parking_solution/wiki/concepts/parking-session.md

---
type: concept
tags: [parking, domain, business, anti-fraud]
sources: []
updated: 2026-06-15
status: open
---

# Parking Session

The core business-domain entity: one vehicle's stay, from entry to exit, plus the money owed and
paid for it. Everything on the business side — [[tariff|tariffs]], payment, [[reconciliation]],
revenue reporting — hangs off the session. This page defines what a session **is** and, just as
importantly, what it is **not**.

> Scope decision (2026-06-15): build the **transient** (casual, pay-for-duration) session first;
> layer **permit holders** on top as a second identity source that short-circuits payment. Mixed
> site, transient-first — see [[entry-exit-readers]] ("two populations, one shared relay") and
> [[session-model]].

## A session is a PROJECTION over the signed event log — not a mutable table

This is the single most important rule, and it falls straight out of the [[threat-model]] (the
adversary is the insider who can edit the database) and the [[append-only-event-chain]]:

- The **events** table is the ledger and the **only** source of truth. `vehicle_entry`,
  `vehicle_exit`, `payment`, `void` are all **appended + signed**, never updated or deleted.
- A **session** is a **read-model folded from those events** — open when an entry has no matching
  exit, paid when a `payment` event references it, closed when an exit lands. It MAY be cached in
  a table for query speed (dashboards, "cars currently in"), but that cache is **always rebuildable
  from the chain and never authoritative** ([[append-only-event-chain]]), scaled to the business
  domain.
- **Why this matters:** a mutable `sessions` row that stored "amount owed / paid" would reopen
  exactly the fraud hole the whole system exists to close (operator marks a session paid, pockets
  the cash). With sessions as a projection, "paid" is a **signed `payment` event** an operator
  can't forge or silently delete — a deletion breaks the chain visibly. See [[session-model]] for
  the rejected mutable-table alternative.

## Identity — how an entry is tied to its exit

A session needs a key that survives from entry to exit. Two populations, two keys
([[entry-exit-readers]]):

- **Transient:** a **ticket id** (printed, ideally on pre-numbered stock — see [[reconciliation]])
  or a **plate** read by [[lpr-camera|LPR]]. This id is carried in the event's `identity` field.
- **Permit holder:** a **credential** (card / plate / QR) matched to a [[subscription]] record. A valid
  permit means the session owes nothing — the PAY step is skipped (see below).

## Lifecycle (pay-on-foot / pay station model)

Payment is **decoupled from exit** (decision 2026-06-15, matching the [[autonomous-direction|
unmanned]] roadmap): the customer pays at a central station before walking back to the car; the
exit lane only *validates* that the session is settled.

```
ENTRY (lane)      vehicle_entry event              → session OPEN
                  (ticket printed / plate read; barrier opens)
PAY  (pay station) payment event {sessionRef, fee, paidAt}
                                                    → session PAID  (grace window starts)
EXIT (lane)       validate: PAID && now ≤ paidAt + graceMinutes ?
                    yes → vehicle_exit event        → session CLOSED → pulseOpen
                    no  → reject → re-pay overstay top-up at station, then exit
```

States, as derived from events:

| State | Condition (over the event chain) |
| --- | --- |
| **OPEN** | a `vehicle_entry` with no later matching `vehicle_exit` |
| **PAID** | OPEN + a `payment` event covering the fee due, within its grace window |
| **CLOSED** | a matching `vehicle_exit` event exists |
| **VOIDED** | a `void` event references the session (lost ticket written off, error correction) |

Permit sessions skip PAID: a valid [[subscription]] at exit is itself the authorization to close.

### Cancel a wrongly-printed ticket — BUILT (2026-06-22)

A ticket printed in error (misprint, test press, wrong vehicle) is cancelled by appending a **signed
`void`** event — the `vehicle_entry` is NEVER edited or deleted (append-only; [[append-only-event-chain]]).
`apps/server/src/void-flow.ts` (`VoidFlow`) appends `{ type:"void", identity, payload:{ sessionRef,
voidedEntryRef:<entry id>, voidReason, operator, reasonCode:"void.ticketCancelled" } }`. Traceable: the
operator (from the JWT) + a **REQUIRED reason** are signed in. Route `POST /api/tickets/void` gated on
`event:void` + an open shift. **No barrier action** — a misprinted ticket's car never entered.

- **Refused** for: a subscription occurrence (closed via its own flow), an already-exited session, an
  already-voided ticket, or a **paid** ticket (a refund is a separate, out-of-scope action) → 409.
- **The void folds the session CLOSED everywhere it's counted** — this is the correctness crux. A
  `void` decrements like a `vehicle_exit` in `occupancy.ts` (count + reserved-spots), and reads as
  closed in `pay-station.ts` (`lookup`/`activeSessions`) and `exit-flow.ts` (`#sessionFor`), and is
  excluded from the `reports.ts` entries stat. So a voided car stops occupying a spot, can't be
  paid/exited, and doesn't inflate "cars entered". The booth surfaces it in the pay/exit lookup modal
  (transient + unpaid + open only).

