bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
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1.9 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated
| type | tags | sources | updated | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| concept |
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2026-06-14 |
Entry / Exit Readers
There are two populations of users, and they map to two integration paths. (See parking-system-architecture §8.)
- Permit holders / subscribers — want hands-free/quick entry. Best served by reads reaching the controller directly (wiegand) so it can decide autonomously (works if host is down).
- Casual / transient — printed ticket, pay-on-exit, or plate recognition. Inherently host-side identity sources (lpr-camera, QR/ticket scanner).
How reads reach the system
| Reader type | Who sees the read | Decision by | Offline autonomy |
|---|---|---|---|
| wiegand reader → UHPPOTE port | The controller | Controller (onboard card list) | Yes — works if host down |
| Pure TCP/IP reader | Host only | Host, then UDP open to relay |
No — host on critical path |
| [[lpr-camera | LPR]] / QR scanner | Host only | Host |
Key points
- Pure network readers are invisible to the uhppote-controller — it only generates events for its own terminals. For a pure-TCP reader, only the host can listen/decide/command; the controller is demoted to a commanded relay (onboard card DB + offline autonomy bypassed).
- Check for a Wiegand output first — many "network" readers have both; wiring Wiegand in keeps autonomy + native event log.
- Both models can share one relay (valid Wiegand read or host
openin "controlled" mode), so one lane serves permit + casual. - Host-in-the-loop is good for fraud detection — two independent records (host's signed append-only-event-chain entry + the UHPPOTE remote-open event) should reconcile 1:1; any mismatch is an anomaly.
Autonomy caveat: with remote-host control enabled, the controller expects host comms every ~30 s or reverts to local control (Wiegand-on-board lanes only).