julian
355026dcf7
Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki. Code: - delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs), and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts. - remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server. - unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5). - refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why the precondition capability exists. Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped): - uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts; uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful). - re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay. - transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a- door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.
38 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, comparison, access-control, security]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-14
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---
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# UHPPOTE vs. Custom ESP32 — Detection vs. Prevention
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> **Historical comparison.** Neither is the current device — the [[uhppote-controller]] was
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> **rejected** (entry-flow blocker → [[dingtian-relay]] chosen) and the [[esp32-custom-controller]]
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> is **deferred**. Kept because the **detection-vs-prevention** framing on the [[trust-boundary]]
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> fork is a durable lens that applies to any access device.
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A head-to-head on the [[trust-boundary]] fork: the off-the-shelf [[uhppote-controller]] versus
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the [[esp32-custom-controller]]. (Synthesized from [[parking-system-architecture]] §6–7.)
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| | [[uhppote-controller]] | [[esp32-custom-controller]] |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| **Trust boundary** | The network | The device |
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| **Security posture** | Tamper-**evident** (detection) | Tamper-**proof** (prevention) |
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| **Command auth** | None — [[uhppote-udp-protocol]] is open UDP | [[challenge-response-auth]] (asymmetric sigs) |
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| **Key mitigation** | [[network-isolation]] (mandatory) + [[event-log-ingestion]] | [[atecc608]] holds non-extractable key; controller stores only a public key |
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| **Firmware** | Manufacturer-only; not customizable | You own it (tiny + auditable) |
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| **Cost / effort** | Cheap, off-the-shelf, available now | Build + firmware reliability, EMC/surge, field maintenance |
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| **Replay/forgery on the wire** | Possible — contained only by isolation | Defeated by fresh per-command nonce |
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| **Safety** | Barrier operator owns it ([[barrier-not-a-door]]) | Same + explicit [[fail-state-safety]] |
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## Bottom line
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- The UHPPOTE was the **detection-grade** option: good enough as a detection/audit layer **when
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only the host can reach it** (isolation) and every event lands in the [[append-only-event-chain]]
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— but it was rejected for the entry lane (the button blocker).
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- The ESP32 is the **prevention-grade** option when you need a control path that holds even against
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an attacker on the wire. Deferred.
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- Both still rely on host-side integrity ([[append-only-event-chain]]) and external
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[[reconciliation]] as the ultimate anti-fraud control.
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