julian
c142166972
No secure element is on-site: event signing runs on the software HMAC (EVENT_SIGNING_KEY, an env var on the host disk), so the ledger is tamper-EVIDENT but forgeable by anyone who owns the host. Several pages overstated it as present-tense "ATECC608-signed / unforgeable"; correct them. - NEW concepts/hardware-signer-options.md: four options for a non-extractable signing key (USB HSM / YubiKey / reuse the TPM / plain-dongle trap) + the recommendation (TPM interim → USB-HSM target; ATECC608 stays for the embedded ESP32, wrong part for a PC host). - entities/atecc608.md: UPCOMING-not-present status banner + PC-vs-embedded. - disk-os-hardening.md: fix the live-USB row (BIOS boot-order password is load-bearing, not Secure Boot — a signed live USB runs); add a physical-tamper chain (Dell 7070 CMOS-reset → live-USB → PCR-7 same-signer unseal) + accepted risks (that unseal, unsigned-initramfs evil-maid, operator-USB read TODO). - open-questions #6 reframed; standing-decisions / overview / threat-model / index de-overstated; log query entry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
44 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
44 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
type: decision
|
|
tags: [parking, decisions]
|
|
sources: [parking-system-architecture]
|
|
updated: 2026-06-21
|
|
status: settled
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Standing Decisions (settled)
|
|
|
|
The decisions treated as settled in the design notes. (See [[parking-system-architecture]]
|
|
"Summary of standing decisions".)
|
|
|
|
- **Stack:** [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] (Node) · [[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] +
|
|
[[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]]. All MIT/Apache/BSD — **no vendor lock, no rug-pull
|
|
risk** (see [[payload-cms]]). Full table in [[technology-stack]].
|
|
- **Scoped exception (2026-06-15):** the [[opencv-anpr-service]] — a **separate local process**,
|
|
not linked into the app — **may use AGPL** components (plate/vehicle models). The exception is
|
|
bounded to that process; the Node/React app stays strictly MIT/Apache/BSD. See
|
|
[[vision-service]].
|
|
- **Platform:** a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance** (LUKS + GRUB password + Secure Boot),
|
|
**not Windows/WSL** — see [[disk-os-hardening]].
|
|
- **Desktop shell:** the operator UI ships as a **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk wrapper
|
|
(chosen over Electron, 2026-06-21) — small footprint, no bundled Chromium to patch, and a
|
|
deny-by-default native surface that fits [[threat-model|the booth-operator threat model]]. The
|
|
shell stays **thin**: all privileged logic remains in [[fastify]]. One open dependency — the
|
|
appliance's WebKitGTK version (see [[open-questions]] #11).
|
|
- **Integrity:** append-only, hash-chained, **software-signed** event log
|
|
([[append-only-event-chain]]) — hardware-backed signing (a non-extractable key in the
|
|
**[[tpm|TPM]]** or a **USB HSM**; the [[atecc608]] is [[open-questions|upcoming, not present]]) is
|
|
the target that makes it unforgeable by a host owner ([[hardware-signer-options]]). **[[reconciliation]]
|
|
is the anti-fraud control**; encryption protects only at-rest (see [[threat-model]]).
|
|
- **Access control:** the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller, on an **isolated VLAN**
|
|
([[network-isolation]]). Chosen because its **inputs are decoupled from its relays**, enabling
|
|
host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry — the resolution to [[access-controller-button-flow]].
|
|
(The [[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** — kept as
|
|
historical record. The [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the documented prevention-grade
|
|
alternative — the [[trust-boundary]] fork.)
|
|
- **Readers:** prefer [[wiegand]]-into-controller for permit holders (autonomous); host-in-the-loop
|
|
for [[lpr-camera|LPR]]/QR/pure-network readers; both can share a relay (see
|
|
[[entry-exit-readers]]).
|
|
|
|
Unsettled items live in [[open-questions]].
|