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The reader on hand is a GEE-QR-ER80 QR/DataMatrix/1D barcode access reader (not an EM4100 prox-card reader as first guessed). Interfaces: Wiegand 26/34, RS-232, RS-485, USB, TCP/IP; 4-15 VDC; Linux-supported. Variant on hand: -Q-W (QR scanner, Wiegand/RS-232/485). This is the QR-ticket scanner the design already needed: a host-side reader whose scans become read-bus events consumed by the (already-built) exit flow and QR-permit path. Prefer RS-232/485 over Wiegand (Wiegand can't carry a variable-length QR string; autonomy is moot with the no-ACL Dingtian). New source + entity pages; updated ticket-encoding, entry-exit-readers, index. Open (blocks the adapter): the RS-232/485 frame + baud (ASCII CR/LF expected).
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type, tags, sources, updated
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2026-06-14 |
Entry / Exit Readers
There are two populations of users, and they map to two integration paths. (See parking-system-architecture §8.)
- Permit holders / subscribers — want hands-free/quick entry. Best served by reads reaching the controller directly (wiegand) so it can decide autonomously (works if host is down).
- Casual / transient — printed ticket, pay-on-exit, or plate recognition. Inherently host-side identity sources (lpr-camera, QR/ticket scanner).
How reads reach the system
| Reader type | Who sees the read | Decision by | Offline autonomy |
|---|---|---|---|
| wiegand reader → UHPPOTE port | The controller | Controller (onboard card list) | Yes — works if host down |
| Pure TCP/IP reader | Host only | Host, then UDP open to relay |
No — host on critical path |
| [[lpr-camera | LPR]] / QR scanner | Host only | Host |
| gee-qr-er80 QR reader (serial) | Host only | Host (reads serial → read bus) |
No |
Concrete host-side reader on hand: the gee-qr-er80 (QR over RS-232/RS-485). Note autonomy is moot here anyway — the current relay (dingtian-relay) has no onboard card list, so even a Wiegand reader would be host-decided. So we take the serial/QR path straight to the host's
readbus.
Key points
- Pure network readers are invisible to the uhppote-controller — it only generates events for its own terminals. For a pure-TCP reader, only the host can listen/decide/command; the controller is demoted to a commanded relay (onboard card DB + offline autonomy bypassed).
- Check for a Wiegand output first — many "network" readers have both; wiring Wiegand in keeps autonomy + native event log.
- Both models can share one relay (valid Wiegand read or host
openin "controlled" mode), so one lane serves permit + casual. - Host-in-the-loop is good for fraud detection — two independent records (host's signed append-only-event-chain entry + the UHPPOTE remote-open event) should reconcile 1:1; any mismatch is an anomaly.
Autonomy caveat: with remote-host control enabled, the controller expects host comms every ~30 s or reverts to local control (Wiegand-on-board lanes only).