julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
2.4 KiB
2.4 KiB
type, tags, sources, updated, status
| type | tags | sources | updated | status | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| decision |
|
|
2026-06-21 | settled |
Standing Decisions (settled)
The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See parking-system-architecture "Summary of standing decisions".)
- Stack: turborepo · fastify (Node) · react-vite-spa · sqlite +
drizzle-orm · local-jwt-auth. All MIT/Apache/BSD — no vendor lock, no rug-pull
risk (see payload-cms). Full table in technology-stack.
- Scoped exception (2026-06-15): the opencv-anpr-service — a separate local process, not linked into the app — may use AGPL components (plate/vehicle models). The exception is bounded to that process; the Node/React app stays strictly MIT/Apache/BSD. See vision-service.
- Platform: a dedicated, hardened Linux appliance (LUKS + GRUB password + Secure Boot), not Windows/WSL — see disk-os-hardening.
- Desktop shell: the operator UI ships as a desktop-shell-tauri kiosk wrapper (chosen over Electron, 2026-06-21) — small footprint, no bundled Chromium to patch, and a deny-by-default native surface that fits threat-model. The shell stays thin: all privileged logic remains in fastify. One open dependency — the appliance's WebKitGTK version (see open-questions #11).
- Integrity: append-only, hash-chained, atecc608-signed event log (append-only-event-chain); reconciliation is the anti-fraud control; encryption protects only at-rest (see threat-model).
- Access control: the dingtian-relay relay+input controller, on an isolated VLAN (network-isolation). Chosen because its inputs are decoupled from its relays, enabling host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to access-controller-button-flow. (The uhppote-controller and zkteco-controller were evaluated and rejected — kept as historical record. The esp32-custom-controller remains the documented prevention-grade alternative — the trust-boundary fork.)
- Readers: prefer wiegand-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop for lpr-camera/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see entry-exit-readers).
Unsettled items live in open-questions.