77606da2c9
Brought up the real UHPPOTE controller (serial 225088491, fw 09120) end to end and recorded a procurement-level blocker. Verified on hardware: - discovery (LAN scan), host-commanded openDoor on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated; reason="remote open door"), and live button capture (reason="push button ok"). Driver/networking fixes (packages/devices/src/drivers/access-uhppote.ts): - broadcast to subnet-directed address (lib doesn't enable SO_BROADCAST for the global 255.255.255.255 -> EACCES); - Config broadcast must match the target's subnet for unicast reply routing (fixes the health-check timeout: 5s -> 24ms ready); - discover across all local subnets, dedupe by serial; - serialize all controller I/O (concurrent calls collided on UDP :60001). Server/UX: - load .env via node --env-file-if-exists (vars weren't being read before); - SETUP_AUTH_BYPASS hardened: env-gated, dev + loopback only, fails closed otherwise; surfaced as catalog.authBypass so the wizard drops the token field; - .env.example documents all vars; inline favicon stops a 404. - apps/server/scripts/: uhppote-listen (live events, restores prior listener) and uhppote-relay (guarded door-open test). BLOCKER (wiki/decisions/access-controller-button-flow.md): the controller's push-button input auto-opens the relay in firmware with no report-without-open mode, so ticket-first entry (button -> print -> open, fail-closed) is impossible as wired. UHPPOTE can't do it on that input; ZKTeco *might* via a programmable aux input + PULL SDK but that's unverified and needs a new driver. Entry-lane hardware decision paused to focus on the business side. wiki: access-controller-button-flow (blocker), zkteco-controller (stub + assessment), uhppote-controller callout, index + log.
56 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, current-choice]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-15
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---
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# UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
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The starting access-control hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** —
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a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable **provided you understand its limits**. The plan
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is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see [[bom]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
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> **⚠️ Entry-flow blocker (verified on hardware):** the push-button input **auto-opens the relay
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> in firmware** — there's no command to make it report-without-opening — so it **cannot** do
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> ticket-first entry (`button → print → open`). Fine as a host-**commanded relay** and for
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> [[wiegand]]/permit lanes, but **not** the button-driven entry lane as wired. Full detail and
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> options: [[access-controller-button-flow]].
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>
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> **Verified working on the real unit** (serial 225088491, fw 09120): host-commanded `openDoor`
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> on doors 1 & 2 (physically actuated, `reason="remote open door"`); button presses captured live
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> (`reason="push button ok"`); [[device-discovery]] scan. Test scripts: `apps/server/scripts/`.
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> **Implementation:** integrated via the official **`uhppoted`** npm package (MIT, by the
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> `uhppoted` org — `github.com/uhppoted/uhppoted-lib-nodejs`), added to `@parking/devices` as the
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> `uhppote` access driver ([[device-registry]]). It exposes exactly the protocol commands this
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> design needs: `openDoor`, `getStatus`, and the event-log set (`getEvent`, `getEventIndex`,
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> `setEventIndex`, `recordSpecialEvents`) plus `setListener`/`listen` for auto-push — see
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> [[event-log-ingestion]]. Transport defaults to **UDP** (broadcast `…:60000`), with optional
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> per-call TCP on newer firmware. The driver also implements **[[device-discovery]]**
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> (`getDevices` broadcast) so the setup wizard can scan for controllers. Note: the lib pulls one
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> trivial extra dep (the npm `os` shim) and uses UDP broadcast, which needs socket broadcast
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> permission on the host.
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## What it is
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- Combines reader input ([[wiegand]]) and door relays, with an onboard card list enabling
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**autonomous offline decisions** for Wiegand lanes.
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- Stores an **indexed event log** (see [[event-log-ingestion]]): `get-events` returns the
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stored range + current index; each record has event ID, timestamp, card number, door,
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access-granted flag, reason code. **At the record level it's effectively append-only** — no
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command edits/deletes an individual event.
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## The catch
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It speaks the [[uhppote-udp-protocol]]: **UDP port 60000, no auth, no encryption**. Anyone on
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the LAN can open any door — and several unauthenticated commands can blind/reset/skew the log.
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So the device is **tamper-evident, not tamper-proof**, and only trustworthy behind
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[[network-isolation]] (mandatory). **Firmware cannot be customized** — the open-source
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`uhppoted` ecosystem is protocol reverse-engineering only; the controller accepts only the
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manufacturer's official firmware images.
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Make the log trustworthy via [[event-log-ingestion]] (host-side index tracking) landing into
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the [[append-only-event-chain]]. For prevention-grade authentication, see the
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[[esp32-custom-controller]]. The choice between them is the [[trust-boundary]] decision.
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