julian
bfe64032d8
Turborepo (pnpm workspaces) with all dependencies pinned to latest mutually-compatible versions: turbo 2.9, TypeScript 6, Fastify 5, React 19, Vite 8, better-sqlite3 12 + Drizzle ORM 0.45. Layout: - apps/server Fastify backend (local JWT auth + role guard, /health) - apps/web React 19 + Vite 8 operator SPA - packages/db Drizzle schema on SQLite/WAL; append-only events + users - packages/devices reader/printer/relay adapter interfaces (intent-only relay) - packages/shared shared domain types Architecture constraints from the design wiki are encoded in the scaffold: append-only hash-chained + signed event log, device-agnostic adapters, "a barrier is not a door" (relay expresses intent only), fully-local offline-first auth. wiki/ is an LLM-maintained Obsidian knowledge base (28 pages) ingested from the architecture & design notes, with its own maintenance schema. Verified: pnpm install, full turbo build (5/5), server boots and serves /health, drizzle-kit generates the initial migration.
35 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
35 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
type: entity
|
|
tags: [parking, hardware, access-control, current-choice]
|
|
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
|
|
updated: 2026-06-14
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# UHPPOTE Controller (current choice)
|
|
|
|
The starting access-control hardware: a **UHPPOTE Wiegand 26/34 network controller (4-door)** —
|
|
a cheap reader-plus-relay frontend, acceptable **provided you understand its limits**. The plan
|
|
is UHPPOTE now → ZKTeco later (see [[bom]]). (See [[parking-system-architecture]] §6.)
|
|
|
|
## What it is
|
|
|
|
- Combines reader input ([[wiegand]]) and door relays, with an onboard card list enabling
|
|
**autonomous offline decisions** for Wiegand lanes.
|
|
- Stores an **indexed event log** (see [[event-log-ingestion]]): `get-events` returns the
|
|
stored range + current index; each record has event ID, timestamp, card number, door,
|
|
access-granted flag, reason code. **At the record level it's effectively append-only** — no
|
|
command edits/deletes an individual event.
|
|
|
|
## The catch
|
|
|
|
It speaks the [[uhppote-udp-protocol]]: **UDP port 60000, no auth, no encryption**. Anyone on
|
|
the LAN can open any door — and several unauthenticated commands can blind/reset/skew the log.
|
|
So the device is **tamper-evident, not tamper-proof**, and only trustworthy behind
|
|
[[network-isolation]] (mandatory). **Firmware cannot be customized** — the open-source
|
|
`uhppoted` ecosystem is protocol reverse-engineering only; the controller accepts only the
|
|
manufacturer's official firmware images.
|
|
|
|
Make the log trustworthy via [[event-log-ingestion]] (host-side index tracking) landing into
|
|
the [[append-only-event-chain]]. For prevention-grade authentication, see the
|
|
[[esp32-custom-controller]]. The choice between them is the [[trust-boundary]] decision.
|