julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
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2026-06-14 |
Challenge–Response Auth (asymmetric signatures)
The authentication scheme for the esp32-custom-controller. Closes the actual hole in the uhppote-udp-protocol: forged or replayed commands. The requirement is authenticity + freshness (anti-replay); encryption is optional. (See parking-system-architecture §7.)
Host (private key) ESP32 (host's PUBLIC key only)
│── "open lane 2" ──────────────────▶│ generates fresh random nonce
│◀──────────── nonce ─────────────────│
│ sign(nonce ‖ command ‖ ts) ────────▶│ verify vs stored public key
│ │ check nonce fresh + unused → pulse relay
The elegant property
The controller stores only a public key. Physically compromising the ESP32 (popping the cabinet, dumping flash via the atecc608) yields nothing usable for forging commands. The fresh per-command nonce defeats replay without counter-persistence headaches.
A shared-secret / encrypted channel would not have this property — the secret would sit on both ends. That's why authentication (not encryption) is the right build here.