Files
julian 9c05f86c86 docs(desktop): updates are admin-only — keep the polkit prompt; AppImage rejected on field evidence
Decision (user, 2026-09-04) after the first successful self-update
(v0.1.6 → v0.1.7): a .deb update runs pkexec dpkg -i and asks for an admin
password the operator does not have — that prompt is the intended gate.
The AppImage was tried as the no-root path and aborts on the 26.04 booth
(bundled 24.04 glib/WebKitGTK vs host gvfs/Mesa: EGL_BAD_PARAMETER), and it
discards the distro-maintained WebKitGTK the platform decision rests on.
Passwordless polkit for dpkg is root for the operator — rejected.

- update.prompt (en + sq) now says the install needs the administrator
  password.
- desktop-shell-tauri.md: decision, evidence, rejected alternatives, and the
  deferred fleet-grade option (root systemd timer in the .deb, minisign-
  verified, notify-only in-app).
- standing-decisions.md: ship the .deb; runtime backend; updates admin-only.
- appliance-provisioning.md: drop the stale "hardcoded to localhost" note.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FWncR69HgGPuei1dLrW3cU
2026-09-04 18:11:41 +02:00

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2.9 KiB
Markdown

---
type: decision
tags: [parking, decisions]
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
updated: 2026-06-21
status: settled
---
# Standing Decisions (settled)
The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-architecture]]
"Summary of standing decisions".)
- **Stack:** [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] (Node) · [[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] +
[[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]]. All MIT/Apache/BSD — **no vendor lock, no rug-pull
risk** (see [[payload-cms]]). Full table in [[technology-stack]].
- **Scoped exception (2026-06-15):** the [[opencv-anpr-service]] — a **separate local process**,
not linked into the app — **may use AGPL** components (plate/vehicle models). The exception is
bounded to that process; the Node/React app stays strictly MIT/Apache/BSD. See
[[vision-service]].
- **Platform:** a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance** (LUKS + GRUB password + Secure Boot),
**not Windows/WSL** — see [[disk-os-hardening]].
- **Desktop shell:** the operator UI ships as a **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk wrapper
(chosen over Electron, 2026-06-21) — small footprint, no bundled Chromium to patch, and a
deny-by-default native surface that fits [[threat-model|the booth-operator threat model]]. The
shell stays **thin**: all privileged logic remains in [[fastify]]. One open dependency — the
appliance's WebKitGTK version (see [[open-questions]] #11). Ships as a **`.deb`** (the AppImage
bundles a runner's WebKitGTK and fails on the 26.04 booth — 2026-09-04); its backend address is
**operator-entered at runtime**, not baked in; and **in-app updates are an admin-only action**
behind the polkit password prompt (user, 2026-09-04) — never make that prompt passwordless.
- **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, **software-signed** event log
([[append-only-event-chain]]) — hardware-backed signing (a non-extractable key in the
**[[tpm|TPM]]** or a **USB HSM**; the [[atecc608]] is [[open-questions|upcoming, not present]]) is
the target that makes it unforgeable by a host owner ([[hardware-signer-options]]). **[[reconciliation]]
is the anti-fraud control**; encryption protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
(The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
- **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
[[entry-exit-readers]]).
Unsettled items live in [[open-questions]].