julian
f6e35bbebf
An early wrong assumption named the QR/RFID access reader "GEE" / "GEE/Fondvision" / "GEE-QR-ER80" (and summarized a raw GEE PDF as its datasheet). There is no GEE device — it's the Dingtian DT-008 (dingtian-tech.com/en_us/qr_code_reader.html), the same vendor as the relay board, which is why it integrates the identical HTTP-GET-push way. Code: - Driver symbol geeQrReaderDriver → dingtianQrReaderDriver; label → "Dingtian DT-008 QR/RFID reader (HTTP push)"; comments/description rewritten to the real DT-008 facts (Wiegand 26/34, TCP/IP, USB, RS485 — not RS-232; QR/barcode + ID/IC/NFC — not DataMatrix/1D). - Persisted driverId "gee-qr-reader" → "dingtian-qr-reader" (the registry lookup key + the row created on assign in qr-reader.ts). - Migration 0015 rewrites existing devices.driver_id rows so configured readers keep resolving (applied to the dev DB — 2 rows; the booth applies it on boot). Behaviour is unchanged: naming + the persisted id only. Wiki + memory: - Renamed entities/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008-reader.md and sources/gee-qr-er80.md → dingtian-dt008.md; rewrote both to the real DT-008 product-page specs while KEEPING all the verified-on-hardware protocol facts (cjihao serial, .jsp path, Connection: close). Fixed every cross-reference + "GEE" mention in 6 other pages. Memory gee-reader-serial-binding → dingtian-reader-serial-binding. The only surviving "GEE" mentions are deliberate naming-correction notes, the raw PDF filename, and the append-only log history. Full workspace build/lint/test green; dev DB readers verified resolving to the registered dingtian-qr-reader driver. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
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type, tags, sources, updated
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2026-06-14 |
Entry / Exit Readers
There are two populations of users, and they map to two integration paths. (See parking-system-architecture §8.)
- Permit holders / subscribers — want hands-free/quick entry. Best served by reads reaching the controller directly (wiegand) so it can decide autonomously (works if host is down).
- Casual / transient — printed ticket, pay-on-exit, or plate recognition. Inherently host-side identity sources (lpr-camera, QR/ticket scanner).
How reads reach the system
| Reader type | Who sees the read | Decision by | Offline autonomy |
|---|---|---|---|
| wiegand reader → UHPPOTE port | The controller | Controller (onboard card list) | Yes — works if host down |
| Pure TCP/IP reader | Host only | Host, then UDP open to relay |
No — host on critical path |
| [[lpr-camera | LPR]] / QR scanner | Host only | Host |
| **[[dingtian-dt008-reader | Dingtian DT-008]] QR reader** | Host only | Host (reads serial → read bus) |
Concrete host-side reader on hand: the dingtian-dt008-reader (QR/RFID over HTTP push). Note autonomy is moot here anyway — the current relay (dingtian-relay) has no onboard card list, so even a Wiegand reader would be host-decided. So we take the serial/QR path straight to the host's
readbus.
Key points
- Pure network readers are invisible to the uhppote-controller — it only generates events for its own terminals. For a pure-TCP reader, only the host can listen/decide/command; the controller is demoted to a commanded relay (onboard card DB + offline autonomy bypassed).
- Check for a Wiegand output first — many "network" readers have both; wiring Wiegand in keeps autonomy + native event log.
- Both models can share one relay (valid Wiegand read or host
openin "controlled" mode), so one lane serves permit + casual. - Each reader BINDS to a controller relay (
config.controllerId+relay) — the barrier it sits at — and inherits that relay's direction (entry/exit/both). An exit read opens exactly that relay; an entry read the entry relay. This is how separate in/out readers are disambiguated, with no "lane". See entry-exit-points. - Host-in-the-loop is good for fraud detection — two independent records (host's signed append-only-event-chain entry + the UHPPOTE remote-open event) should reconcile 1:1; any mismatch is an anomaly.
Autonomy caveat: with remote-host control enabled, the controller expects host comms every ~30 s or reverts to local control (Wiegand-on-board lanes only).