65328b8c11
CI / check (push) Failing after 15s
Wire the lane camera's vehicle event into the gated subscription flow: on a vehicle/active push from an opt-in (config.anpr) camera, AnprBridge pulls a fresh snapshot, runs ANPR, applies a stricter entry confidence floor, debounces, and — matching the plate to a subscription BEFORE emitting — emits a kind:"plate" read. The existing ReadDispatcher -> SubscriptionFlow then signs the entry/exit and opens the barrier. A plate is never the sole authority: it routes through the same gate (active/window/blocklist/car-count) as any credential. Fail-soft, fire-and-forget, subscriber-only by construction. Field-verified end to end (plate AA504LX opened the entry barrier and appended a signed vehicle_entry). Add an admin master switch (site_config.anpr_entry_enabled, default ON) in Site Settings that disables ONLY the barrier-driving bridge; advisory snapshot-ANPR and lane busy/free are unaffected. Read live per event, so toggling takes effect with no restart. Migration 0013 (additive ALTER ADD COLUMN, default 1). - New: apps/server/src/anpr-entry.ts (AnprBridge) + tests (9) - hikvision-alarm.ts hands vehicle detections to the bridge (fire-and-forget) + wiring tests (3) - server.ts reorders the read flows above the hik-alarm registration - snapshot.ts exports buildCamera for reuse - env: VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE (0.85), ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS (12000) - site route + SiteSettings checkbox + i18n (sq/en parity) - wiki: lane-presence-and-anpr-entry / lpr-camera / index / log -> BUILT Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
66 lines
3.8 KiB
Bash
66 lines
3.8 KiB
Bash
# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in.
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# The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists.
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#
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# cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env
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#
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# Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars).
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# Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET=
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# Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars).
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for
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# dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed
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# them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=
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# Optional ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# PORT=3000
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only.
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# LOG_LEVEL=info
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# DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite
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#
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# Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT —
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# you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment
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# (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure
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# cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over
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# http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# Recycle bin retention: a soft-deleted user/role/subscription/plan/tariff is auto-purged
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# this many days after deletion (a 6-hourly sweep). Default 30. Set 0 to keep deleted
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# items forever (manual purge only). See wiki/concepts/soft-delete.md.
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# RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30
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# First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin
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# ADMIN_USER=admin
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# ADMIN_PASS=
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# Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws).
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# In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this.
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# The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send
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# http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both
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# so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop.
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# To open the dev SPA from another LAN device (phone over wifi), Vite must bind
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# 0.0.0.0 (vite.config.ts) AND the host's LAN origin must be listed here, e.g.
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# http://10.0.10.203:5173 — the WS handshake's Origin is that LAN address.
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost
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# Vision / ANPR (optional) -------------------------------------------------
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# OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision),
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# which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the
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# VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate.
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# See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration".
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# ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling.
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# VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory confidence floor; keep in sync with the service
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#
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# ANPR subscriber-entry bridge (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate, read off a lane
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# camera's vehicle detection, admits them through the gated SubscriptionFlow. Opt-in per
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# camera (the camera's config.anpr checkbox in Setup); the camera must be BOUND to a relay.
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# VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # stricter floor for a BARRIER-driving read (near-miss → falls back to card/QR)
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# ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this window = ONE presentation (camera re-fires ~1Hz)
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