julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
42 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
type: entity
|
|
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, upgrade-path]
|
|
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
|
|
updated: 2026-06-14
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Custom ESP32 Controller (prevention alternative)
|
|
|
|
A small custom controller for **device-level authentication** — a control path that holds even
|
|
against an attacker on the wire. The prevention-grade upgrade from the [[uhppote-controller]]
|
|
(which is only tamper-*evident*). It moves the [[trust-boundary]] to the device. (See
|
|
[[parking-system-architecture]] §7.)
|
|
|
|
## Requirement reframed
|
|
|
|
The threat is **forged or replayed commands**, not eavesdropping ("open lane 2" isn't secret).
|
|
So the essential requirement is **authenticity + freshness (anti-replay)**; encryption is
|
|
optional defence-in-depth. This is implemented as [[challenge-response-auth]].
|
|
|
|
## Hardware
|
|
|
|
- **Olimex ESP32-POE** (wired Ethernet + PoE, open-source hardware) or **ESP32-S3 + W5500**.
|
|
- **[[atecc608]]** secure element holding the key(s), generated on-chip, non-extractable.
|
|
- **Opto-isolated relay** between GPIO and the barrier operator's dry-contact open input.
|
|
- Enable **ESP32 flash encryption + secure boot** regardless.
|
|
- Transport: Ethernet (one network paradigm on the managed switch), or **RS-485** multidrop for
|
|
long/noisy runs.
|
|
|
|
## Safety — treat as seriously as the crypto
|
|
|
|
Governed by [[fail-state-safety]]: **entry fails closed, exit fails open**, a **hardware manual
|
|
override** (key switch) that works with the ESP32 dead, a watchdog with a safe default, and the
|
|
barrier operator still owns physical safety ([[barrier-not-a-door]]).
|
|
|
|
## Trade-offs
|
|
|
|
You take on firmware reliability, EMC/surge protection (TVS diodes, isolation, grounding,
|
|
Ethernet surge arrestor outdoors), and field maintenance. Mitigate by keeping firmware **tiny
|
|
and auditable**: verify a signed fresh command, pulse a relay, watchdog + safe state, nothing
|
|
more. All parking logic stays on the host.
|