julian
c142166972
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
57 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: overview
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tags: [parking, overview, synthesis]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-21
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---
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# Parking System — Overview
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The synthesis / entry point for this wiki. Start here, then follow links. Catalog of every page:
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[[index]]. Source summaries: [[parking-system-architecture]].
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## What it is
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A **parking-management web application** running on a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance**
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deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
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1. **[[offline-first]]** — a park may be air-gapped; nothing core may depend on a network.
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2. **[[threat-model]]** — the primary adversary is the **legitimate operator at the booth**, not
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an outsider. The classic fraud is *take the cash, delete the record.*
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## The architecture in one pass
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- **Stack** ([[technology-stack]] / [[standing-decisions]]): [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] ·
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[[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] + [[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]] — all open-licensed to
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avoid lock-in (cf. rejected [[payload-cms]], [[refine]], [[logto-zitadel-oidc]]). The operator UI
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ships as a thin **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk shell (chosen over Electron).
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- **Integrity** is the heart of it: an [[append-only-event-chain]] (hash-chained, signed) plus
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external [[reconciliation]] — *that's* what remote sync really is. Signing is **software today**
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(key on-disk → forgeable by a host owner); a non-extractable **hardware signer** (TPM / USB-HSM;
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the [[atecc608]] is upcoming) is the pending fix — [[hardware-signer-options]]. Encryption at rest
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([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.
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- **Devices** sit behind a [[device-adapter-pattern]] (swap hardware → new adapter only), with
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the [[barrier-not-a-door]] safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
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- **Access control** today is the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller behind
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[[network-isolation]] — chosen because its inputs are **decoupled from its relays**, enabling
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host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving [[access-controller-button-flow]]). The
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[[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** (historical).
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The deeper fork is still the [[trust-boundary]] ([[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]);
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the [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the prevention-grade alternative.
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- **Readers** split two ways ([[entry-exit-readers]]): permit holders via [[wiegand]]
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(autonomous), casual/transient via host-side [[lpr-camera]] / QR; both can share a relay.
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- A reference [[bom]] lists recommended devices.
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## Where it stands
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6 [[open-questions]] still drive procurement — most critically **lane topology**, **failure
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modes (fail-open on exit)**, the **reconciliation channel**, and **backup/durability**.
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## Reading paths
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- *Security-first:* [[threat-model]] → [[append-only-event-chain]] → [[reconciliation]] →
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[[uhppote-vs-esp32]].
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- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[dingtian-relay]] → [[access-controller-button-flow]] →
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[[entry-exit-readers]].
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- *Stack-first:* [[technology-stack]] → [[offline-first]] → [[device-adapter-pattern]].
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