julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
3.2 KiB
3.2 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
| type | tags | sources | updated | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| source |
|
|
2026-06-14 |
Source: Parking Management System — Architecture & Design Notes
A working design reference (not a final spec) recording architectural decisions, the
reasoning behind them, and rejected alternatives for a parking-management system. Several
items are explicitly open. Raw file: raw/parking-system-architecture.md.
Key takeaways
- The system is a web app on Linux, deployed on-site. Two forces shape every decision: offline-first operation and the physical-security reality of a machine in an exposed booth.
- Stack (technology-stack): turborepo · fastify (Node) · react-vite-spa · sqlite + drizzle-orm · local-jwt-auth. All MIT/Apache/BSD — chosen for no vendor lock / no rug-pull risk (the reason payload-cms was rejected).
- The threat-model reframing (threat-model): the primary adversary is the legitimate operator at the booth, not an outsider stealing the machine. Encryption-at-rest defends the wrong threat. The real controls are the append-only-event-chain (hash-chained, atecc608-signed) plus reconciliation against an authority the operator can't alter.
- Devices go through a device-adapter-pattern so hardware swaps don't touch business logic. Safety principle: barrier-not-a-door — physical safety lives in the barrier operator firmware.
- Access control today is the uhppote-controller on an isolated VLAN — tamper-evident, not tamper-proof, because its uhppote-udp-protocol is unauthenticated. The esp32-custom-controller is documented as the prevention-grade upgrade (challenge–response with asymmetric signatures).
- Readers split into two populations (entry-exit-readers): permit holders (best via wiegand into the controller, autonomous) and casual/transient (host-side: lpr-camera, QR/ticket). Both can share one relay.
- A reference bom lists recommended devices; 6 open decisions remain (open-questions) that drive procurement.
Section map
| § | Topic | Wiki pages |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | System context | offline-first, threat-model |
| 2 | Technology stack | technology-stack, fastify, sqlite, drizzle-orm, turborepo, react-vite-spa, local-jwt-auth, payload-cms |
| 3 | Data security & threat model | threat-model, append-only-event-chain, atecc608, reconciliation, disk-os-hardening |
| 4 | SQLite limits | sqlite |
| 5 | Device architecture | device-adapter-pattern, barrier-not-a-door, trust-boundary |
| 6 | UHPPOTE access control | uhppote-controller, uhppote-udp-protocol, network-isolation, event-log-ingestion |
| 7 | Custom ESP32 controller | esp32-custom-controller, challenge-response-auth, atecc608, fail-state-safety |
| 8 | Entry/exit readers | entry-exit-readers, wiegand, lpr-camera |
| 9 | Recommended devices (BOM) | bom |
| 10 | Open decisions / next steps | open-questions |
| — | Summary of standing decisions | standing-decisions |