julian
23d6379be8
Groundwork for the Car Wash pilot (wiki/decisions/venue-modules.md, build-order
steps 1 + 3). No Car Wash code yet; validation is the first module behind the
seam, unchanged in behaviour.
- @parking/shared: MODULE_IDS, ModuleManifest, MODULES (parking required;
validation dependsOn parking), parseEntitledModules / resolveModuleActivation
/ effectiveModules as pure functions.
- DB: site_config.modules_json (migration 0026, hand-written + journal;
additive, nullable = everything entitled).
- Server: modules.ts (entitledModules from MODULES_ENTITLED env, activated
from site_config, effective set, requireModule preHandler → 403
module_disabled); modules/index.ts registers folder-based modules by
iterating the registry (modules/validation); site-config GET exposes
modules/modulesEntitled/modulesActivated, PUT takes the full desired set,
enforces entitlement + dependency rules (400 with reason) and signs one
config_change per module that actually flips; /api/auth/me carries the
effective set; validation routes guarded requireModule → requirePermission.
- Web: lib/modules.ts + modules/{index,validation}; router.tsx spreads
WEB_MODULES into nav + route tree (validate route no longer named there);
Setup → Site "Modules" panel (required shown disabled, dependencies as
hints, server refusal shown verbatim); validation sections + programs fetch
gated on the module; App invalidates the router whenever the session
changes (route-context consumers only re-read on navigation — the nav was
stale after a flip, and after every other setUser too).
- Lavazh validation station retired (STATIONS = ["bar"]; rows untouched).
- Deploy: MODULES_ENTITLED=parking,validation explicit in both booth stacks;
documented in .env.example.
- Tests: modules.test.ts (7); suite 329/329; web build clean; Playwright
round-trip on /setup/site verified live.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
88 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
88 lines
5.3 KiB
Bash
# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in.
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# The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists.
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#
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# cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env
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#
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# Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars).
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# Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET=
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# Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars).
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for
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# dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed
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# them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=
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# On-site encrypted DB backup (durability for the signed ledger). A daily timer + an admin
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# "back up now" button write a consistent, AES-256-GCM-encrypted copy to the target. The
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# TARGET DIRECTORY is chosen by the admin in the UI (Setup → Backup) and stored in the DB —
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# NOT here. Only the encryption KEY is an env secret. RESTORE is an out-of-band runbook action,
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# not a console call. See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
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#
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# Dedicated backup-encryption key (>=16 chars), SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY so it can
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# rotate without fracturing the signed chain. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# Escrow it offsite (alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) — recovery needs both, and neither is ever
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# stored inside the backup it unlocks. Backups stay a no-op until BOTH this key and an in-UI
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# target directory are set. The target directory AND retention (keep-last / keep-daily) are
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# admin-chosen in the UI (Setup → Backup), NOT env — only this key is an env secret.
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# BACKUP_KEY=
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# Optional ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# PORT=3000
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only.
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# LOG_LEVEL=info
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# DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite
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#
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# Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT —
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# you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment
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# (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure
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# cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over
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# http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# Recycle bin retention: a soft-deleted user/role/subscription/plan/tariff is auto-purged
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# this many days after deletion (a 6-hourly sweep). Default 30. Set 0 to keep deleted
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# items forever (manual purge only). See wiki/concepts/soft-delete.md.
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# RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30
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# First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin
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# ADMIN_USER=admin
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# ADMIN_PASS=
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# Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws).
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# In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this.
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# The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send
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# http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both
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# so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop.
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# To open the dev SPA from another LAN device (phone over wifi), Vite must bind
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# 0.0.0.0 (vite.config.ts) AND the host's LAN origin must be listed here, e.g.
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# http://10.0.10.203:5173 — the WS handshake's Origin is that LAN address.
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost
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# Vision / ANPR (optional) -------------------------------------------------
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# OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision),
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# which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the
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# VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate.
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# See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration".
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# ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling.
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# VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory confidence floor; keep in sync with the service
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#
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# ANPR subscriber-entry bridge (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate, read off a lane
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# camera's vehicle detection, admits them through the gated SubscriptionFlow. Opt-in per
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# camera (the camera's config.anpr checkbox in Setup); the camera must be BOUND to a relay.
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# VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # stricter floor for a BARRIER-driving read (near-miss → falls back to card/QR)
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# ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this window = ONE presentation (camera re-fires ~1Hz)
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# Venue modules --------------------------------------------------------------
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# Comma-separated ids of the modules this site is ENTITLED to (a vendor/deployment
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# decision — set in the Komodo stack env, never by a site role). The site admin then
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# ACTIVATES within this set in Setup → Site; effective = entitled ∩ activated. Unset or
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# blank = every registered module (parking,validation). Required modules (parking) are
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# always on. See wiki/decisions/venue-modules.md.
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#MODULES_ENTITLED=parking,validation
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