381046190b
Model the staging-vs-production split that fleet-deployment-komodo flagged as open. Three tiers: dev (working, no booth) -> stage (staging booth park-buzi, real-world test) -> main (production, manual + pinned). - build-images.yml: trigger on [dev, stage, main]. The tag computation is already branch-derived, so :stage / :stage-<sha> build with no other change. - komodo/resources.toml: park-buzi now branch=stage + TAG=stage-<sha> (pinned; no webhook even on staging). BACKUP_KEY already wired as a per-booth secret. - komodo/README.md: a Promotion (dev->stage->main) section; per-booth secret list now includes backup_key; hard-rule #1 generalised to pinned <branch>-<sha>. - wiki: fleet-deployment-komodo open-item resolved + a Promotion-tiers table; deploy-trigger choice generalised; container-deployment tag list gains :stage. Promotion is a merge: when dev is ready, merge dev->stage, CI builds the image, bump TAG=stage-<sha> in resources.toml, deploy from Core. stage is branched from dev HEAD so the first real-world test carries the full current app. Per-booth secrets must pre-exist in Core; migrations run at boot so a promotion auto-migrates the staging ledger (where a bad migration is caught before production). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
179 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
179 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: decision
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tags: [parking, deployment, fleet, komodo, netbird, offline-first, threat-model]
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sources: []
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updated: 2026-06-29
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status: settled
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---
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# Fleet deployment — Komodo Periphery over a NetBird mesh
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How the parking appliance is deployed and managed **at fleet scale**, superseding the
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single-box, SSH-and-`booth.sh` model. The image build/tag/registry pipeline
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([[container-deployment]]) is unchanged — this decides only the *control plane* that drives
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those same compose files onto many booths. Settled 2026-06-27.
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## The problem `booth.sh` couldn't solve
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[[container-deployment|`scripts/booth.sh`]] is a thin wrapper over `docker compose -f base -f
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prod --env-file .env`. It works for **one** appliance you can get a shell on, but as the fleet
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grows (the stated direction is **many/growing** sites) it gives us none of:
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- **Remote, no-SSH operation** — an update means someone gets a root shell on the booth.
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- **A fleet view** — which booth runs which `dev-<sha>`, which is healthy/offline.
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- **A deploy audit trail** — who deployed what, when.
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- **One-click rollback** to a previous immutable `dev-<sha>`.
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These are exactly the gaps a deployment controller fills. We already run every prerequisite
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(a **Komodo Core**, a **NetBird** zero-trust mesh, the **Gitea registry**), so the marginal
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cost is low.
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## Decision
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Adopt **Komodo Periphery** on each appliance, driven by the existing **Komodo Core** over the
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**NetBird** mesh. Keep the compose files and the [[container-deployment|image pipeline]]
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verbatim — Komodo consumes them as a *Stack*; it does not replace them. `booth.sh` is demoted
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to a **break-glass local fallback** for when the mesh/Core is unreachable.
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```
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Gitea push ─▶ build-images.yml ─▶ registry (parking-server:dev-<sha>, parking-vision:dev-<sha>)
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│
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Komodo Core (off-site) ──── NetBird mesh ─┼─▶ Periphery @ booth-A ─▶ docker compose up (pinned sha)
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• fleet table / history / rollback ├─▶ Periphery @ booth-B
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• per-booth secret injection └─▶ Periphery @ booth-C …
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• NO deploy webhook (manual + pinned)
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```
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### The three load-bearing choices (settled with the user 2026-06-27)
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1. **Fleet size: many/growing.** Komodo is treated as load-bearing infrastructure, not a
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convenience. This is what tips the decision away from "SSH-over-NetBird + a playbook".
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2. **Deploy trigger: always manual + pinned.** **No deploy webhook on a booth Stack.** A human
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deploys a specific immutable `TAG=<branch>-<sha>` from Core. This preserves the determinism we
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chose when pinning the booth tag (a moving tag auto-redeploying a booth is the surprise we
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explicitly rejected). This holds for **every** booth — including the **staging** booth: it tracks
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the `stage` *branch* but still runs a **pinned `stage-<sha>`** (an earlier sketch floated a moving
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`:dev` + webhook for staging; rejected in favour of pinned-everywhere). See "Promotion tiers".
