julian
7629d5d7b1
secureCookies() keyed off NODE_ENV === "production", so an appliance deployed without that var silently sent the auth + CSRF cookies WITHOUT the Secure flag — the review's one Medium finding. Now Secure is the DEFAULT and you only ever opt OUT: a misconfigured/forgotten env can only make cookies more restrictive, never drop the flag. Dropped only on a deliberate COOKIE_SECURE=0/false/no/off (or an explicit NODE_ENV=development as a dev fallback). The LAN appliance that serves the SPA over plain http sets COOKIE_SECURE=0 on purpose (a Secure cookie would never be sent over its http origin and would lock operators out); a TLS deploy leaves it unset and gets Secure. - auth.test.ts (5): pins the matrix — default Secure, production Secure, dev opt-out, COOKIE_SECURE falsey opts out, any other value opts in. - .env.example documents COOKIE_SECURE (replaces the stale NODE_ENV cookie note). - dev .env sets COOKIE_SECURE=0 (local http://localhost login keeps working). server 80/80; build+lint green. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
52 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
52 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
# Copy this file to `.env` (same folder: apps/server/.env) and fill it in.
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# The dev/start scripts load it automatically via Node's --env-file-if-exists.
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#
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# cp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env
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#
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# Required ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# The server refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET (>=32 chars).
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# Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET=
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# Dedicated HMAC key for signing the append-only event ledger (>=16 chars).
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# If unset, the server falls back to JWT_SECRET (logged as a warning) — fine for
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# dev, but set a dedicated key before production. Events store the key that signed
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# them (keyId), so verifyChain still validates a chain that spans a key change.
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EVENT_SIGNING_KEY=
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# Optional ----------------------------------------------------------------
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# PORT=3000
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# HOST=0.0.0.0 # interface to bind. 127.0.0.1 = loopback only.
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# LOG_LEVEL=info
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# DATABASE_URL=./parking.sqlite
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#
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# Auth-cookie Secure flag. FAIL-SAFE: cookies are Secure (HTTPS-only) BY DEFAULT —
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# you only ever opt OUT, never in. Set COOKIE_SECURE=0 for a plain-HTTP deployment
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# (e.g. the LAN appliance serving the SPA same-origin over http, where a Secure
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# cookie would never be sent and would lock operators out). Local dev over
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# http://localhost MUST set this (the dev .env does). Leave unset in any TLS deploy.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=0
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# First admin (seed once): pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin
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# ADMIN_USER=admin
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# ADMIN_PASS=
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# Comma-separated extra origins allowed to open the booth WebSocket (/api/ws).
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# In dev, set the Vite SPA origin. Same-origin is always allowed without this.
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# The Tauri DESKTOP shell loads from tauri://localhost (Linux may also send
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# http://tauri.localhost), which is NOT same-origin with the backend — add both
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# so the desktop app's live feed connects. See apps/desktop.
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WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173,tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost
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# Vision / ANPR (optional) -------------------------------------------------
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# OFF by default. The Node SERVER's view of the vision microservice (apps/vision),
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# which runs as a separate process with its OWN apps/vision/.env. Both sides share the
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# VISION_ prefix but are different processes — keep the two .env files separate.
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# See wiki/entities/opencv-anpr-service.md "Configuration".
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# ANPR rides the entry/exit snapshot (button / QR / RFID triggers it) — no polling.
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# VISION_ENABLED=1 # master switch — nothing runs without it
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# VISION_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8089 # must match apps/vision VISION_HOST:VISION_PORT
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# VISION_TIMEOUT_MS=1500 # per-request cap so a slow call can't hang the lane
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# VISION_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.5 # confidence floor; keep in sync with the service
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