julian
8129b63a8c
Self-service profile: any signed-in user edits their OWN fullName/email and changes their OWN password (proving the current one), without any user:* permission. New routes PUT /api/auth/profile + /api/auth/password act only on req.user.sub (cannot touch username/role), CSRF-guarded; SPA screen at /profile reachable from the header username chip. email added to the session view + SessionUser. 7 tests (routes/profile.test.ts); 148 server tests green. Desktop in CI: new .gitea/workflows/build-desktop.yml builds .deb + .AppImage on every push to dev/main and uploads them as unsigned workflow artifacts (per-commit test build). Signed/versioned release stays on release.yml (tag v*). Wiki: local-jwt-auth (self-service routes), desktop-shell-tauri (two-workflow CI split), log entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
96 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
96 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: entity
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tags: [parking, stack, auth, offline-first]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-15
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---
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# Local JWT Auth
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Authentication and authorization, kept **fully local** — a direct consequence of
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[[offline-first]] (an air-gapped park cannot reach an external identity provider; see
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[[logto-zitadel-oidc]] for the rejected alternative). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §2.)
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- `@fastify/jwt` signs tokens with a **local secret** (symmetric HMAC). The server **refuses to
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start** without a strong `JWT_SECRET` (≥32 chars, no placeholder) — there is deliberately no
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insecure default.
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- **Session lifetime: valid until explicit logout — no time expiry** (decision 2026-06-15, built).
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Booth reality breaks any fixed clock: relief arrives late, fails to show, or one operator is
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forced to work two shifts in a row — a token that expired mid-duty would strand an active
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operator. So the login persists until logout; a **[[shift]] is a separate, explicit boundary**,
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not tied to token lifetime. (Superseded the earlier "8h expiry, bound to a shift" assumption.)
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The JWT carries no `exp`; the cookie has a long fixed `maxAge` (30 days) so a browser restart
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doesn't log out an active operator, and `logout` clears it.
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- A `users` table in [[sqlite]] holds **bcrypt** password hashes plus a **`role_id`** FK. The
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first admin is seeded via `pnpm --filter @parking/server seed-admin` (no bootstrap endpoint);
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every other user is created in-app (admin → Users screen).
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- Authorization = **dynamic RBAC** (built 2026-06-18, replacing the old hardcoded
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`admin/operator/cashier/readonly` enum — those are now ordinary seed roles). Roles are **data**:
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`roles` + `role_permissions` tables, composed by an admin from a **code-defined permission grid**
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(`@parking/shared` `PERMISSIONS` = `resource:action`, e.g. `tariff:update`, `payment:create`,
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`event:void`). A `preHandler` `requirePermission(...)` per route checks a PERMISSION, not a role
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name. The JWT carries `roleId` (not the permission list); the guard resolves the role's permission
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set per-request from an **in-memory cache** (`bumpPermsCache()` on any role write), so editing a
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role applies immediately — no re-login, no token bloat. No Casbin/engine needed at this scale.
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- **Protected built-in `admin` role** (`id='admin'`, `builtin=1`): non-editable, non-deletable, and
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always resolves to the FULL permission set in code. The app refuses to delete or downgrade the
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**last user holding admin** — administration can never be locked out of the appliance.
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- `event:void` is a permission, NOT a ledger delete: the append-only signed chain is untouched; the
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permission only gates who may APPEND a void event (there is no void API route yet — forward seam).
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- The grid is **extensible** — adding a feature adds its `resource:action` rows. Recent additions:
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**`log:read`** (gates the diagnostic-log viewer, `GET /api/logs`; see [[app-logs]]); **`report:read`**
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(the admin Reports dashboard; see [[reporting-analytics]]); and **`recyclebin:read/update/delete`**
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(view / restore / purge soft-deleted master data; see [[soft-delete]]). Admin holds them all; each is
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grantable to a scoped role.
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- **Soft-deleted users can't authenticate.** The login route rejects a user whose `deleted_at` is set
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(with the same generic "invalid credentials" so a deleted account isn't enumerable). The no-lockout
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"last admin" check counts only LIVE admins, so soft-deleting can't strand administration. See
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[[soft-delete]].
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- **No privilege escalation through the RBAC system itself.** `role:create`/`role:update` and
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`user:create`/`user:update` are themselves grantable, so a non-admin could otherwise self-escalate.
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Guards (`routes/roles.ts`, `routes/users.ts`): a caller may only put permissions on a role that
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they *already hold*, and may only assign/modify users whose role is a SUBSET of the caller's own
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(so no minting a privileged role, handing out the admin role, or resetting/deleting a more-
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privileged account). An admin holds the full set, so it is unrestricted — the intended behaviour.
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## Cookie session (browser auth)
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The SPA never sees the JWT. Login (`POST /api/auth/login`) verifies bcrypt and sets two cookies:
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- **`parking_token`** — the JWT, **HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict**, and **`Secure` by default**
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(fail-safe — a forgotten env can only make cookies more restrictive, never drop the flag).
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`Secure` is dropped ONLY for a deliberate opt-out: `COOKIE_SECURE=0` (the plain-HTTP LAN
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appliance — see [[disk-os-hardening]] deploy checklist) or `NODE_ENV=development`. (Was keyed
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off `NODE_ENV=production`, which silently leaked cookies on an appliance that forgot to set it
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— corrected 2026-06-21.) JS can't read it; `@fastify/jwt` reads it from the cookie, not the
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`Authorization` header.
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- **`parking_csrf`** — a random token, **readable** by JS. The JWT also carries a matching `csrf`
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claim. On every mutation the SPA echoes the cookie in the **`X-CSRF-Token`** header; the guard
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requires header == cookie == the signed claim (**double-submit CSRF**). Safe reads are exempt.
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Routes: `login`, `logout` (clears cookies), `me` (bootstraps SPA session on load). The dev
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**Self-service profile (added 2026-06-24).** Alongside the admin user-manager (`routes/users.ts`,
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gated on `user:*`), any signed-in user has two **self-only** routes (no permission needed — they
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act solely on `req.user.sub`):
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- `PUT /api/auth/profile` — edit own `fullName` / `email` (`""` clears → null). Returns the
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refreshed session (so the SPA header updates). **Cannot** touch `username` or `role` — those stay
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admin-only, so this is not a privilege-escalation surface.
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- `PUT /api/auth/password` — change own password, but **must prove the current one** first
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(`bcrypt.compare`) → defends a walked-up, already-logged-in booth from a silent re-key. New
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password ≥ 8 chars. Distinct from the admin reset (`PUT /api/users/:id/password`), which needs no
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current password but DOES need `user:update` + the no-escalation guard.
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Both are still CSRF-guarded (mutations). The SPA surfaces them at `/profile` (`apps/web/src/Profile.tsx`),
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reachable from the header username chip. Covered by `apps/server/src/routes/profile.test.ts`.
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The dev
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[[react-vite-spa|Vite]] proxy and the prod **nginx** reverse proxy keep the SPA and API
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**same-origin**, so the cookies work without CORS. (This replaced an earlier dev-only
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`SETUP_AUTH_BYPASS` shim, now removed.)
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> **Open decision:** moving from the symmetric secret to an **asymmetric key (RS256/EdDSA)** so
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> verifying hosts hold only a public key — [[open-questions]] #7. Relevant before any
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> multi-host/multi-lane deployment.
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Part of the [[technology-stack]]. License: MIT.
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