Files
parking_solution/apps/server/src/snapshot.ts
T
julian e67f0ccef0 feat(carwash): review outbox, booth side — plate-blurred vehicle crop + the operator's choice, queued for a trusted remote reviewer
The operator's category choice is a hypothesis, not truth (user, 2026-09-06): each wash
order with a vehicle read queues a package for a trusted reviewer over the private overlay
(Netbird); the verdict becomes the phase-B training label and the per-operator error rate.
wiki/concepts/vision-review-outbox.md.

- Boxes: the vision service returns the vehicle bbox; snapshot.ts stores the vehicle and
  plate boxes on the read as FRACTIONS of the analysed frame (the stored snapshot is a
  downscaled copy); vehicleForIdentity() returns them.
- carwash_review_outbox (migration 0031) + review-outbox.ts: crop = detector box + 8 %
  margin, ≤ 640 px, plate blurred in place from the plate box; payload carries a
  pseudonymous booth id and a keyed operator hash — no site name, no plate, no OSD, no
  bystanders; multipart POST with a per-booth bearer; 2xx → sent (image dropped);
  400/404/413/415/422 → abandoned; anything else → backoff 1 min·2^n capped 6 h; voided
  orders and items older than 14 days abandoned unsent. Nothing queued while unconfigured.
- Enqueue is fire-and-forget off the intake path in createOrder; the loop runs every
  CARWASH_REVIEW_INTERVAL_SEC (60) and stops on close.
- GET /api/carwash/review/status (site:read) + a "Remote review" line in Setup → Car wash.
- Env CARWASH_REVIEW_URL / _TOKEN / _BOOTH_ID (all three or off) documented in
  .env.example and forwarded by compose.
- Tests: review-outbox.test.ts (crop + blur on a synthetic frame, config/pseudonyms,
  queue/drain/backoff/abandon, through the app). Wiki: new concept page, index,
  venue-modules As built, log. The collector is not built.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
2026-09-06 22:33:43 +02:00

420 lines
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TypeScript
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import sharp from "sharp";
import { and, eq, gte, sessions, deviceEvents as deviceEventsTable, snapshots, type Db } from "@parking/db";
import { registry, type CameraDevice, type Snapshot } from "@parking/devices";
import { reasonPayload } from "@parking/shared";
import type { FastifyBaseLogger } from "fastify";
import { devicesByDirection, type FlowDirection } from "./device-resolve.js";
import { deviceEvents } from "./device-events.js";
import type { EventLog } from "./event-log.js";
import type { VisionClient } from "./vision-client.js";
// Camera snapshot capture, fired AFTER the barrier opens and never awaited on the
// open path (decision 2026-06-16): a snapshot is EVIDENCE, not a gate. A camera
// failure must never delay or prevent an open — the signed ledger is the decision,
// the image is an independent, prunable record stored as a BLOB in `snapshots`.
// See wiki/concepts/entry-exit-points.md and append-only-event-chain.md.
//
// Every camera serving the firing direction (entry/exit, or both) snapshots. Each
// capture is independent — one camera down doesn't stop the others. A captured image
// → a `snapshots` row + a `kind:"snapshot"` telemetry device_event; a failure → a
// telemetry device_event only. The caller passes the session `identity` so the image
// links to the signed vehicle_entry/exit.
//
// ANPR rides this snapshot (2026-06-19). A transient button-press or a subscriber
// QR/RFID read triggers the entry/exit, which fires THIS snapshot — that is exactly the
// moment to recognize the plate, off the SAME image, tied to the SAME session identity.
// So when a `vision` client is passed AND the camera opts in (config.anpr), each stored
// snapshot is sent to the vision service and the extracted plate is RECORDED against the
// session (a `kind:"read"` device_event with plate/confidence/snapshotId). ADVISORY +
// fire-and-forget: it never blocks the open and never changes the entry/exit decision —
// it's a record ("session X entered on plate AA558EE"). No polling; recognition only
// happens on a real entry/exit. See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md.