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3. **Secrets: Komodo-managed (per-booth, unique).** Core's secret store injects `JWT_SECRET`,
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`EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` and `BACKUP_KEY` into the Stack at deploy. This scales (no SSH-to-N-booths to
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rotate a key) — but see the threat-model tension below; the keys MUST be **distinct per booth**.
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## Promotion tiers — dev → stage → main (settled 2026-06-29)
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Three git branches map to three image tags and three booth roles:
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| Branch | Image tag | Role | Deploy |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `dev` | `:dev` / `:dev-<sha>` | working branch | no booth runs it |
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| `stage` | `:stage` / `:stage-<sha>` | **staging booth (`park-buzi`)** — real-world test | **manual + pinned** `stage-<sha>` |
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| `main` | `:main` / `:main-<sha>` | **production** booths | manual + pinned `main-<sha>` |
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- **Promotion is a merge, not a build trigger.** When `dev` is confident-ready, **merge `dev → stage`**;
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CI (`build-images.yml`, which now triggers on `dev`/`stage`/`main`) builds `:stage` + `:stage-<sha>`;
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then **bump `TAG=stage-<sha>`** in `komodo/resources.toml` and deploy from Core. `main` only ever
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receives what survived staging.
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- **`stage` was branched from `dev`** (2026-06-29) so the first real-world test carries the full current
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app, not a `main` that predates this work. `park-buzi`'s Stack `branch` + `TAG` both point at `stage`.
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- **DB migrations run at boot** (`migrate-runtime.mjs`), so a promotion auto-migrates the staging booth's
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SQLite ledger — staging is exactly where a bad migration is caught before production.
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- **Per-booth secrets must pre-exist** in Core for `park-buzi`: `[[park_buzi_jwt_secret]]`,
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`[[park_buzi_event_signing_key]]`, `[[park_buzi_backup_key]]` — distinct, never shared. Once the booth
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signs real entries under its `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY`, that key is load-bearing for its ledger forever
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(escrow it; see [[backup-recovery]]).
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## Why this is safe (against the project's two forces)
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### Offline-first ([[offline-first]]) — Core is orchestration, never a runtime dependency
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The booth must run **fully when the mesh is down**. Komodo's agent model satisfies this:
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Periphery + the local containers keep operating if Core is unreachable; we lose *remote
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management* until the mesh returns, **not operation**. There must be **no runtime path** from
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booth operation to Core — Core only deploys. (Periphery's own liveness is irrelevant to entry/
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exit; the Fastify server and SQLite ledger run independently of it.)
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### Threat model — the adversary is the booth operator ([[threat-model]])
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This is the sharp edge, and the reason this page is explicit rather than a footnote.
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- **Periphery is a root-capable remote-exec agent on the appliance.** If the operator
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compromises the box, the agent is a lever. Mitigations: bind Periphery **only to the NetBird
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interface** (never `0.0.0.0`), enforce its **passkey + TLS**, and fold the agent into the
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[[disk-os-hardening]] surface. It is part of the trusted computing base now.
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- **`EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` is the anti-fraud root.** It signs the [[append-only-event-chain|
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append-only ledger]] — the control between us and a booth operator forging entry/exit events.
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Holding it in Core means **a Core compromise can forge any booth's ledger that shares a key**.
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Two mitigations make central management acceptable:
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- **Per-booth, unique keys.** Never reuse a signing key across sites, so a single leak taints
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one booth, not the fleet.
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- **The [[atecc608|ATECC608]] is the real long-term signer.** The
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`EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` HMAC is the *interim* mechanism; once the secure element signs the
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chain, the key in Core stops being the fraud root. Tracked in [[open-questions]].
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- **Core becomes a Tier-0 asset.** It now holds login + ledger keys for the whole fleet, so it
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must be hardened to the booths' bar: Komodo API bound to the NetBird mesh only, never a public
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interface; access-controlled; backed up.
