julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
929 B
929 B
type, tags, sources, updated
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2026-06-14 |
Network Isolation
Mandatory mitigation for the unauthenticated uhppote-udp-protocol: because the uhppote-controller can't authenticate, the network must be the security boundary (the trust-boundary = the network). (See parking-system-architecture §6.)
- Control devices go on their own VLAN with no route to the booth/office network and no wireless bridge.
- Requires a managed VLAN switch (in the bom).
- Only when only the host can reach the controller does the controller's event log become a trustworthy audit source (combined with event-log-ingestion + the append-only-event-chain).
This makes the UHPPOTE setup tamper-evident behind isolation — but never tamper-proof; that requires the esp32-custom-controller.