julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
31 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
31 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, security, platform]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-21
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---
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# Disk / OS Hardening
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Worthwhile, but **not the main event** — it defends against the outsider-with-physical-access,
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not the operator (see [[threat-model]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §3.)
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Physical-access attacks on Windows are trivial (boot media + password-reset tools), so a
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**dedicated Linux machine is the correct platform** — not Windows or WSL. This is a
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[[standing-decisions|standing decision]].
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- **LUKS full-disk encryption** — defeats boot-from-USB.
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- **GRUB password + Secure Boot** — prevents boot-parameter tampering / unsigned loaders.
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- **No desktop environment** — single-purpose appliance.
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- **Key-based SSH only.**
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- **[[tpm|TPM 2.0]]** _(recommended, 2026-06-21)_ — seals the LUKS key to the boot chain so the disk
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**auto-unlocks only on an untampered boot**, making encryption-at-rest compatible with **unattended
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reboot** (a booth must come back up after a power cut without a human typing a passphrase). Also a
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candidate home for the non-extractable host event-signing key. Caveats (live-root limit, bus-sniff,
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PCR brittleness, mandatory recovery passphrase + re-seal runbook) on [[tpm]]; implementation is
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[[open-questions]] #12.
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With LUKS in place, **SQLCipher becomes optional** defence-in-depth rather than the critical
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layer. (The custom controller adds its own: ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot — see
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[[esp32-custom-controller]].)
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