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parking_solution/wiki/entities/atecc608.md
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julian bfe64032d8 Initial scaffold: Turborepo monorepo + design wiki
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest
mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5,
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Layout:
- apps/server   Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health)
- apps/web      React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA
- packages/db   Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users
- packages/devices  reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay)
- packages/shared   shared domain types

Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold:
append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters,
"a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local
offline-first auth.

wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested
from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema.

Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves
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2026-06-14 00:34:11 +02:00

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type, tags, sources, updated
type tags sources updated
entity
parking
hardware
security
crypto
parking-system-architecture
2026-06-14

ATECC608 (secure element)

An inexpensive secure element holding a signing key that cannot be extracted, even by someone who owns the machine. The keystone of integrity in this system. (See parking-system-architecture §3, §7.)

Two distinct uses:

  1. Host-side event signing. Each event in the append-only-event-chain is signed by the ATECC608 on the host machine. This is what makes the hash chain unforgeable rather than merely self-consistent.
  2. Custom controller command authentication. On the esp32-custom-controller, it holds the key(s) for challenge-response-auth — generated on-chip, non-extractable, so popping the cabinet and dumping flash yields nothing usable.

Confirming ATECC608 wiring/usage on both ends is open-questions #6. Listed in the bom on the host machine.