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### Licensing — Komodo is GPL-3.0, and that's fine here
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The hard MIT/Apache/BSD constraint ([[technology-stack]]) is about **shipped app dependencies**
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(code we distribute/link). Komodo is **external ops tooling we self-host and don't distribute**,
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so its GPL-3.0 does not taint the product — exactly like the [[vision-service|AGPL ANPR
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exception]] reasoning (a separate process / external boundary, not a linked dependency). Noted
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here so it isn't re-litigated.
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## What lives where
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| Concern | Where | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Image build + tags | Gitea CI ([[container-deployment]]) | unchanged: `:dev` moving + `:dev-<sha>` immutable |
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| Compose files | the repo + on the booth | unchanged base + `docker-compose.prod.yml` |
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| Stack / deploy definition | **Komodo Core** | git-synced from `komodo/` (infra-as-code) |
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| Which sha is deployed | **Komodo Core**, manual | `TAG=dev-<sha>`, pinned, no webhook |
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| `JWT_SECRET`, `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY` | **Komodo Core** secret store | **per-booth, unique** |
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| `COOKIE_SECURE=0`, `TAG`, `REGISTRY` | Komodo Stack env | per-environment |
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| Registry pull creds | **Komodo Core** | so Periphery can pull from Gitea |
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| Local break-glass | `booth.sh` + a local `.env` | mesh-down fallback only |
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## Setup outline
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**On each appliance** (after [[appliance-provisioning]]):
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1. Install **Komodo Periphery** (binary or container), bound **only** to the NetBird interface;
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set its passkey/TLS.
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2. Point its compose/stack dir at `/opt/parking_systems/` (the existing files).
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3. Keep `booth.sh` + a minimal local `.env` (no real secrets) as break-glass.
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**In Komodo Core:**
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1. Add the booth as a **Server**, address = its **NetBird IP** (mesh, not LAN/WAN).
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2. Define the **Stack** = base + `docker-compose.prod.yml`, env from Core's secret store, secrets
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**per booth**.
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3. **No deploy webhook** on the booth Stack — deploys are manual; set `TAG=dev-<sha>` explicitly.
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4. Add Gitea registry creds so Periphery can pull.
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5. Sync the Stack/Server definitions from the repo's `komodo/` directory (infra-as-code:
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`komodo/resources.toml` + README) so the control plane is itself reviewable +
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version-controlled.
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## Open / not yet done
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- **Per-booth secret generation + rotation flow** — how a new site's unique `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY`
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is generated and registered in Core (vs. on-site `openssl rand`). Tie-in: [[open-questions]]
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JWT-key item.
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- **ATECC608 as the signer** supersedes `EVENT_SIGNING_KEY`-in-Core as the fraud root — until
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then central secrets carry the blast-radius noted above.
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- **Periphery hardening checklist** folded into [[disk-os-hardening]] (interface binding, passkey,
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TLS, agent as TCB).
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- **Staging vs production booth split** — ✅ MODELLED 2026-06-29 (see "Promotion tiers" below).
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`park-buzi` is the first **staging** booth, tracking the `stage` branch / `:stage` image, deployed
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**manual + pinned** (`TAG=stage-<sha>`, no webhook — we hold the no-moving-tag-on-a-booth line even
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on staging, *not* the webhook-on-staging option the earlier sketch floated). `komodo/resources.toml`
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+ `komodo/README.md` updated.
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- **Core backup / DR** — Core is now Tier-0; its loss = no fleet management (operation
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unaffected, per offline-first). Backup story TBD.
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## Supersedes / relates
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- **Supersedes** the "SSH + `booth.sh` is the deploy mechanism" assumption in
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[[container-deployment]] (that page's *build/tag/registry* content stands; its `booth.sh`-as-
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primary-deploy framing is now the fallback). Cross-linked there.
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- Companion: the `komodo/` infra-as-code sketch (in the repo, not the wiki),
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[[appliance-provisioning]] (what runs *before* Periphery), [[disk-os-hardening]] (the
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appliance's hardening surface).
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