julian
355026dcf7
Neither UHPPOTE nor ZKTeco is used — the Dingtian relay controller was chosen and verified. Remove their code and re-scope the wiki. Code: - delete access-uhppote.ts, uhppoted.d.ts, access.ts (zkteco/esp32-relay stubs), and the three uhppote-*.mjs hardware test scripts. - remove the `uhppoted` npm dependency from @parking/devices and @parking/server. - unregister uhppote/zkteco/esp32-relay from the driver registry; drop their exports. Catalog access drivers = dingtian only. Build green (5/5). - refresh now-stale example comments (registry/interfaces/setup/api) to use current examples; keep the two "UHPPOTE blocker" references that explain why the precondition capability exists. Wiki (kept pages, re-scoped): - uhppote-controller, zkteco-controller -> rejected/historical with callouts; uhppote-vs-esp32 -> historical (detection-vs-prevention lens still useful). - re-point all "current device" framing (standing-decisions, bom, overview, open-questions, device-registry, device-discovery, index) to dingtian-relay. - transferable concepts (network-isolation, event-log-ingestion, barrier-not-a- door, threat-model) untouched. Raw source immutable. Links lint clean.
60 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
60 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
type: entity
|
|
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, rejected, historical]
|
|
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
|
|
updated: 2026-06-15
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# UHPPOTE Controller (rejected — historical)
|
|
|
|
> **❌ NOT USED. Replaced by the [[dingtian-relay]] controller** (and its driver/test code
|
|
> removed). Kept as the record of *why* — its firmware-fixed push-button blocker
|
|
> ([[access-controller-button-flow]]) is what drove the switch to a board with decoupled inputs.
|
|
> The transferable lessons below (network isolation, append-only log ingestion, "a barrier is not
|
|
> a door") still apply to any access device.
|
|
|
|
The original starting hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** — a cheap
|
|
reader-plus-relay frontend. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
|
|
|
|
> **⚠️ The fatal limit (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay in
|
|
> firmware** — no command makes it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do ticket-first entry
|
|
> (`button → print → open`). This is *the* reason it was dropped: full detail and the resolution in
|
|
> [[access-controller-button-flow]].
|
|
>
|
|
> **What was verified on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120) before retiring it:
|
|
> host-commanded `openDoor` on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`);
|
|
> button presses captured live (`reason="push button ok"`); UDP-broadcast [[device-discovery]].
|
|
> The driver, `uhppoted` dependency, and test scripts have since been removed from the codebase.
|
|
|
|
> **Past implementation (removed):** was integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package
|
|
> (MIT — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`) as the `uhppote` access driver. It exposed
|
|
> exactly the protocol commands the design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set
|
|
> (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`, `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen`
|
|
> for auto-push — see [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaulted to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`),
|
|
> with optional per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implemented **[[device-discovery]]**
|
|
> (`getDevices` broadcast) so the setup wizard can scan for controllers. Note: the lib pulls one
|
|
> trivial extra dep (the npm `os` shim) and uses UDP broadcast, which needs socket broadcast
|
|
> permission on the host.
|
|
|
|
## What it is
|
|
|
|
- Combines reader input ([[wiegand]]) and door relays, with an onboard card list enabling
|
|
**autonomous offline decisions** for Wiegand lanes.
|
|
- Stores an **indexed event log** (see [[event-log-ingestion]]): `get-events` returns the
|
|
stored range + current index; each record has event ID, timestamp, card number, door,
|
|
access-granted flag, reason code. **At the record level it's effectively append-only** — no
|
|
command edits/deletes an individual event.
|
|
|
|
## The catch
|
|
|
|
It speaks the [[uhppote-udp-protocol]]: **UDP port 60000, no auth, no encryption**. Anyone on
|
|
the LAN can open any door — and several unauthenticated commands can blind/reset/skew the log.
|
|
So the device is **tamper-evident, not tamper-proof**, and only trustworthy behind
|
|
[[network-isolation]] (mandatory). **Firmware cannot be customized** — the open-source
|
|
`uhppoted` ecosystem is protocol reverse-engineering only; the controller accepts only the
|
|
manufacturer's official firmware images.
|
|
|
|
Make the log trustworthy via [[event-log-ingestion]] (host-side index tracking) landing into
|
|
the [[append-only-event-chain]]. For prevention-grade authentication, see the
|
|
[[esp32-custom-controller]]. The choice between them is the [[trust-boundary]] decision.
|