//
// STORAGE RE-ENCODE (2026-06-28). Cameras serve full-res JPEGs (a Hikvision main stream is
// 2688×1520 / ~600 KB); stored raw, snapshots dominated the appliance DB (~72%). Each frame
// is now downscaled (long edge ≤ SNAPSHOT_MAX_EDGE) + re-compressed (q SNAPSHOT_JPEG_QUALITY)
// BEFORE storage — ~6–10× smaller, plate still clearly readable. RECOGNITION runs on the
// ORIGINAL full-res bytes (downscaling hurts OCR); the re-encode is storage-only. Fail-soft:
// a re-encode error stores the original, never drops the snapshot or blocks the open.
/** Long-edge cap (px) + JPEG quality for the STORED snapshot. Env-overridable per appliance. */
const SNAP_MAX_EDGE = Number(process.env.SNAPSHOT_MAX_EDGE ?? 1280);
const SNAP_QUALITY = Number(process.env.SNAPSHOT_JPEG_QUALITY ?? 80);
/** Strip a camera's `; charset=...` cruft from a content type (a JPEG is binary). A bare
* `image/jpeg` renders; `image/jpeg; charset="UTF-8"` (what some cameras return, e.g.
* Hikvision) is malformed for a binary body and browsers refuse to decode it. Applied
* both on capture AND when serving, so legacy rows stored before this normalization
* existed still serve a clean type. */
export function cleanType(ct: string | null | undefined): string {
const base = ct?.split(";")[0]?.trim();
return base || "image/jpeg";
}
/** Downscale + re-encode a captured frame for STORAGE (evidence, not OCR). Caps the long edge
* and re-compresses to JPEG. Fail-soft: any error (e.g. a non-image body) returns the original
* bytes with a cleaned content type, so a snapshot is never lost. */
export async function encodeForStorage(
shot: Snapshot,
logger: FastifyBaseLogger,
): Promise<{ bytes: Buffer; contentType: string }> {
try {
const out = await sharp(shot.bytes, { failOn: "none" })
.rotate() // honor EXIF orientation before we drop the metadata
.resize({ width: SNAP_MAX_EDGE, height: SNAP_MAX_EDGE, fit: "inside", withoutEnlargement: true })
.jpeg({ quality: SNAP_QUALITY, mozjpeg: true })
.toBuffer();
return { bytes: out, contentType: "image/jpeg" };
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(`snapshot re-encode failed, storing original: ${(err as Error).message}`);
return { bytes: shot.bytes, contentType: cleanType(shot.contentType) };
}
}
interface SnapshotJob {
readonly db: Db;
readonly direction: FlowDirection;
/** Session/credential ref (ticket id, plate, subscription car key) — links to the ledger. */
readonly identity: string;
readonly logger: FastifyBaseLogger;
/** Optional vision client — when present, ANPR runs on each captured image from an
* `anpr`-enabled camera and records the plate against `identity`. Advisory only. */
readonly vision?: VisionClient | null;
/** Optional signed ledger — when present (the transient ENTRY path passes it), a
* recognized entry plate that is already OPEN under another recent session signs an
* `entry.duplicatePlate` anomaly (same car, second ticket). Post-hoc; never a gate. */
readonly log?: EventLog | null;
}
/** Camera config flag opting it into snapshot-triggered ANPR. */
interface CameraConfig {
readonly anpr?: boolean;
readonly [k: string]: unknown;
}
/**
* Fire snapshots for the directional camera set. Returns immediately with a promise
* the caller MAY ignore (fire-and-forget) — it resolves to the captured snapshot ids.
* The caller must NOT block its open path on this.
