128 lines
11 KiB
Bash
128 lines
11 KiB
Bash
# Komodo Stack environment — the COMPLETE reference of every env the booth stack reads:
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# required, image-selection, set-by-compose (don't override), and the optional tunables
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# with their code defaults. Under Komodo, plain env lives in the Stack definition
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# (komodo/resources.toml); the two SECRETS come from Core's secret store, PER BOOTH and
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# UNIQUE. This file is DOCUMENTATION — never fill in real secrets here. See
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# wiki/decisions/fleet-deployment-komodo.md.
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#
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# A minimal working Stack only needs: REGISTRY, TAG, the two secrets, COOKIE_SECURE=0,
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# VISION_ENABLED=1, WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS. Everything under "OPTIONAL TUNABLES" has a safe
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# default in code — set one only to override it.
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# IMAGE SELECTION (picks which container image to pull — not server runtime env)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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REGISTRY=git.infra.msai.al/mca/parking_solution
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# IMMUTABLE per-commit tag. Manual + pinned. Bump per deploy. Never the moving `dev`
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# on a PRODUCTION booth (a staging booth may track `dev`).
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TAG=dev-830993b
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# REQUIRED (no safe default — the server refuses to boot / login breaks without)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# Login signing secret (>=32 chars, no change-me/insecure/dev-only). openssl rand -hex 32.
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JWT_SECRET=[[booth_<name>_jwt_secret]]
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# Ledger-signing HMAC key — the anti-fraud root. DISTINCT per booth; never reuse. If unset
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# it falls back to JWT_SECRET (warned). openssl rand -hex 32.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=[[booth_<name>_event_signing_key]]
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# CRITICAL on the plain-HTTP booth LAN: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) by DEFAULT, so
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# without =0 the auth cookie never sends and operators CANNOT log in. Set 1 only behind TLS.
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COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# BACKUP (encrypted on-site DB backup — see wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# Dedicated backup-ENCRYPTION key. SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (independent rotation;
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# backups travel to the target, the signing key must not). Per booth + unique. openssl rand
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# -hex 32. ESCROW it offsite alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY — disaster recovery needs BOTH, and
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# neither is ever stored inside the backup it unlocks. Backups stay OFF until this key is set
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# AND the admin picks a target directory in the UI. The key is the ONLY backup env var — the
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# target directory and retention (keep-last / keep-daily) are admin-chosen in the UI (Setup →
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# Backup) and stored in the DB, so changing them needs no redeploy.
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BACKUP_KEY=[[booth_<name>_backup_key]]
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# COMMONLY SET (have defaults, but you usually want these explicit on a booth)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# Turn the ANPR/vision call on. Default "" (off-ish). Set 1 to enable. (Prod compose also
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# forces VISION_RECOGNIZER=fast_alpr on the vision container.)
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VISION_ENABLED=1
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# Extra origins the booth WebSocket (/api/ws) accepts beyond same-origin. Comma-separated,
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# e.g. http://parksystems.msai.al. Blank = only the same-origin booth URL. Default "".
