julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
1.8 KiB
1.8 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| concept |
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2026-06-14 |
UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
A head-to-head on the trust-boundary fork: the off-the-shelf uhppote-controller versus the esp32-custom-controller. (Synthesized from parking-system-architecture §6–7.)
| uhppote-controller | esp32-custom-controller | |
|---|---|---|
| Trust boundary | The network | The device |
| Security posture | Tamper-evident (detection) | Tamper-proof (prevention) |
| Command auth | None — uhppote-udp-protocol is open UDP | challenge-response-auth (asymmetric sigs) |
| Key mitigation | network-isolation (mandatory) + event-log-ingestion | atecc608 holds non-extractable key; controller stores only a public key |
| Firmware | Manufacturer-only; not customizable | You own it (tiny + auditable) |
| Cost / effort | Cheap, off-the-shelf, available now | Build + firmware reliability, EMC/surge, field maintenance |
| Replay/forgery on the wire | Possible — contained only by isolation | Defeated by fresh per-command nonce |
| Safety | Barrier operator owns it (barrier-not-a-door) | Same + explicit fail-state-safety |
Bottom line
- The UHPPOTE is the current choice: good enough as a detection/audit layer when only the host can reach it (isolation) and every event lands in the append-only-event-chain.
- The ESP32 is the documented upgrade when you need a control path that holds even against an attacker on the wire. They're mixable per lane.
- Both still rely on host-side integrity (append-only-event-chain) and external reconciliation as the ultimate anti-fraud control.