*/
export function snapshotAsync(job: SnapshotJob): Promise<string[]> {
const { db, direction, identity, logger, vision, log } = job;
const rows = devicesByDirection(db, "camera", direction);
if (rows.length === 0) return Promise.resolve([]);
return Promise.all(
rows.map(async (row): Promise<string | null> => {
const camera = buildCamera(row);
if (!camera) {
recordFailure(db, direction, row.id, identity, "camera config won't build", logger);
return null;
}
try {
// Shared capture: if the ANPR bridge just pulled this camera's frame for the
// same vehicle, reuse it instead of a 2nd concurrent GET (which 503s).
const shot = await captureSnapshotShared(row.id, camera, { direction });
const id: string = randomUUID();
// Re-encode for STORAGE only (downscale + recompress). Recognition below still
// uses the original full-res `shot`.
const stored = await encodeForStorage(shot, logger);
db.insert(snapshots)
.values({
id,
direction,
deviceId: row.id,
identity,
contentType: stored.contentType,
bytes: stored.bytes,
capturedAt: shot.capturedAt,
})
.run();
// Telemetry breadcrumb pointing at the stored image (NOT the bytes).
recordEvent(db, direction, row.id, identity, { snapshotId: id, ok: true }, logger);
// ANPR off the SAME image, tied to the SAME session — when vision is enabled
// and this camera opts in. Fire-and-forget: never delays the open path.
if (vision?.enabled && (row.config as CameraConfig)?.anpr === true) {
void recognizePlate(db, vision, row.id, direction, identity, id, shot, logger, log);
}
return id;
} catch (err) {
recordFailure(db, direction, row.id, identity, (err as Error).message, logger);
return null;
}
}),
).then((ids) => ids.filter((id): id is string => id != null));
}
/**
* Recognize the plate off a captured entry/exit image and RECORD it against the session
* `identity` — an unsigned `kind:"read"` device_event carrying the plate, confidence,
* region, and the `snapshotId` it was read from. Advisory: this records the plate
* observed for the session; it does NOT feed the access decision (the flow already
* decided). A low-confidence/no-plate result records nothing (a shaky read isn't a fact).
* Best-effort + fail-soft — a vision error never surfaces on the (already-open) path.
*/
async function recognizePlate(
db: Db,
vision: VisionClient,
deviceId: string,
direction: FlowDirection,
identity: string,
snapshotId: string,
shot: { bytes: Buffer; contentType: string },
logger: FastifyBaseLogger,
log?: EventLog | null,
): Promise<void> {
try {
const result = await vision.analyze(shot.bytes, shot.contentType);
if (!result) return;
// Boxes are kept as FRACTIONS of the analysed frame (the stored snapshot is a
// downscaled copy — see reencodeForStorage), so the wash's review crop can cut the
// vehicle out of whatever copy survives and blur the plate inside it.
const frame = await frameSize(shot.bytes);
const norm = (b: { x1: number; y1: number; x2: number; y2: number } | null | undefined) =>
b && frame
? {
x1: clamp01(b.x1 / frame.w), y1: clamp01(b.y1 / frame.h),
x2: clamp01(b.x2 / frame.w), y2: clamp01(b.y2 / frame.h),
}
: null;
// The vehicle's body type (advisory; the wash desk's category suggestion — see
// venue-modules.md §Vehicle category). Rides the plate's read row when there is one,
// else a row of its own: a car with an unreadable plate is still a car of some class.
const vehicleBox = norm(result.vehicle?.bbox);
const vehicle = result.vehicle
? { bodyType: result.vehicle.bodyType, bodyConfidence: result.vehicle.confidence, ...(vehicleBox ? { vehicleBox } : {}) }
: {};
const plate = !result.plate || result.lowConfidence ? "" : result.plate.text.trim().toUpperCase();
const plateBox = plate ? norm(result.plate?.bbox) : null;
if (!plate && !result.vehicle) return; // nothing trustworthy to record
db.insert(deviceEventsTable)
.values({
id: randomUUID(),
deviceId,
category: "camera",
kind: "read",
// `identity` ties the read to the session; `snapshotId` to the evidence image.
detail: {
identity,
direction,
...(plate
? { plate, confidence: result.plate!.confidence, region: result.plate!.region ?? null, ...(plateBox ? { plateBox } : {}) }
: {}),
...vehicle,
modelVersion: result.modelVersion,
snapshotId,
source: "entry-exit-snapshot",
},
occurredAt: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.run();
if (result.vehicle) logger.info(`vision vehicle '${result.vehicle.bodyType}' (${result.vehicle.confidence.toFixed(3)}) for ${identity}`);
if (!plate) return;
logger.info(`anpr plate '${plate}' (${result.plate!.confidence.toFixed(3)}) for ${identity}`);
// The session's entry/exit event already shipped without this (async) plate — tell the
// booth so it backfills the plate badge in place (no refresh). Advisory; ledger untouched.
