julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
1.6 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
| type | tags | sources | updated | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| entity |
|
|
2026-06-14 |
ATECC608 (secure element)
An inexpensive secure element holding a signing key that cannot be extracted, even by someone who owns the machine. The keystone of integrity in this system. (See parking-system-architecture §3, §7.)
Two distinct uses:
- Host-side event signing. Each event in the append-only-event-chain is signed by the ATECC608 on the host machine. This is what makes the hash chain unforgeable rather than merely self-consistent.
- Custom controller command authentication. On the esp32-custom-controller, it holds the key(s) for challenge-response-auth — generated on-chip, non-extractable, so popping the cabinet and dumping flash yields nothing usable.
Confirming ATECC608 wiring/usage on both ends is open-questions #6. Listed in the bom on the host machine.
Platform caveat (2026-06-21): the ATECC608 is not a PC component — it's an external I²C secure element you add/solder, native to embedded boards (the esp32-custom-controller), not to an off-the-shelf host PC. For a PC-based appliance the realistic host secure-element for the non-extractable event-signing key is the tpm the machine likely already has; reserve the ATECC608 for the embedded controller. Both give the same non-extractable property — see tpm "TPM vs. ATECC608". So use #1 (host event signing) is TPM on a PC, ATECC608 on embedded; use #2 (controller command auth) stays ATECC608.