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parking_solution/wiki/index.md
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julian 9e442586af docs(wiki): settle on-site encrypted backup + disaster-recovery design
New concept page backup-recovery.md resolving the design half of open-question #5.
Driving scenario: a stolen/destroyed PC whose LUKS+TPM disk is unrecoverable by
design — recovery stands up a NEW PC, restores a backup, and keeps signing the
SAME chain.

Settled: admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (SQLite online-backup/VACUUM INTO,
snapshots included) to local/USB, SMB/NFS, or SFTP targets; manual button + an
in-process daily timer; keep-last-N + dailies retention; restore is admin-only /
out-of-band (operator-adversary surface). A restored copy must still verifyChain.

Key custody (the load-bearing decision, bears on #6): three independent keys —
EVENT_SIGNING_KEY kept an extractable, escrowed software key DECOUPLED from the
TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss (the conscious trade: a TPM-sealed
signing key would be unforgeable but permanently unverifiable after the machine
dies); a NEW dedicated park_buzi_backup_key in Komodo for backup encryption,
separate from the signing key; the LUKS/TPM disk key, appliance-only and
deliberately non-recoverable. Keys are never inside the backup they unlock.

Updated open-questions #5 (design SETTLED) + #10 note; disk-os-hardening deploy
runbook (why the signing key is not sealed + park_buzi_backup_key); index catalog
+ concept count. Design only — not yet built.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
2026-06-29 11:43:23 +02:00

12 KiB
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type, tags, updated
type tags updated
overview
parking
index
2026-06-21

Index

Content catalog for the wiki. Start at overview. Maintained on every ingest. Counts: 4 sources · 19 entities · 46 concepts · 7 decision records.

Overview & navigation

  • overview — the top-level synthesis and entry point.
  • index — this catalog.
  • log.md — chronological record of ingests/queries/lints.

Sources

  • parking-system-architecture — design notes: stack, threat model, devices, UHPPOTE, ESP32, readers, BOM, open decisions.
  • dingtian-dt008 — Dingtian DT-008 product page: QR/RFID access reader (QR/barcode + ID/IC/NFC; Wiegand/TCP-IP/USB/RS485; HTTP-GET push).
  • qrcode-sdk — QRCode SDK v1.6.5: the reader's HTTP-GET-poll protocol + JSON verdict (beep/output).
  • parksql2017-legacy-schema — predecessor SQL Server schema (Albanian market): legacy tariff/discount/membership/shift/fiscal model; confirms blocks, adds time-windows + categories, lacks postpaid sponsors.

Entities — technology stack

  • technology-stack — the full stack table; all MIT/Apache/BSD, chosen to avoid lock-in.
  • fastify — Node backend; hosts device-driver plugins + auth; serves the SPA.
  • sqlite — local single-writer DB (WAL); limits & why it fits.
  • drizzle-orm — ORM; schemas port to PostgreSQL for remote sync.
  • turborepo — monorepo tool.
  • react-vite-spa — React/Vite frontend served by Fastify.
  • local-jwt-auth — fully local auth (JWT + bcrypt + role guard); forced by offline-first.

Entities — rejected alternatives

  • payload-cms — strong, but rejected over BSL license shift (the rug-pull cautionary case).
  • refine — dropped for plain React; UI too simple to justify a framework.
  • logto-zitadel-oidc — OIDC providers ruled out by offline-first.

Entities — hardware & devices

  • uhppote-controller — ❌ rejected/historical; firmware auto-open blocker drove the switch to Dingtian.
  • esp32-custom-controller — prevention-grade upgrade; device-level auth.
  • atecc608 — secure element; non-extractable signing key (host events + controller auth).
  • wiegand — reader standard feeding the controller directly (autonomous permit-holder path).
  • lpr-camera — edge-AI plate recognition; host-side casual-identity source.
  • dingtian-dt008-reader — Dingtian DT-008 QR/RFID reader on hand; host-side serial → read bus (the QR-ticket scanner).
  • zkteco-controller — ❌ rejected/historical; aux-input path was a contender, not pursued.
  • dingtian-relay — ✅ CHOSEN access controller; decoupled inputs solve the button blocker (driver verified on hardware); spare relays drive aux outputs (setAux).
  • hikvision-radar — vehicle-presence radar on a Dingtian input; the entry presence gate (per-input active-level caveat).
  • rongta-printer — ✅ CHOSEN 80mm thermal printer; ESC/POS over raw TCP 9100 (or local USB, see printer-usb-transport); driver written, one unit reachable at 10.0.10.6.
  • bom — reference bill of materials (barrier, loops, controller, readers, payment, host, network).

