Files
julian bfe64032d8 Initial scaffold: Turborepo monorepo + design wiki
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest
mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5,
React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45.

Layout:
- apps/server   Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health)
- apps/web      React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA
- packages/db   Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users
- packages/devices  reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay)
- packages/shared   shared domain types

Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold:
append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters,
"a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local
offline-first auth.

wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested
from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema.

Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves
/health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
2026-06-14 00:34:11 +02:00

1.9 KiB

type, tags, sources, updated
type tags sources updated
concept
parking
architecture
readers
parking-system-architecture
2026-06-14

Entry / Exit Readers

There are two populations of users, and they map to two integration paths. (See parking-system-architecture §8.)

  • Permit holders / subscribers — want hands-free/quick entry. Best served by reads reaching the controller directly (wiegand) so it can decide autonomously (works if host is down).
  • Casual / transient — printed ticket, pay-on-exit, or plate recognition. Inherently host-side identity sources (lpr-camera, QR/ticket scanner).

How reads reach the system

Reader type Who sees the read Decision by Offline autonomy
wiegand reader → UHPPOTE port The controller Controller (onboard card list) Yes — works if host down
Pure TCP/IP reader Host only Host, then UDP open to relay No — host on critical path
[[lpr-camera LPR]] / QR scanner Host only Host

Key points

  • Pure network readers are invisible to the uhppote-controller — it only generates events for its own terminals. For a pure-TCP reader, only the host can listen/decide/command; the controller is demoted to a commanded relay (onboard card DB + offline autonomy bypassed).
  • Check for a Wiegand output first — many "network" readers have both; wiring Wiegand in keeps autonomy + native event log.
  • Both models can share one relay (valid Wiegand read or host open in "controlled" mode), so one lane serves permit + casual.
  • Host-in-the-loop is good for fraud detection — two independent records (host's signed append-only-event-chain entry + the UHPPOTE remote-open event) should reconcile 1:1; any mismatch is an anomaly.

Autonomy caveat: with remote-host control enabled, the controller expects host comms every ~30 s or reverts to local control (Wiegand-on-board lanes only).