julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
42 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: decision
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tags: [parking, decisions]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-21
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status: settled
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---
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# Standing Decisions (settled)
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The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-architecture]]
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"Summary of standing decisions".)
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- **Stack:** [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] (Node) · [[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] +
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[[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]]. All MIT/Apache/BSD — **no vendor lock, no rug-pull
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risk** (see [[payload-cms]]). Full table in [[technology-stack]].
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- **Scoped exception (2026-06-15):** the [[opencv-anpr-service]] — a **separate local process**,
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not linked into the app — **may use AGPL** components (plate/vehicle models). The exception is
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bounded to that process; the Node/React app stays strictly MIT/Apache/BSD. See
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[[vision-service]].
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- **Platform:** a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance** (LUKS + GRUB password + Secure Boot),
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**not Windows/WSL** — see [[disk-os-hardening]].
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- **Desktop shell:** the operator UI ships as a **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk wrapper
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(chosen over Electron, 2026-06-21) — small footprint, no bundled Chromium to patch, and a
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deny-by-default native surface that fits [[threat-model|the booth-operator threat model]]. The
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shell stays **thin**: all privileged logic remains in [[fastify]]. One open dependency — the
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appliance's WebKitGTK version (see [[open-questions]] #11).
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- **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-signed event log
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([[append-only-event-chain]]); **[[reconciliation]] is the anti-fraud control**; encryption
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protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
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- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
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([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
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host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
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(The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
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historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
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alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
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- **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
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for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
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[[entry-exit-readers]]).
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Unsettled items live in [[open-questions]].
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