julian
7de5c74500
- open-questions #7: symmetric vs. asymmetric JWT signing key (from the commit security review). Prefer RS256/EdDSA so verifying hosts hold only a public key — mirrors the ATECC608 / challenge-response "public key only" property. Decide before multi-host/multi-lane deployment. - Mark esp32-custom-controller status: deferred per decision not to build device-level auth now; access control stays on UHPPOTE + network isolation (noted in open-questions #6). - local-jwt-auth: document hardened secret handling + 8h expiry and the asymmetric-key pointer. - Update index.md and append a log.md entry.
26 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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tags: [parking, stack, auth, offline-first]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-15
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---
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# Local JWT Auth
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Authentication and authorization, kept **fully local** — a direct consequence of
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[[offline-first]] (an air-gapped park cannot reach an external identity provider; see
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[[logto-zitadel-oidc]] for the rejected alternative). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §2.)
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- `@fastify/jwt` signs tokens with a **local secret** (symmetric HMAC). The server **refuses to
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start** without a strong `JWT_SECRET` (≥32 chars, no placeholder) — there is deliberately no
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insecure default — and mints tokens with an **8h expiry** (bound to a shift).
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- A `users` table in [[sqlite]] holds **bcrypt** password hashes plus a **role** column.
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- Authorization = a simple `preHandler` role guard per route: **admin / operator / cashier /
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readonly**. No Casbin or full RBAC engine needed at this scale.
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> **Open decision:** moving from the symmetric secret to an **asymmetric key (RS256/EdDSA)** so
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> verifying hosts hold only a public key — [[open-questions]] #7. Relevant before any
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> multi-host/multi-lane deployment.
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Part of the [[technology-stack]]. License: MIT.
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