Concepts — foundational forces

  • offline-first — no network dependency in core operation; what it forces (and doesn't).
  • threat-model — the operator-at-the-booth reframing; why encryption defends the wrong threat.
  • tpm — TPM 2.0 hardening: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non-extractable signing key; limits (live-root, bus-sniff) + TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform; complements, not replaces, reconciliation.

Concepts — integrity & anti-fraud

  • append-only-event-chain — append-only + hash chain + ATECC608 signing = unforgeable log.
  • reconciliation — the real anti-fraud control; what remote sync actually is.
  • disk-os-hardening — LUKS/GRUB/Secure Boot; worthwhile but not the main event.
  • backup-recovery — admin-driven encrypted full-DB backup (local/SMB/SFTP) + DR; signing key escrowed & decoupled from TPM so the ledger survives total hardware loss; restore is admin-only.

Concepts — device architecture & safety

  • device-adapter-pattern — business logic talks to interfaces; swap hardware → new adapter.
  • device-registry — catalog of selectable drivers per category (admin-configurable).
  • first-run-setup — admin adds controllers + binds readers/cameras to relays from the catalog at install.
  • device-input-flow — button → device push → backend decides → relay; backend is source of truth.
  • device-discovery — optional driver capability to scan the LAN (no current driver uses it; UHPPOTE was the example).
  • barrier-not-a-door — never timed-close a barrier; safety lives in barrier firmware.
  • printer-roles-failover — ≥2 printers by role; entry ticket falls back outside→booth.
  • printer-status-monitoring — live poll of paper/cover/cutter/offline via the device's status page; SSE to the booth UI.
  • printer-usb-transport — ESC/POS drivers drive TCP (9100) OR local USB (/dev/usb/lp0) behind one render layer; USB = usblp char device, reachability-only status; provisioning open (oq#14).
  • device-status-monitoring — unified live status across ALL device categories (healthCheck + printer readStatus) → the booth footer over /api/ws.
  • trust-boundary — the core fork: network vs. device; auditable vs. unforgeable.
  • fail-state-safety — entry fails closed, exit fails open; manual override; watchdog.

Concepts — access control

  • uhppote-udp-protocol — open UDP weakness + the unauthenticated commands that undermine the log.
  • network-isolation — mandatory VLAN isolation; the network as security boundary.
  • event-log-ingestion — host-side index tracking that makes the UHPPOTE log trustworthy.
  • challenge-response-auth — asymmetric nonce scheme for the ESP32 (auth + anti-replay).
  • entry-exit-readers — two populations, two integration paths; both can share a relay.
  • entry-exit-points — pool-of-spaces model (no lane); per-relay direction, reader→relay binding, camera snapshots.
  • entry-double-press — one car = one ticket: per-relay presence gate (loop OR radar) preferred, cooldown fallback; suppressed press = telemetry.
  • button-light-indicator — entry button lamp on a spare relay: radar × camera 3-state (blink/solid/off); aux-output; fails OFF.
  • uhppote-vs-esp32 — comparison: detection vs. prevention.