deviceEvents.emitPlateRecognized({ identity, plate, direction });
// ENTRY-SIDE duplicate check: this plate already OPEN under another recent session is
// most likely the SAME car that minted a second ticket (a motion radar drops a
// stationary car → the button re-arms). Signed anomaly for the operator to void.
if (direction === "entry" && log) {
await flagDuplicateEntryPlate({ db, log, identity, plate, snapshotId, logger });
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(`anpr recognize failed (${identity}): ${(err as Error).message}`);
}
}
function clamp01(v: number): number {
return Math.max(0, Math.min(1, v));
}
/** Pixel size of the analysed frame (JPEG header only — cheap). Null when unreadable. */
async function frameSize(bytes: Buffer): Promise<{ w: number; h: number } | null> {
try {
const m = await sharp(bytes, { failOn: "none" }).metadata();
return m.width && m.height ? { w: m.width, h: m.height } : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** How far back a recognized entry plate is compared against other OPEN sessions'
* entry plates. Short on purpose: the duplicate-ticket scenario is the same car
* re-pressing within minutes; a long window would flag legit re-visits. */
function dupPlateWindowMs(): number {
const raw = Number(process.env.ENTRY_DUP_PLATE_WINDOW_MIN ?? 15);
return (Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? raw : 15) * 60_000;
}
/**
* Flag a freshly-recognized ENTRY plate that is already open under a DIFFERENT recent
* session: sign ONE `entry.duplicatePlate` anomaly keyed to the new session, pointing at
* the prior one. Mirrors the exit-side plateSwapSuspected pattern (advisory, post-hoc —
* the barrier already opened; the operator voids the duplicate ticket). Exported for tests.
*/
export async function flagDuplicateEntryPlate(opts: {
db: Db;
log: EventLog;
/** The session the plate was just recognized for (the NEW ticket). */
identity: string;
plate: string;
snapshotId: string;
logger: FastifyBaseLogger;
}): Promise<void> {
const { db, log, identity, plate, snapshotId, logger } = opts;
try {
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - dupPlateWindowMs()).toISOString();
// Recent entry-plate reads (unsigned `kind:"read"` telemetry, written above) for the
// same plate under a different identity. detail is JSON — filter in JS; read volume
// inside the window is tiny (one row per entry).
const reads = db
.select()
.from(deviceEventsTable)
.where(and(eq(deviceEventsTable.kind, "read"), gte(deviceEventsTable.occurredAt, cutoff)))
.all();
const prior = reads
.map((r) => r.detail as { identity?: string; direction?: string; plate?: string })
.find((d) => d.direction === "entry" && d.plate === plate && d.identity && d.identity !== identity);
if (!prior?.identity) return;
// Only a still-OPEN prior session is a duplicate suspect (a closed one drove off).
const open = db
.select()
.from(sessions)
.where(and(eq(sessions.id, prior.identity), eq(sessions.state, "open")))
.get();
if (!open) return;
await log.append({
type: "anomaly",
identity,
payload: {
...reasonPayload("entry.duplicatePlate", { plate, otherIdentity: prior.identity }),
duplicateEntrySuspected: true,
plate,
otherIdentity: prior.identity,
snapshotId,
},
});
logger.warn(`duplicate entry suspected: plate ${plate} on ${identity} already open under ${prior.identity}`);
} catch (err) {
// Best-effort, post-hoc — never let the duplicate check surface on the open path.
