julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
38 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: concept
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tags: [parking, security, foundational]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-14
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---
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# Threat Model
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The **second foundational force** (with [[offline-first]]). The central insight is a
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**reframing of who the adversary is**. (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §3.)
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## The key reframing
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Early thinking focused on protecting the database **at rest** — SQLCipher, LUKS, BitLocker,
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TPM-sealed keys. All of that defends against **an outsider who steals the machine or boots from
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external media**.
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That is the **wrong primary threat**. The most likely adversary is the **legitimate operator at
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the booth**. While the app runs, the database is decrypted in memory and the operator has full
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authorised access *through the app*. Encryption does nothing against the classic parking fraud:
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**take the cash, then void/delete the entry/exit record so the books balance.**
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## Consequences
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The controls that actually address insider/operator fraud are different in kind:
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- **[[append-only-event-chain]]** — events appended, never edited/deleted; a "void" is itself a
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recorded event, hash-chained, and **[[atecc608]]-signed** (unforgeable).
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- **[[reconciliation]]** against an authority the operator can't alter — *this is what remote
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sync really is*: a fraud-control mechanism, not just a backup.
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- **[[disk-os-hardening]]** still worthwhile (defeats boot-from-USB) but **not the main event**;
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with LUKS in place, SQLCipher is optional defence-in-depth.
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The same reframing recurs at the device layer: the [[uhppote-controller]]'s real problem is
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unauthenticated commands ([[uhppote-udp-protocol]]), addressed by detection
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([[event-log-ingestion]]) or prevention ([[esp32-custom-controller]]).
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