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# SET BY COMPOSE — do NOT put these in the Stack (the compose files own them)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # prod override (host-net server → loopback vision)
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# DATABASE_URL=/data/parking.sqlite # the mounted volume (the signed ledger)
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# VISION_RECOGNIZER=fast_alpr # prod override on the vision container
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# OPTIONAL TUNABLES — all have code defaults; set only to override. (defaults shown)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# --- networking / process ---
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# PORT=3000 # server listen port
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # bind interface (127.0.0.1 = loopback only)
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# BACKEND_HOST_IP= # override the auto-picked IP devices push back to
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# # (multi-NIC hosts; usually auto-detected fine)
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# WEB_DIST_DIR= # where the built SPA lives (the image sets it)
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# --- logging ---
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# LOG_LEVEL=info # trace|debug|info|warn|error|fatal (pino)
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# LOG_RETENTION_DAYS=60 # app_logs auto-purge age (~2 months, matches the
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# # container-log rotation caps in compose.prod)
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# LOG_RETENTION_MAX_ROWS=50000 # app_logs row cap (burst guard regardless of age)
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# RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30 # soft-deleted items auto-purge age (0 = keep forever)
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# --- snapshots (camera evidence; stored re-encoded, then pruned under disk pressure) ---
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# SNAPSHOT_MAX_EDGE=1280 # downscale long edge (px) before storing
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# SNAPSHOT_JPEG_QUALITY=80 # stored JPEG quality (recognition uses full-res original)
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# Disk-pressure prune (daily safety valve; deletes oldest + VACUUM only when the disk is tight):
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# SNAPSHOT_DISK_HIGH_PCT=70 # prune only when the DB's filesystem is ≥ this % used
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# SNAPSHOT_DISK_FREE_TARGET_PCT=10 # try to free ~this % of the disk per run
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# SNAPSHOT_MIN_KEEP=500 # never prune below this many snapshots (floor)
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# SNAPSHOT_PRUNE_BATCH=200 # delete oldest in batches of this many
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# --- device monitor / lane ---
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# DEVICE_POLL_MS=8000 # device health poll interval
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# PRINTER_POLL_MS=5000 # printer status poll interval
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# LANE_BUSY_TTL_MS=30000 # how long a lane stays "busy" after a vehicle push
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# CAPTURE_TTL_MS=30000 # credential-enrollment arm window (card capture form)
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# --- readers (DT-008 channel tagging — must MATCH the vendor tool's output prefixes;
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# see wiki/entities/dingtian-dt008-reader.md) ---
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# READER_QR_PREFIX=Q: # optical-decode marker the reader prepends
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# READER_CARD_PREFIX=K: # RF-read marker the reader prepends
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# --- ANPR / vision (server side) ---
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# VISION_URL is compose-set (above). These are the knobs you may tweak per booth:
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per /analyze call timeout
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory floor (telemetry/lane); below = low_confidence
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# VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # STRICT barrier-driving floor (auto entry/exit). A
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# # read below this is ignored (falls back to card/QR).
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# ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this = one presentation
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# ANPR_POLL_MS=1000 # poll-until-confident: re-pull a fresh frame every N ms
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# ANPR_POLL_WINDOW_MS=8000 # ...for this long AFTER THE LAST vehicle push (sliding:
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# # a car arriving mid-loop extends it). RAISE if a slow
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# # barrier means the car waits >8s before reading clean.
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# ANPR_POLL_MAX_MS=30000 # hard ceiling on one loop from start (so a continuously
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# # busy lane can't slide the window forever)
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# ENTRY_DUP_PLATE_WINDOW_MIN=15 # entry ANPR duplicate-plate lookback (same plate already
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# # OPEN under another session → signed anomaly)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# VISION CONTAINER env (the Python ANPR service — its OWN process, prefix VISION_)
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# Mostly compose-set; documented here for completeness. (defaults shown)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# VISION_RECOGNIZER=fast_alpr # stub | fast_alpr (prod compose forces fast_alpr)
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# VISION_HOST=0.0.0.0 # bind (prod publishes 127.0.0.1 only — see compose)
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# VISION_PORT=8089
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# VISION_DETECTOR_MODEL=yolo-v9-t-384-license-plate-end2end
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# VISION_OCR_MODEL=cct-xs-v2-global-model
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # the Python service's own floor (keep ~in sync w/ server)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# SECRETS — referenced by name in resources.toml, stored in Core (never inline here)
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# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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# JWT_SECRET -> [[booth_<name>_jwt_secret]] (login)
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# EVENT_SIGNING_KEY -> [[booth_<name>_event_signing_key]] (ledger signing — fraud root)
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# BACKUP_KEY -> [[booth_<name>_backup_key]] (backup encryption — escrow offsite)
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# periphery passkey -> [[periphery_passkey_booth_<name>]] (agent onboarding)
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# registry account -> [[gitea_registry_account]] (image pull)
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