### Live-feed display: refused-action WARNING vs. genuine ANOMALY

The signed ledger `type:"anomaly"` is overloaded: it carries both benign **refused-action** events
(`exitRefused` / `entryRefused` / `permitRefused` — e.g. a double card-scan, an at-capacity
subscriber, an exit on an already-closed session) AND genuine red-flags (barrier-open failure,
opened-without-ticket). The booth feed now classifies from those existing payload flags
(`event-detail.tsx isRefusedWarning`) and shows the refused ones as an amber **REFUZUAR / REFUSED**
warning, reserving red **ANOMALI** for true anomalies. **Display-only** — no ledger type/data change,
so historical events reclassify correctly too.

## Edge cases the model must name (not yet designed in full)

- **Overstay after payment** — exited the grace window; needs a top-up payment. The one genuinely
  stateful rule; handled as a second `payment` event, fee = f(time since paid).
- **Lost ticket** — no entry id to match. A default flat "lost ticket" fee (see [[tariff]]), **or
  an amount the admin sets at the moment** (operator judgement — e.g. they can establish entry time
  from [[opencv-anpr-service|plate]] capture or CCTV and charge accordingly, or apply a fixed
  penalty). Recorded as a `payment` (with the chosen amount + a reason) + a `void`/annotation so it
  reconciles; the admin-set amount is captured in the signed event, attributed.
- **Manual override** — an operator/admin opens the barrier for a stuck or disputed car, or writes
  off a session, as a deliberate act. Each is a **signed, reason-coded event**
  (`barrier_open_command` / a void with reason) — so an override is *authorized and logged*, while
  an open with **no** such signed event remains the fraud signal ([[append-only-event-chain]]). The
  override is the legitimate counterpart to the out-of-band-open anomaly.
- **Forced / fail-open exit** — barrier failed open ([[fail-state-safety]]): the vehicle leaves with
  **no `vehicle_exit`**. This is an open session that never closes — a **reconciliation anomaly by
  design** ([[append-only-event-chain]]'s "physical open with no signed command"), not something to
  paper over. (A *manual* override above is the signed, non-anomalous version.)
- **Re-entry / never-exited** — stale open sessions (drove out tailgating, sensor missed). Surface
  as anomalies; never auto-close silently.

## What this unblocks (build order)

The device layer left the entry flow dangling — the session domain is that next step. Schema + code
follow this page and [[tariff]]; the decision is recorded in [[session-model]].

### As-built (2026-06-15)

- **Entry flow** (`apps/server/src/entry-flow.ts`): access-device input edge → print ticket
  (failover) → signed `vehicle_entry` → `pulseOpen`. Holds (anomaly, no open, no entry) if printing
  fails. See [[device-input-flow]].
- **Read dispatch** (`apps/server/src/read-dispatch.ts`): a credential read routes to the
  **permit flow** if it matches a permit (card/QR/bound plate), else to the transient **exit flow**.
  Lane resolved once (`readerLaneWithAccess`). See [[subscription]] as-built.
- **Exit flow** (`apps/server/src/exit-flow.ts`): a credential **read** (the `read` bus channel) →
  fold the signed ledger for that identity → validate **open + PAID + within `gracePeriodExitMin`**
  → signed `vehicle_exit` → `pulseOpen`. Unpaid / expired / unknown → signed `anomaly`, barrier
  stays closed. Validation folds the **ledger** (authoritative), then updates the `sessions` cache.
  - **Not a fail-state:** an unpaid reject keeps the barrier closed deliberately (driver returns to
    the pay station); "exit fails open" ([[fail-state-safety]]) is about the *system* being unable
    to decide (host/power loss), not an unpaid car.
- **Pay station** (`apps/server/src/pay-station.ts`, routes `GET /api/pay/quote` + `POST /api/pay`):
  look up the open session → resolve the active tariff version (latest `effectiveFrom ≤ entry`) →
  `computeFee` → append a signed `payment` event (amount, currency, tender, `tariffVersionId`,
  `graceExitMin`). An operator `overrideMinor` covers lost-ticket/dispute (recorded as the charged
  amount + the quoted amount). Pay-on-foot: payment is decoupled from the exit lane. PCI scope stays
  out of the app — `tender` only records cash/card; card capture is the standalone P2PE terminal.
  - **The full transient loop now passes end to end** (verified): entry → quote → pay → exit opens,
    session closed, `verifyChain` ok.

> **Resolved (2026-06-16):** the earlier "no entry/exit direction" gap is closed by the
> [[entry-exit-points]] model. Direction lives on each access **relay**; readers/cameras bind to a
> relay and inherit it. The "lane" concept was dropped entirely (pool-of-spaces) — separate in/out
> readers are distinguished by their relay binding, not a lane.