api/ws` showed
+a fresh handshake every 10 s (use-live-feed's capped backoff), i.e. every connect rejected.
+
+- **Gate two: `req.jwtVerify()` reads the HttpOnly `parking_token` cookie — which the WebSocket
+  plugin cannot send.** `tauri-plugin-websocket` is a bare tokio-tungstenite client with **no
+  cookie jar at all** (its source has no cookie handling); the cookie lives in
+  `tauri-plugin-http`'s reqwest jar and is HttpOnly besides, so JS can't copy it across either.
+  Origin OK + no cookie → 401 → reconnect forever. **Fix: a single-use WS ticket.** The desktop
+  client `POST`s `/api/ws/ticket` over normal HTTP auth (cookie + CSRF, which it CAN do) and gets
+  a 32-byte random ticket bound to its user, valid 30 s, single-use, in-memory only; it presents
+  it in an `x-ws-ticket` header on the handshake (`platform-ws.ts`), and the preHandler accepts
+  ticket-or-cookie *after* the Origin check, then does the same `report:read` role check for both.
+  A browser page can't set custom WebSocket headers, so the ticket path is unreachable from a
+  browser and adds no CSWSH surface. **Rejected:** echoing the JWT in the login body and sending
+  it as `Authorization: Bearer` (fastify-jwt would accept it) — that puts the session token in JS,
+  which HttpOnly exists to prevent; the ticket keeps it out. Verified locally with an 11-case
+  handshake script: ticket/no-cookie → 101 + hello; reused/bogus/absent → 401; ticket + bad Origin
+  → 403; cookie path unchanged.
+- **Desktop client logs had never reached `app_logs`.** `logger.ts`'s flush read the CSRF token
+  from `document.cookie` (null on desktop — the same jar split as above), so every
+  `POST /api/logs` from the desktop 403'd under `requireAuth`→`assertCsrf`, and the flush drops
+  failures by design (loop safety). Consequences: the 2026-09-03 "route update-failure logging
+  through logClient" fix wrote to a dead channel, and the v0.1.5 CSRF fix patched `api.ts` but not
+  `logger.ts`. **Fix:** the stash moved to a dependency-free `lib/desktop-csrf.ts` (so `logger.ts`
+  can read it without importing `api.ts`, which imports `logger.ts`), and the flush uses it when
+  `inTauri()`. `platform-ws.ts`'s connect failure now goes through `logClient` too (rate-limited
+  to one row/min — reconnects are every ≤10 s), instead of `console.error`, which only forwards at
+  debug/trace.
+- **ConnectScreen probe now hits `/health`.** The v0.1.5 probe hit an auth-guarded route and
+  treated 401/403 as "ours" — any password-protected service on the LAN would have passed it, and
+  the comment claiming no unauthenticated route existed was wrong (`/health` has been there all
+  along). `/health` now also returns `app: "parking-system"`, and the probe requires both a 2xx
+  and that value.
+- **Why every one of these was found in the field:** `tauri dev` loads `http://localhost:5173`,
+  not `tauri://localhost`, so the relative-URL error, mixed content, the missing Origin, and the
+  cookie-jar split *cannot* reproduce in dev mode. The pre-tag gate is now: build the bundle
+  locally, run the AppImage against a local server, log in, confirm **LIVE**, do one mutation,
+  and confirm a desktop-sourced row appears in the Logs viewer (`apps/desktop/README.md`).

wiki/log.md

@@ -2841,3 +2841,22 @@ value in the login/me JSON body; the desktop client stashes it in memory and ech
 reading document.cookie. assertCsrf() itself is untouched — the cookie is still what's verified,
 and reqwest was already sending it correctly; this only fixes how the desktop client *learns* the
 value. Full detail (including the exact CSP/capability tradeoffs) on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].
+
+## [2026-09-04] fix | Desktop live feed: WS handshake can't carry the cookie → single-use ticket; desktop logs never reached app_logs
+
+Retrospective of the 2026-09-03/04 desktop run (six releases in 26 h) found the v0.1.4 Origin fix
+cleared only gate one of two in routes/ws.ts: gate two is req.jwtVerify() reading the HttpOnly
+cookie, and tauri-plugin-websocket has no cookie jar at all — so every desktop handshake 401'd and
+use-live-feed reconnected every 10 s (confirmed in the park-2 server log). Fixed with a 30-second,
+single-use, in-memory WS ticket minted by POST /api/ws/ticket over normal cookie+CSRF auth and
+presented in an x-ws-ticket header; Origin check still runs first, browser path unchanged, JWT
+stays out of JS. Second finding: logger.ts read the CSRF cookie via document.cookie, null on
+desktop, so every desktop POST /api/logs 403'd and was dropped silently — no desktop client log had
+EVER reached app_logs, which is why "no logs whatsoever" kept happening and why yesterday's
+logClient fix couldn't help. Stash moved to lib/desktop-csrf.ts, shared by api.ts and logger.ts;
+WS connect failures now go through logClient (rate-limited). Third: the ConnectScreen probe now
+uses the unauthenticated /health (extended with app: "parking-system") instead of accepting any
+401. Also corrected four wiki citations (WebKit 171934 scope, tauri#11518 is closed, the HTTP
+plugin does set Origin itself, the http-scope "quirk" is URLPattern default-port semantics) and
+added a local-AppImage pre-tag gate to the desktop README, since tauri dev cannot reproduce any
+of these origin-dependent bugs. Full detail on [[desktop-shell-tauri]].