logger.error(`duplicate-plate check failed (${identity}): ${(err as Error).message}`);
}
}
/** Build a live camera adapter from a resolved devices row, or null. Exported so the
* ANPR bridge (anpr-entry.ts) reuses the identical registry-build-or-null logic. */
export function buildCamera(row: { driverId: string; config: unknown }): CameraDevice | null {
const driver = registry.get(row.driverId);
if (!driver) return null;
try {
return driver.create(row.config as never) as CameraDevice;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
// --- shared snapshot capture (one HTTP pull per camera per vehicle) -----------
// A Hikvision camera serves /ISAPI/.../picture SINGLE-THREADED: two concurrent
// snapshot GETs to the same unit return HTTP 503 "service busy". On a vehicle entry
// TWO paths capture the SAME camera within ~1s — the ANPR bridge (barrier-driving,
// anpr-entry.ts) and the advisory snapshotAsync (evidence + telemetry, below). They
// each `buildCamera()` a SEPARATE adapter instance, so a per-instance cache can't
// dedupe them. This module-level, deviceId-keyed cache does: it coalesces in-flight
// captures (the 2nd caller awaits the 1st's pull) AND serves a result captured within
// SNAPSHOT_TTL_MS, so the bridge + advisory share ONE frame instead of colliding into
// a 503 (which then burned the bridge's 12s debounce → the slow entry observed
// 2026-06-25; see wiki/concepts/lane-presence-and-anpr-entry.md).
/** How long a fresh capture is reused for the same camera. A car is one event for a
* couple of seconds; 1.5s comfortably spans the bridge→advisory gap without ever
* serving a stale frame for a *different* vehicle (entries are seconds apart). */
const SNAPSHOT_TTL_MS = 1500;
interface CacheEntry {
/** A capture in flight — concurrent callers await this instead of issuing a 2nd GET. */
inflight?: Promise<Snapshot>;
/** The last SUCCESSFUL capture + when it resolved, for the freshness window. */
last?: { shot: Snapshot; at: number };
}
const snapshotCache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();
/**
* Capture a snapshot for a camera, sharing ONE HTTP pull across concurrent/near-
* simultaneous callers (the ANPR bridge and the advisory snapshot). Same contract as
* `camera.captureSnapshot` (throws on failure) — a failed pull is NOT cached, so the
* next caller retries rather than inheriting the error. Key by the stable `deviceId`.
*/
export function captureSnapshotShared(
deviceId: string,
camera: CameraDevice,
ctx: { direction: FlowDirection },
): Promise<Snapshot> {
const now = Date.now();
let entry = snapshotCache.get(deviceId);
if (!entry) {
entry = {};
snapshotCache.set(deviceId, entry);
}
// Fresh enough → reuse the last frame (same vehicle, no second hardware hit).
if (entry.last && now - entry.last.at < SNAPSHOT_TTL_MS) {
return Promise.resolve(entry.last.shot);
}
// A capture is already running → join it (this is what prevents the 503 collision).
if (entry.inflight) return entry.inflight;
// Otherwise issue the single real pull; record it as the in-flight promise.
const pull = camera
.captureSnapshot(ctx)
.then((shot) => {
entry.last = { shot, at: Date.now() };
return shot;
})
.finally(() => {
// Clear the in-flight slot whether it resolved or threw; a failure is never cached.
if (entry.inflight === pull) entry.inflight = undefined;
});
entry.inflight = pull;
return pull;
}
function recordFailure(
db: Db,
direction: FlowDirection,
deviceId: string,
identity: string,
error: string,
logger: FastifyBaseLogger,
): void {
logger.warn(`snapshot failed (${direction}, ${identity}): ${error}`);
recordEvent(db, direction, deviceId, identity, { ok: false, error }, logger);
}
function recordEvent(
db: Db,
direction: FlowDirection,
deviceId: string,
identity: string,
detail: Record<string, unknown>,
logger: FastifyBaseLogger,
): void {
try {
db.insert(deviceEventsTable)
.values({
id: randomUUID(),
deviceId,
category: "camera",
kind: "snapshot",
detail: { ...detail, direction, identity },
occurredAt: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.run();
} catch (err) {
// Telemetry is best-effort; never let it surface on the (already-open) path.
logger.error(`snapshot device-event insert failed: ${(err as Error).message}`);
}
}