julian
84f00db48b
Retention (keep-last / keep-daily-days) is operational policy the on-site admin should tune, not a server env var requiring a redeploy -- same reasoning that moved the target directory to the UI. - Migration 0017: site_config.backup_keep_last + backup_keep_daily_days (nullable; null = code default 7 / 30 per field). - BackupService reads retention fresh each run; status() exposes keepLast + keepDailyDays. DEFAULT_BACKUP_RETENTION is now a pure code default (env reads gone). - PUT /api/backup/config accepts keepLast / keepDailyDays (non-negative int, or null to reset to default; 400 on negative). - UI: two retention fields on the Backup config card; one Save covers target + retention. i18n sq + en. BACKUP_KEY wired into Komodo: - komodo/resources.toml: BACKUP_KEY=[[park_buzi_backup_key]] (per-booth secret, alongside JWT / signing keys). - komodo/.env.komodo.example: documents it as the ONLY backup env var -- escrow it offsite alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY (recovery needs both); target + retention are admin-chosen in the UI / DB, not env. Server .env.example trimmed to just BACKUP_KEY. Also carries the small in-progress setup-intro i18n copy trim. Tests: 218 server tests green, incl. retention persist / reset-to-default / reject- negative and the updated status shape. Migration applies cleanly (needed a statement-breakpoint between the two ALTERs). Wiki backup-recovery updated. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
80 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
80 lines
4.8 KiB
Bash
# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in.
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# The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists.
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#
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# cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env
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#
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# Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars).
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# Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET=
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# Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars).
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for
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# dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed
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# them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=
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# On-site encrypted DB backup (durability for the signed ledger). A daily timer + an admin
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# "back up now" button write a consistent, AES-256-GCM-encrypted copy to the target. The
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# TARGET DIRECTORY is chosen by the admin in the UI (Setup → Backup) and stored in the DB —
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# NOT here. Only the encryption KEY is an env secret. RESTORE is an out-of-band runbook action,
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# not a console call. See wiki/concepts/backup-recovery.md.
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#
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# Dedicated backup-encryption key (>=16 chars), SEPARATE from EVENT_SIGNING_KEY so it can
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# rotate without fracturing the signed chain. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# Escrow it offsite (alongside EVENT_SIGNING_KEY) — recovery needs both, and neither is ever
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# stored inside the backup it unlocks. Backups stay a no-op until BOTH this key and an in-UI
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# target directory are set. The target directory AND retention (keep-last / keep-daily) are
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# admin-chosen in the UI (Setup → Backup), NOT env — only this key is an env secret.
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# BACKUP_KEY=
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# Optional ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# PORT=3000
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only.
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# LOG_LEVEL=info
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# DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite
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#
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# Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT —
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# you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment
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# (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure
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# cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over
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# http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# Recycle bin retention: a soft-deleted user/role/subscription/plan/tariff is auto-purged
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# this many days after deletion (a 6-hourly sweep). Default 30. Set 0 to keep deleted
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# items forever (manual purge only). See wiki/concepts/soft-delete.md.
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# RECYCLE_BIN_RETENTION_DAYS=30
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# First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin
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# ADMIN_USER=admin
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# ADMIN_PASS=
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# Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws).
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# In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this.
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# The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send
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# http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both
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# so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop.
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# To open the dev SPA from another LAN device (phone over wifi), Vite must bind
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# 0.0.0.0 (vite.config.ts) AND the host's LAN origin must be listed here, e.g.
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# http://10.0.10.203:5173 — the WS handshake's Origin is that LAN address.
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost
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# Vision / ANPR (optional) -------------------------------------------------
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# OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision),
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# which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the
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# VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate.
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# See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration".
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# ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling.
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# VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # advisory confidence floor; keep in sync with the service
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#
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# ANPR subscriber-entry bridge (anpr-entry.ts): a subscriber's plate, read off a lane
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# camera's vehicle detection, admits them through the gated SubscriptionFlow. Opt-in per
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# camera (the camera's config.anpr checkbox in Setup); the camera must be BOUND to a relay.
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# VISION_ENTRY_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.85 # stricter floor for a BARRIER-driving read (near-miss → falls back to card/QR)
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# ANPR_DEBOUNCE_MS=12000 # same plate/camera within this window = ONE presentation (camera re-fires ~1Hz)
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