julian
8a8e74561d
Pivot from the hardware/integrity layer to the parking operation. All wiki-only; no code yet. Core principle throughout: business entities are projections over the signed append-only event log, never mutable tables. New concepts: parking-session, tariff (composable/versioned, FX-ready), shift (manned-only Z-report), capacity-occupancy, validation-discounts, reporting-analytics, clock-integrity, ticket-encoding, anti-passback. New entities: permit, opencv-anpr-service, blocklist. Decisions: session-model, vision-service (host-side ANPR + vehicle verification; scoped AGPL exception for the isolated service). Updates: append-only-event-chain (new event types + vision witness), local-jwt-auth (drop 8h expiry -> until logout; code change pending), lpr-camera (host-side recognition supersedes edge-AI), standing-decisions (AGPL exception), open-questions (+FX, +pay-station money corners, backup). Deferred + flagged: intercom/help-call, receipts/refunds/change, FX engine, lane topology (#1).
50 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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tags: [parking, stack, auth, offline-first]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-15
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---
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# Local JWT Auth
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Authentication and authorization, kept **fully local** — a direct consequence of
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[[offline-first]] (an air-gapped park cannot reach an external identity provider; see
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[[logto-zitadel-oidc]] for the rejected alternative). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §2.)
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- `@fastify/jwt` signs tokens with a **local secret** (symmetric HMAC). The server **refuses to
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start** without a strong `JWT_SECRET` (≥32 chars, no placeholder) — there is deliberately no
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insecure default.
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- **Session lifetime: valid until explicit logout — no time expiry** (decision 2026-06-15).
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Booth reality breaks any fixed clock: relief arrives late, fails to show, or one operator is
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forced to work two shifts in a row — a token that expired mid-duty would strand an active
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operator. So the login persists until logout; a **[[shift]] is a separate, explicit boundary**,
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not tied to token lifetime. (Superseded the earlier "8h expiry, bound to a shift" assumption.)
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> ⚠️ Code still mints an 8h-expiry token — this page records the decided design; the server
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> change (drop `expiresIn`, persist until logout) is pending.
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- A `users` table in [[sqlite]] holds **bcrypt** password hashes plus a **role** column. The
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first admin is seeded via `pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin` (no bootstrap endpoint).
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- Authorization = a simple `preHandler` role guard per route: **admin / operator / cashier /
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readonly**. No Casbin or full RBAC engine needed at this scale.
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## Cookie session (browser auth)
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The SPA never sees the JWT. Login (`POST /api/auth/login`) verifies bcrypt and sets two cookies:
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- **`parking_token`** — the JWT, **HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict** (+ `Secure` when
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`NODE_ENV=production`). JS can't read it; `@fastify/jwt` reads it from the cookie, not the
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`Authorization` header.
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- **`parking_csrf`** — a random token, **readable** by JS. The JWT also carries a matching `csrf`
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claim. On every mutation the SPA echoes the cookie in the **`X-CSRF-Token`** header; the guard
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requires header == cookie == the signed claim (**double-submit CSRF**). Safe reads are exempt.
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Routes: `login`, `logout` (clears cookies), `me` (bootstraps SPA session on load). The dev
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[[react-vite-spa|Vite]] proxy and the prod **nginx** reverse proxy keep the SPA and API
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**same-origin**, so the cookies work without CORS. (This replaced an earlier dev-only
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`SETUP_AUTH_BYPASS` shim, now removed.)
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> **Open decision:** moving from the symmetric secret to an **asymmetric key (RS256/EdDSA)** so
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> verifying hosts hold only a public key — [[open-questions]] #7. Relevant before any
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> multi-host/multi-lane deployment.
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Part of the [[technology-stack]]. License: MIT.
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