julian
d0536da3d7
Add apps/desktop, a thin Tauri v2 shell wrapping the SAME @parking/web SPA so the desktop and browser UIs never drift: dev loads the Vite dev server (HMR), prod bundles the web app's dist/. No business logic in the shell (device/auth/ ledger stay in @parking/server); deny-by-default capabilities. apps/web (single UI source of truth): - lib/origin.ts: centralize the backend origin (API_BASE/apiUrl/wsUrl from VITE_API_BASE); no-op in the browser, lets the desktop build target Fastify. - lib/kiosk.ts: block the right-click context menu in PROD only (dev keeps it + devtools). - lib/desktop-updater.ts: prompt-on-update auto-update (no-op in browser/offline) → downloadAndInstall + relaunch; i18n update.* keys (sq+en). - .env.production: VITE_API_BASE wired to the Fastify origin for the bundle. Desktop: - window starts maximized (not fullscreen — operator keeps OS access). - auto-update via tauri-plugin-updater + -process; self-hosted endpoint is a PLACEHOLDER to fill in. Updater keypair: pubkey embedded in tauri.conf.json; private key + password kept OUTSIDE the repo (~/.parking-updater-keys) and as TAURI_SIGNING_* build secrets. - Turbo build is a no-op; the real signed bundle is `pnpm --filter @parking/desktop bundle` (verified → .deb/.rpm/.AppImage + .sig signatures). Verified: cargo check clean; turbo run build lint 14/14 green; i18n parity holds; no key/sig/bundle artifacts in the repo. Wiki (security + desktop analysis recorded alongside): - new concepts/tpm.md (TPM 2.0: how it works, sealed-LUKS auto-unlock + non- extractable signing key, limits — live-root, bus-sniff — TPM-vs-ATECC608 by platform). - new decisions/desktop-shell-tauri.md (Tauri v2 over Electron; best-case Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, worst-case Windows+WSL → kiosk browser; full as-built). - pull-the-disk attack trace on append-only-event-chain; ATECC608 not-in-a-PC caveat; cross-links from disk-os-hardening / threat-model. - open-questions #11 (appliance WebKitGTK), #12 (TPM hardening impl), #13 (startup verifyChain self-check); index/overview/log/standing-decisions. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xcm6ikLgGoCxxHrxtjkk5V
55 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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type: overview
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tags: [parking, overview, synthesis]
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sources: [parking-system-architecture]
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updated: 2026-06-21
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---
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# Parking System — Overview
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The synthesis / entry point for this wiki. Start here, then follow links. Catalog of every page:
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[[index]]. Source summaries: [[parking-system-architecture]].
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## What it is
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A **parking-management web application** running on a **dedicated, hardened Linux appliance**
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deployed on-site at a parking facility. Two forces shape nearly every decision:
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1. **[[offline-first]]** — a park may be air-gapped; nothing core may depend on a network.
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2. **[[threat-model]]** — the primary adversary is the **legitimate operator at the booth**, not
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an outsider. The classic fraud is *take the cash, delete the record.*
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## The architecture in one pass
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- **Stack** ([[technology-stack]] / [[standing-decisions]]): [[turborepo]] · [[fastify]] ·
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[[react-vite-spa]] · [[sqlite]] + [[drizzle-orm]] · [[local-jwt-auth]] — all open-licensed to
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avoid lock-in (cf. rejected [[payload-cms]], [[refine]], [[logto-zitadel-oidc]]). The operator UI
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ships as a thin **[[desktop-shell-tauri|Tauri v2]]** kiosk shell (chosen over Electron).
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- **Integrity** is the heart of it: an [[append-only-event-chain]] (hash-chained, [[atecc608]]-
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signed) plus external [[reconciliation]] — *that's* what remote sync really is. Encryption at
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rest ([[disk-os-hardening]]) defends a secondary threat.
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- **Devices** sit behind a [[device-adapter-pattern]] (swap hardware → new adapter only), with
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the [[barrier-not-a-door]] safety principle keeping physical safety in barrier-operator firmware.
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- **Access control** today is the **[[dingtian-relay]]** relay+input controller behind
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[[network-isolation]] — chosen because its inputs are **decoupled from its relays**, enabling
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host-in-the-loop ticket-first entry (resolving [[access-controller-button-flow]]). The
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[[uhppote-controller]] and [[zkteco-controller]] were evaluated and **rejected** (historical).
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The deeper fork is still the [[trust-boundary]] ([[uhppote-vs-esp32|detection vs. prevention]]);
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the [[esp32-custom-controller]] remains the prevention-grade alternative.
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- **Readers** split two ways ([[entry-exit-readers]]): permit holders via [[wiegand]]
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(autonomous), casual/transient via host-side [[lpr-camera]] / QR; both can share a relay.
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- A reference [[bom]] lists recommended devices.
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## Where it stands
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6 [[open-questions]] still drive procurement — most critically **lane topology**, **failure
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modes (fail-open on exit)**, the **reconciliation channel**, and **backup/durability**.
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## Reading paths
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- *Security-first:* [[threat-model]] → [[append-only-event-chain]] → [[reconciliation]] →
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[[uhppote-vs-esp32]].
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- *Hardware-first:* [[bom]] → [[dingtian-relay]] → [[access-controller-button-flow]] →
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[[entry-exit-readers]].
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- *Stack-first:* [[technology-stack]] → [[offline-first]] → [[device-adapter-pattern]].
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