Concepts — business domain

  • parking-session — the core domain entity; a projection over the signed log, never a mutable table.
  • tariff — fee model; pure, data-driven, offline; pay-on-foot adds a walk-back grace window.
  • tariff-time-tiers — BUILT (V2 tariff): happy-hour/off-peak/weekend/seasonal + vehicle category + flat rate via wall-clock windowed cards; tz frozen per version.
  • booth-exit-flow — manned booth: pay → voucher (self-exit later) or immediate exit; active sessions; audited barrier re-open.
  • shift — manned-only accountability period; explicit Start/End; End → signed + printed Z-report; drawer float carries across shifts.
  • capacity-occupancy — live count = open sessions; refuse entry + FULL sign when full (soft policy); exit never blocked.
  • site-metadata — optional park identity (name, operator, VAT, address, contact) in site_config; feeds the ticket header.
  • valet-overcapacity — "full" is soft: operator may valet-accept over capacity (keys handed over, custody). Manned, deferred.
  • validation-discounts — merchant validates a ticket → signed discount event applied at fee time.
  • validation-sponsorship — design: sponsor accounts + postpaid B2B (customers park free, business billed monthly); not a permit.
  • reporting-analytics — revenue/occupancy/stay reports + plate-search, all projections over the signed log.
  • clock-integrity — fees depend on the host clock; detect/flag backdating on an offline box.
  • ticket-encoding — transient ticket id (11-digit numeric + Luhn) as Code128; printed at entry, scanned at pay station + exit; barcode geometry must fit paper width (KP-300H overflow); plate-as-ticket alt.
  • anti-passback — block/flag one id entering twice without an exit; fold over open sessions.
  • device-events — unsigned hardware telemetry (relay/printer/camera/reader/input); separate from the signed ledger.
  • app-logs — the third stream: diagnostic logs (backend warn+ pino sink + frontend errors) → app_logs; log:read viewer; pruned by age+row cap.
  • soft-delete — BUILT: accidental admin deletes of master data (users/roles/subs/plans/tariffs) are soft (deleted_at) + recoverable from a recycle bin; auto-purge after N days; signed ledger out of scope.
  • subscription — recurring plan (e.g. 10,000 ALL/month); RF/QR or plate identity, car-count + max-concurrent, host-in-loop; short-circuits payment. (Renamed from "permit"; time-of-day windows noted, deferred.)
  • opencv-anpr-service — host-side vision microservice: ANPR (plate identity) + vehicle verification (anti-plate-spoofing witness); fast-alpr (MIT, YOLOv9+CCT/ONNX) the evaluated recognizer baseline.
  • lane-presence-and-anpr-entry — camera vehicle detection → (BUILT) advisory lane busy/free booth lights + (BUILT) the ANPR "bridge" (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate read at the lane admits them via the existing gated subscription flow (match-before-emit; subscriber-only). Measured camera limits; rejected the queue-tracking/livestream ideas.
  • blocklist — barred plates/cards refused at entry (never at exit); signed, attributed.

Concepts — frontend / operator UI

  • booth-console — operator-UI architecture: TanStack Query/Router + Zustand + Tailwind terminal theme; one /api/ws live feed (anti-CSWSH); shift control + device-status footer.
  • i18n — Albanian default + English; per-user server-stored language preference (users.language), loaded on login; tickets stay Albanian.

Dev environment (reference)

  • local-dev-workflow — running the stack locally; setup, the dev-hang gotchas, seed:admin.
  • wsl-dev-networking — WSL2 NAT blocks device broadcast; use mirrored mode + the gotchas after.

Decisions

  • standing-decisions — settled decisions (stack, platform, integrity, access control, readers).
  • open-questions — 9 open items (procurement + JWT key + FX + pay-station money corners); ESP32 device auth deferred.
  • access-controller-button-flow — ✅ RESOLVED: Dingtian decoupled inputs enable ticket-first entry (was a UHPPOTE/ZKTeco blocker).
  • autonomous-direction — roadmap: toward fully unmanned (no booth); reshapes threat model + fail-state.
  • dingtian-vs-mqtt — transport choice: direct HTTP/UDP now, MQTT parked until multi-lane scale.
  • session-model — business layer start: session = projection; transient-first; pay-on-foot. New event types.
  • vision-service — build a host-side ANPR + vehicle-verification service; replaces edge-LPR; scoped AGPL exception.
  • vision-service-packaging — the vision service lives in this monorepo (apps/vision/), separate process, wired into Turbo via a package.json shim; uv-managed Python.
  • event-streams-split — split the signed business ledger (ledger_events) from unsigned device telemetry (device_events).
  • desktop-shell-tauri — ✅ Tauri v2 chosen over Electron for the desktop kiosk shell; thin wrapper, server keeps all logic. Best case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS (resolves WebKitGTK); worst case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser, no native shell.
  • container-deployment — Docker images for the non-desktop apps: parking-server (Fastify API + bundled SPA via @fastify/static) + parking-vision (Python/uv ANPR); branch+SHA tags, per-env compose, Gitea registry, build-images.yml CI; pnpm deploy (not prune) for native better-sqlite3; migrate-at-boot.
  • fleet-deployment-komodo — fleet control plane: Komodo Periphery on each booth, driven by Komodo Core over a NetBird mesh, running the same compose files. Deploys manual + pinned to dev- (no webhook); secrets Komodo-managed per-booth+unique; booth.sh demoted to break-glass. Threat-model caveats: Periphery is a root agent (mesh-bound only), EVENT_SIGNING_KEY-in-Core is a fraud-root blast radius until ATECC608 signs. komodo/ is infra-as-code.
  • appliance-provisioning — booth-PC provisioning runbook (Dell 7070, i5-8500, discrete Nuvoton TPM): BIOS/Secure-Boot → direct-flash Ubuntu 26.04 USB (not Ventoy) → passphrase-LUKS install → manual PCR-7 TPM seal (workaround for the installer's dbt PCR_UNUSABLE error) → Docker. Verified on hardware 2026-06-23; TPM auto-unlock works.